FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 27 JULY 1949 No. 4

THE IDEOLOGICAL COMBAT

By Geroid Tanquary Robinson

THE United States is facing the crisis of 1949 with the military equipment of 1950 and the ideological equipment of 1775. America was well armed, philosophically, for the early conflicts with the parliamentary monarchism of Britain and the reactionary absolutism of Metternich. In those times we were able to make the Europeans and the Latin Americans understand us clearly, because we understood ourselves. But between the day of the Monroe Doctrine and the day of the Truman Doctrine, vast changes have taken place in American life. Many of these changes are, or have appeared to be, in conflict with the testament of the Founding Fathers. It can be argued that a revised philosophy is implicit in the major developments of the last half-century; but if this is so, the efforts to make this philosophy explicit have had but poor success. American theory has lagged far behind American practice; often it has seemed that without benefit of philosophy, we are backing tail-first into the future. For our own guidance at home and abroad, and for the enlightenment and inspiration of our neighbors overseas in this new age of conflict, we need to know what kind of country this is and where it is going.

As matters stand, the Europeans must have great difficulty in making us out, when they look this way. For example, the French probably understand well enough what kind of Germany the Russians want; but do the French understand what kind of Germany America wants? Are we sure about this ourselves? Until the time comes when we can speak out of a clear philosophy, the voice of America is bound to be muffled and confused.

It is painful, but it is also very salutary, that in this time of transition the Communists are forcing us to take stock of our position. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the great

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majority of our people found themselves in conflict with parliamentary-monarchist theory and with British power. That theory and that power had a strong loyalist following in the American colonies; the crisis here was both domestic and foreign, and out of it came the great burst of creative energy that formulated our early philosophy and established the republic. From that time until the end of World War II, this country did not again experience such a simultaneous domestic and foreign crisis; there was no substantial following within the United States for the power of the Holy Alliance, or of Kaiser William, or of Hitler, or for the philosophies that were represented by these powers. But today we are involved in a crisis both at home and abroad: a rival Power and its official philosophy have expanded threateningly in Europe and Asia, and have gained significant support within the United States. This dual crisis must be met by a reëxamination of our position and a renewal of our pattern of thought.

Seldom if ever in history has a social philosophy been at one and the same time so clearly formulated, so generally accepted as an ideal, and so widely realized in practice, as in America in the first half of the nineteenth century. The new state had arisen out of a revolution against too much government (a "tyranny" that was mild indeed, as compared with the full-blown dictatorships of our own time); and in the pursuit of small trade, small crafts, and above all small farming, a very large proportion of the citizens of the new republic could exercise a great measure of control over their own daily activities, and work out for themselves a substantial measure of what they regarded as the good life.

The typical citizen could be, and wanted above all to be, not so much a participant in any collective as an independent and self-directing individual. This attitude is perfectly reflected in the fact that the first amendments to the Constitution (combining to provide an essentially negative bill of rights, and guaranteeing all citizens against certain forms of interference by the state) were adopted, on popular demand, long before the positive right of participation in the state power was extended to the masses of the (male) citizens through the broadening of the suffrage. Even with this extension of the rights of active citizenship, the increasing popular participation in government was not directed so much toward getting the government to assume new responsibilities as toward checking and restricting the government in its powers and functions. The dominant attitude toward govern-

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ment was essentially negative: decentralization, democracy and individualism were the controlling elements of faith and action — and individualism was easily the most significant of these, in the daily life of most Americans.

When President Monroe warned the monarchs of Europe, in 1823, against "any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere," both European monarchists and Latin American republicans were reasonably clear as to the system that we on our part would foster and promote, by precept and example if not by other means, in the Western World.

As time passed, the clarity of the American position was somewhat obscured by the expansion of slavery; but at a prodigious cost that institution was abolished, and democracy, decentralization and individualism still remained the essence of American faith and practice. In abolishing slavery, the Civil War prolonged the dominant American tradition; but at the same time the war promoted two other trends that were in conflict with that tradition. For one thing, the necessities of battle required an unwonted concentration of power in the federal government, and the use of that power to accomplish ends desired by the majority of the people certainly did much to diminish the popular suspicion of political power as such. Again, the demands of the armies drove industry forward under forced draft, along a path of quantitative expansion and qualitative change that seems even today to have no end.

Measured in terms of the old American philosophy, by far the most important change that has taken place in American life since the 1860's is not the vast increase in the output of goods (with the accompanying rise in the standard of living), but the shrinkage of individual self-direction in the productive process. This change affected industry first and most profoundly, but more recently it has been extending its effects to agriculture also. Generally, machine industry seems to require that men work in masses and under discipline. For decades now the trend has been to concentrate production in enterprises of increasing size, and to develop and tighten the control of the work-process within each such enterprise: "The technical character of the apparatus itself demands an iron discipline; the movements of the workman must be timed exactly to the movements of the machine."

If large-scale mechanized enterprise is a comparatively recent development in the field of agriculture, it is chiefly the fault of

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the tilt of the planet: the succession of the seasons requires that each year a number of different types of work shall be done, not simultaneously, but one after another. In nearly all types of manufacture, on the other hand, the work may be split into a number of specialized processes, all of which can operate continuously; and this means, of course, that in industry the various types of specialized machines can be employed steadily throughout the year. The agricultural cycle makes this kind of continuous, parallel operation impossible; generally speaking, the farmer's specialized machines can be used each season for a short time only, and in succession (for example, the gang plow, the seeder, the harvester, the thresher). Thus, much of the fixed capital in mechanized agriculture is bound to be idle for a large part of each year. Yet in spite of all this, the development of large-scale mechanized farms is now proceeding at a rapid rate.

Obviously, only a very limited number of Americans can operate and direct large-scale enterprises in the field of industry and agriculture. Obviously, too, the great and increasing proportion of our people who work in these enterprises are no longer the independent, self-directing Americans of the old philosophy.

These changes that have taken place in recent decades are the source of most of the material power that America now possesses. But they are the source, too, of nearly all of our confusion as to what kind of country this is and ought to be, and as to how its great power ought best to be employed.

II

With the change in character and the expansion in scale of economic enterprise, millions of once independent craftsmen and farmers have become disciplined machine tenders in industry, and have suffered thereby a very fundamental loss. And now a large part of those who continue to work in agriculture may be entering upon a similar change, involving a similar loss.

In a half-century of hasty improvisation, Big Government has developed as in some sense an offset to Big Enterprise — a new system of national checks and balances. Big Government was to do for the citizen some of the things that he no longer could do for himself. Some think that what the individual has lost to Big Enterprise and Big Government has been made good, or could be, by a rising level of consumption and a shorter working day. Yet it is doubtful whether many thoughtful Americans have

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come to believe seriously that a man's loss of independence and self-direction as a producer can be compensated by high wages and more free time in which to spend the pay-check. Conscience is still at work here; a deep sense of values is involved — a sense of what it takes to make the full man. The devotional words in the American vocabulary have not yet become "abundance and leisure;" they are still "freedom," "liberty," "independence," "self-confidence," "self-determination," "individual initiative" — all words that are drawn from the old philosophy. These words are not mere forms; they are the expression of a warm and deep conviction. What is lacking is any clear idea as to how, and even whether, these values can be preserved in a machine age. Gone, certainly, is any foundation for the belief that if things are left to take their own course, some sort of law of nature will preserve the values of individualism. The dominant trend of the time, in economy and in government, is undoubtedly in the direction of discipline and dependence for the citizen. But is that trend inevitable; is it destined to be all inclusive; or can it be radically modified by taking thought?

The idea of freedom has a vast appeal. One of the strange and startling evidences of this is the fact that freedom is still presented as the ultimate goal of one of the most authoritarian societies that has ever existed on the planet — the Soviet Union. Marx and Engels saw the society of the future as "a free association of individuals" where production would be organized "on the basis of a free and equal association of producers," and where "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." This last phrase appeared in the Communist Manifesto, and the Marxians have therefore had one hundred and one years to work out a convincing plan for the promised transition from the promised revolutionary dictatorship to the promised free society that is said to lie beyond. Yet in the massive Marxian literature, which lays down detailed plans, in advance, for the establishment of dictatorship, there are only the ghostliest suggestions as to how dictatorship is to be disestablished and freedom brought into being.

There has been some tendency to excuse this Communist neglect, on the ground that that which is inevitable does not have to be planned — though this reasoning would seem to make planning for dictatorship quite as superfluous as planning for the free society to come after. If the excuse of inevitability ever had any

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validity, in terms of the Communist logic, that validity has been destroyed by several decades of Russian Communist revisionism (a word that the Communists detest, but a process in which they have been engaged, nonetheless). In the course of this process, they have arrived at what might be called a theory of selective inevitability: non-Communists are obliged by the laws of social development to do the self-destroying things that the Communists want them to do, while the Communists are held to be comparatively free to do the self-serving things that *they* want to do. Of course this leaves the Communist Utopia about as little inevitable as anything could possibly be; and it is one of the most valid criticisms of Communism that it has still produced so little on the subject of its own goal.

In our own society, there is not a shadow of an excuse for failure to maintain and develop an adequate philosophy of ends and means. Without some such guidance, what are we to do, for example, with the grain combine and the mechanical cotton-picker? What are we to do with the wealth of electric power that our rivers can produce? What are we to do with the vast potentialities that atomic energy may offer for the alteration of American life? It is dangerous in the extreme simply to extemporize piecemeal answers at the moment when such practical questions happen to come along.

The more we believe in freedom, the more we need to plan for it — even to plan how to avoid over-planning. And broad planning is impossible, except in terms of a philosophy.

III

Our principal weakness today is not economic or military but ideological — not a matter of goods or guns, but of ideas. This is our chief weakness abroad, precisely because it is our chief weakness at home. It is not piecemeal answers that inspire men in "their finest hour;" it is a total conception of the good life — a conception that has some valid connection with their experience and some valid promise of a fuller realization in the future. Such a conception provides guidance, and inspires maximum effort. But it is startling how often (for example, in "orientation courses" for our soldiers, or in broadcasts to countries overseas) we have felt obliged to turn back a hundred and fifty years and more (to such documents as the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the State Bills of Rights, the first

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amendments to the Federal Constitution, the writings of the Founding Fathers) for quotable and generally accepted formulations of an American philosophy — formulations still sound and valid in many ways, but by themselves inadequate for our time.

In this situation, there is urgent need for philosophic reconstruction and renewal. This undertaking has some resemblance, on the one hand, to that of the *philosophes* of the French Encyclopaedia, and on the other, to that of the authors of the Declaration of Independence, the Virginia Bill of Rights, or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. All these monumental achievements were products of collaboration, and a somewhat similar collaborative effort would give the best promise of meeting our present need — a task for philosophers, in all the eighteenth-century breadth and richness of that term.

Many of the building materials for a philosophic reconstruction are at hand, though in vast disorder. Time presses for results that can be presented, under the finest auspices, to our people and to people overseas. Is it an idle dream that a group of qualified men might sit down together, for a year, or two years, or whatever time it would take, to produce tentative results on two levels: first, to distill and clarify the philosophy that is now embodied piecemeal in American life — to say what America *now is;* and second (a far more difficult task) to consider the adequacy of this philosophy for the future — to suggest what America *might become?*

It will be said that what is suggested here is an attempt to produce an official American philosophy, even possibly a compulsory one, and that the entire proposal is therefore essentially un-American; but on the contrary, the procedure suggested is entirely unofficial (though if it succeeds, the government will ultimately be affected); and as to uniformity and compulsion, the objective sought is only some such level of voluntary and conscious agreement as the country attained in the early decades of the republic — when sharp and healthy differences were of course abundant. However, the main emphasis in this paper is upon a fundamental need; if that need is once felt, in all its urgency, a way will be found of meeting it.

The proposed discussion might perhaps be made to revolve around one single proposition: that the end and aim of society and the state ought to be the nurture and wide propagation of a certain kind of man — the independent and self-directing indi-

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vidual. This proposition is rich in difficulties and rich in promise, and the chief business of the remaining pages of this article will be to examine, very tentatively, a few of the pertinent debits and credits.

IV

Before the Civil War, American political philosophy and American law were in a considerable measure negative in their emphasis; they were concerned largely with the protection of the individual against interference by other individuals, and particularly against interference by the state. Basic to all this was a fundamental theory which accorded in large measure with the conditions of American life at the time — the theory that if a minimum of negative protection were provided, the individual could and would be able to fend for himself and to stand up on his own feet as an independent and self-directing personality.

For the period since the Civil War, and especially for the years since the great crash of 1929, there is a vast mass of new evidence, on the levels of both fact and theory. In vital and economic statistics, in laws and court decisions, in the programs of organized labor, of organized farmers, and of both political parties, in the declarations of the New Deal and the Fair Deal, in the proposals respecting human rights presented by the United States to the United Nations, evidence will be found of the diminishing importance of small-scale undertakings, of the wholesale development of large private enterprise, of the vast expansion of governmental activity — and of the coexistence of three sets of ideas which correspond in some degree with the three sets of facts just mentioned. The first of these sets of ideas constitutes the old and well-formulated philosophy of individualism, which persists from the early decades of the republic; the second is the doctrine of competitive capitalism, now badly crisscrossed and confused by ideas favorable to large combinations of capital and even to monopoly; the third is a jumble of all sorts of notions centering largely on the achievement of mass objectives through the agency of the state. These three sets of ideas overlap, compete and conflict, in a bewildering variety of ways, but in recent years the victories have gone most of all to the ideas that are least systematic of all — those of the new stateism. In this growth of a more positive attitude toward government, the United States already shares to a limited degree in a trend that is much farther advanced in

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Britain and in Western Europe — the trend toward Democratic Socialism — and in this, some basis might be found for a common understanding with these European countries. Indeed, it appears that if the voice of America should speak in terms of the new stateism, the majority of our European neighbors would understand us fairly well. But is this trend toward Democratic Socialism predetermined, here and abroad? If the question lies within the range of conscious and deliberate choice, has that choice been taken by our people? Or is the decision still to be made?

It has been suggested that the chief business of society and the state ought to be the nurture of independent and self-directing individuals. Not only under Communism, but in a lesser degree under Socialism and capitalism as well, the trend of the times would seem to be rather in the opposite direction — but is that trend inevitable?

Something of a case can be made for the idea that the major movements of historical change are not specifically inevitable, but that there exists at any given time a certain variety of possibilities and a certain range of free selection. Most men, when they are faced with specific personal situations, have the feeling of being restricted within certain limits, and at the same time the feeling of being free and self-directed within those limitations; the one feeling appears to have exactly as much validity as the other. It is certainly true that many major historical trends have not been, as such, the subject of conscious choice on the part of the millions of men whose lives are affected by them; and such trends therefore have the appearance of being "inevitable." Yet it is arguable that this appearance is superficial, and that each "inevitable" trend is in part the result of innumerable individual choices in matters of detail — choices made freely, within limits, by men who neither foresee nor desire the major result to which they are thus themselves contributing.

Probably most of our people would agree that there is a great and irreducible difference between a society that attaches primary importance to the independence and self-determination of the individual, and a society that is built essentially on the discipline and dependence of a large majority of its members. If faced with a broad choice between the former society and the latter, most of our people would almost certainly choose the former. Not only that, but they would be prepared to make great sacrifices in support of their choice. Yet the choice hardly presents

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itself in this form, but rather in the form of innumerable opportunities to make minor decisions which cumulate (in obscurity) to produce the great decision.

One of the minor choices which is offered an innumerable number of times is the choice between a less efficient method of production and a more efficient one (efficiency being measured here exclusively in terms of output). "Technology solves its problems with a beautiful perfection; it offers self-evident and self-demonstrating truth; its contributions have an immediate value that usually wins acceptance without argument." It is essentially the character of the tools, rather than the character of their ownership, that produces mass organization and mass discipline in an industrial society; in both Pittsburgh and Magnitogorsk, the forces of technology operate to this end. Technological advance tends not only to require mass organization and mass discipline within each plant, but to produce an increasingly complex web of connections between plant and plant, region and region; and both by disciplining the worker on the job and by surrounding him with forces and problems with which he feels unable to deal, machine industry seems to prepare the worker to appeal to the state for help, and to accept the discipline of the state. In a society that is to a significant extent industrialized, people who are not themselves subjected to the disciplinary training of machine work are nevertheless faced with the vast complexities of a machine-based culture; and more and more they too tend to turn to the state for help. The line of descent is clear: technology is the father of Great Enterprise and the grandfather of Great Government.

V

Today there is hardly a man in the United States who does not believe that within recent decades it has become necessary for the Government to do much more for the people than it did a hundred years ago. Yet there still persists here, and perhaps much more vigorously here than in any other great country, a vigorous individualism and a strong and wholesome fear of all great concentrations of power, whether in private or public hands. If the fundamental objective were agreed upon, and kept steadily in mind — the nurture of a certain kind of man — might there not be hope of at least a partial reconciliation of the old individualism with the new stateism of today? Could not the

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beginnings of a reconciliation be made by recognizing as fundamental the difference between government action which is designed to build up the independence and self-sufficiency of the individual citizen, and government action which tends to establish permanent discipline and dependence? The government policy that contributes to the desired type of personality may be either negative or positive, depending on the nature of the concrete problem involved in each particular case. The suggested test of policy is the contribution that it makes to the desired end — not some abstract theory that state action as such is either good or bad. In many instances, the test would be exceedingly difficult to apply in practice; but in our time the suggested principle might prove far more valuable as a guide to action than either the pure (and now unattainable) individualism of the horse-and-buggy past, or the indiscriminate stateism that may well be in the making for the future.

If the recent history of American government swarms with conflicting actions that contribute sometimes to individualism and sometimes to a cumulative stateism, it is partly because of a lack of understanding of the effect that given concrete measures will produce, but still more because of obscurity and indecision respecting the major end to be sought. A vast confusion lies hidden within such terms as the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the welfare state, the social-service state.

If the major objective of society and the state were the nurture and propagation of independent and responsible individuals, the method of production that yields the maximum in goods would not necessarily be the method to be preferred. If personality is the end, the maximizing of production is desirable in the degree in which it serves that end, and in that degree only. The interest of the producers, as well as that of the consumers, must be considered: the adoption of a new technique may result in a larger output of goods, but in human terms this advantage may be more than offset by the damaging conditions which the new technique imposes upon the worker. If the producer feels strongly enough about it, he may refuse to accept mechanization and consolidation, or he may insist upon some humane compromise; and in this fight for life, the state may give him invaluable support if the nature of the issue is widely understood and the democratic process is effectively employed.

All this is not simply a set of speculations, afloat in the air; it

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rests on millions of items of evidence. The chief surviving centers of fundamental self-determination in America today are the individual farm and the individual household. The vigorous persistence of these institutions as centers of production is of course due in part to inertia and in part to special technical situations; in the case of the household, it is obviously due in some degree also to the ties of the family. But for anyone who wants to consider it, there is a great mass of evidence that this persistence is also due, in part, to the deliberate choice of innumerable human beings who *prefer* to cook their own meals and to sow and harvest their own crops. It is a primary fact that hundreds of millions of people, in this country and in other countries, *want* to make their own decisions, on the land, and that still larger numbers *want* the home to be something much more than a biological bedroom. If this were not the case, large-scale farming and barracks living would have developed far more rapidly than they have to date.

The spirit of independence in these two institutions is so powerful that even the greatest of the dictatorships has had to compromise with it. Soviet Russia never succeeded in developing communal living to any great dimensions. Again, the mass of Soviet agriculture is not organized in the ideal Communist pattern (the great state farm, or "grain factory") but in small peasant collectives which have in a limited degree the aspect of producers' coöperatives, and leave the peasant a little less subject to authority than is the worker in Soviet industry.

Government may act, in America, not to destroy but to save the individual farm and the individual household. Government loans may aid in the purchase or building of homes. Government hydroelectric plants may help to maintain the economic significance of the household by supplying power to thousands of electric ranges, dish washers and washing machines. Government loans may help to establish and maintain individual farms, as may government projects for irrigation and drainage; and in some cases the dams and canals may themselves be transferred in the course of time to the farmers of the community. Government loans on the most liberal terms may be made available to groups of small farmers, for investment in large and complex machines which no one of these farmers could purchase independently or employ economically; and these machines may then be used, up to their capacity, on one farm after another, within the coöperating group. These farms, so operated, may not be quite so effi-

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cient as large mechanized farms with hired labor; but through an entirely voluntary association, with state assistance, the participating farmers will have salvaged a large measure of the life that they want, and democratic society will have preserved in active form some of the individualistic spirit that it must have to survive.

There is no reason given in the law of nature why the new mechanical cotton-picker must run wild through the agriculture of the South, converting millions of independent cultivators into day laborers; men made this machine, and men can control it, if they know what it is that they want and have the will to act. If men ran from the enemy in battle, as they run from "inevitable economic trends," where would bombed London be today?

In industry the path is much more obscure than in agriculture; it is in industry that the advantages of mechanization and consolidation are most apparent, and it is here, of course, that mass organization and mass discipline have advanced at maximum speed. But even here a path might perhaps be found, if it were once recognized that the most important end-product of the industrial system is not a certain quantity of goods but a certain quality of personality. This is a problem that cannot be solved simply in terms of maximizing the output of goods and raising the general level of consumption. In an industrialized society, it requires also that a substantial proportion of those engaged in machine production shall maintain some degree of individuality and self-direction within the work process itself. Perhaps there is no solution for this problem; perhaps the age of robots is upon us. But one may believe that the current trend is in that direction and still refuse to accept the outcome as inevitable.

Consider, for example, the possibilities for the future that may lie hidden in the employment of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. If the output of goods alone is considered, this new source of power may only strengthen the prevailing trend toward concentration, mass organization and mass discipline — under either private or public direction. But if some thought is given to the making of men, as well as the making of goods, a quite different result is conceivable. "The unique mobility of atomic fuel," the ease of transporting such material, may perhaps make possible the establishment of small and widely scattered prime movers, to generate and distribute cheap electric power to innumerable industrial undertakings of the smallest size. Under such conditions,

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a share of industrial production could be recaptured by village shops, and even by farmers working with small power machines in the winter season.

However, it goes without saying that under any conceivable condition much of the work of industry cannot possibly be decentralized in this way, but must be carried on in large plants, by large groups of interdependent machines and large forces of operatives. It is here that the problem of maintaining the individuality of the worker arises in its most acute form. The issue cannot be reduced to an immediate conflict over wages and hours, and an ultimate conflict over the ownership of the machines. These are matters of enormous importance, but concentration on them, to the exclusion of the work process itself, is evidence of intellectual poverty on the part of all concerned. Even if nationalization should solve all the problems of maximum output and equitable distribution (it is doubtful indeed that it could), it might still leave the work of production a deforming and deadly routine. There is reason to believe that state management might well tighten this routine. The problem of humanizing the work process in machine industry is one for which no one has yet found an adequate solution; but perhaps the most hopeful prospect lies in the development of labor participation in management, with special emphasis on the smallest functional division of the plant, where the issues are simplest and the worker is best able to deal with them (a Jeffersonian principle in a new setting). Such arrangements, coupled with piece-rate wages and profit-sharing, might do something to give the individual worker a sense of vital participation in the day's work. But no such system as this will develop widely unless the workers press for it earnestly, and unless the managers and owners welcome the compromise and help to bring it into vigorous life.

If in the machine age the philosophy of individualism is to be preached, with full effect, to our people, the practice of individualism must be accessible to them — even in the factory.

VI

The Soviet Union is challenging the United States to renew and develop for our time the magnificent inheritance of western individualism — an inheritance that has come to us out of the faith and morals of Christianity, the rationalism of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the English gift for compromise,

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the liberty of the democratic revolutions, and the ancestral independence of the farms and shops and homes of America.

If this renewal can be brought about, our people will feel a new strength and a new sense of purpose and direction. This country can have again, in Europe, an even greater moral influence than it had a century and a half ago; perhaps it can even extend that influence to Asia and Africa, where Communism ought not to be the only accessible philosophy of change, in societies that have got to be remade.

If we can first learn it, we can teach the new individualism overseas by precept, and above all by example. We can encourage it by special forms of economic aid and by the temperate use of our influence with foreign governments. But for the advancement of this cause, force is a doubtful and dangerous instrument. No man can be compelled by force to think and live as an individualist; but certainly men can be forced to live as Communists, and the blackest danger of all is that in time (where all the modern armament of indoctrination and suppression is in the hands of the Party) men can probably be forced not only to live but to *think* as Communists.

The individualist is powerfully tempted to try by force to dash these instruments of indoctrination and suppression from the hands of the dictators; but he knows, too, the danger to individualism of war-discipline at home, and the measureless difficulty of bringing his philosophy to life abroad after another great conflict. In this dilemma, he will hardly initiate the use of force, and only as a last resort will he respond with force to such an initiative. Certainly he can have no easy answer to the problem of our relations with the Soviet Union; yet he would feel that we must press consistently one policy or the other: "Live and let live," or "Kill or be killed." On balance, he would say that for years to come we should strive to maintain a predominance of power, while at the same time attempting through a long series of adjustments of current issues to convince the veiled prophets of the Kremlin that compromise and stabilization, not crisis and conflict, can set the norm of our relations. Even against the light of their revelation, we might possibly convert them thus, in the long run, into nonpractising World Revolutionists.

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INDIA AS A WORLD POWER

By an Indian Official

THOUGH the Indian Union is an infant state, India is no newcomer to history, no offshoot or colony newly risen to nationhood. She is a mother country, venerable in her own right; and her past, which is ancient as civilization, belongs to the essence of man's achievement on this planet. Nor has India lain broken and buried under the tides of history for so long that, in her reëmergence, she is a mere vestige of her former self. Measured against the millennia that went before, the two centuries of British rule formed only a brief, if critical, interlude. Now that is over, and India steps once more with unimpaired vigor into the main stream of human affairs.

Not only history, but India's geographical position, the idealism of her national movement, and the personality and teachings of Gandhi have combined to give her the distinctive place she holds in men's minds today. Standing midway between the east and west in more senses than one, she is, in terms of population, the largest single political unit in the world. Her initiative in calling the Delhi Conference on Indonesia in January 1949 brought together and successfully coördinated on an important question the views of a number of nations which had never met before as a separate group. And her leaders have behind them a lifetime of devoted public work with Gandhi, under whose guidance India turned a political campaign into a moral exercise on a national scale.

It is not easy to fit in Gandhi's teachings with any of the current social philosophies. As against the abstractions of the various "isms," he pleaded for attention to the elementary needs of humanity and enjoined a method of action and an attitude of mind and spirit as the necessary preconditions of clear sight and right judgment. He reiterated the most ancient ethical precepts, but he gave them meaning in terms of practical action and deduced from them social ideals which continue to be the inspiration of the great political party that he led to its goal.

The free India that came to birth on August 15, 1947, the India that acclaims Gandhi as the "Father of the Nation," has been largely preoccupied, so far, with problems arising from the conditions in which freedom was achieved.

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Independence brought with it partition, and partition was the outcome of communalism. In India, in the last phase of British rule, communalism had developed into the demand for a "Moslem state," backed with the contention that Hindus and Moslems constituted separate nations. Gandhi during all his life had resisted this disruptive doctrine and striven for harmony between the communities. Partition itself was brought about by mutual consent. Even in the best of circumstances, the divisions and readjustments it involved would have caused some dislocation. As it happened, the long agitation that preceded it had inflamed communal fanaticism, particularly in the Punjab; and the intercommunal strife that broke out in that province thrust upon the new state a multiplicity of urgent and unforeseen problems. The prompt restoration of order was perhaps the least formidable of them all. In its wake came the immense task of organizing, within a few weeks, the movement of no less than 6,000,000 refugees, of improvising arrangements for their immediate relief, and devising plans for their permanent resettlement and rehabilitation. When was a "refugee problem" of this magnitude set before an untried government in the very first days of its existence and solved with equal expedition and success?

Besides surmounting this crisis, India has also had to undo the "partitions" effected a hundred years ago which had turned the land into a checkerboard of independent Princely States. More than 550 of them, varying from units of the size of the United Kingdom to hundreds of states each with an area less than ten square miles, were scattered over the peninsula. The internal frontiers that they raised — artificial in most cases — divided peoples who were otherwise homogeneous in every respect. There was never any social or economic justification for this arrangement, and nationalism had expressed itself as a popular movement within each state for the termination of autocratic rule and union with the rest of India. The political *raison d'être* for these hundreds of subservient enclaves disappeared with the disappearance of the imperial system in 1947, but the orderly liquidation of the powerful dynastic interests involved was a task as delicate as it was essential to the peaceful progress of India.

Constitutionally, the Viceroy had provided the link between the states *inter se,* as also between the states as a whole and the rest of India. When this nexus was broken, an indeterminate

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situation arose which might have caused endless trouble and disorder. The new Government, however, succeeded within a remarkably short time in obtaining the "accession," for defense, foreign affairs and communications, of all but a few of the states whose territories were enclosed by or contiguous with those of the Indian Dominion. By this means the Union Government resumed some of the powers formerly comprised in the concept of paramountcy, but the territorial fragmentation and the despotic personal rule remained as before. Since then, however, through patient negotiations and persuasion, these basic evils have also been practically eliminated. Except in a few cases, the states have all been either merged with the adjacent provinces or grouped together into larger units or sub-federations within the Indian Union. Simultaneously with this process of territorial reintegration, a fundamental change has been brought about peacefully in the internal structure of the states as a result of which representative and responsible governments have in all of them superseded the previous personal régimes.

II

In the two largest states, Kashmir and Hyderabad, the transition has been prolonged and complicated by the injection, from within as well as outside, of the communal issue. When the two new Dominions were created, the National Conference in Kashmir — a popular and predominantly Moslem, though politically non-communal movement, which had for many years striven for democracy in the state — took the view that a settlement of the question of Kashmir's relations with India and Pakistan should be deferred until such time as a popular and freely elected government in Kashmir was able to consider it. But the tribal incursions and the invasion by Pakistan nationals and the Pakistan Army in the autumn of 1947 precipitated a decision, and the National Conference as well as the ruler of the state separately applied to accede to India. Seeing especially the urgency of extending protection to the populace against the lawless depredations of the hostile forces, India accepted the accession, but stipulated that it should be confirmed by means of a plebiscite after the restoration of peace. As is well known, the dispute with Pakistan was subsequently referred, on India's initiative, to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Hyderabad, unlike Kashmir, is not a frontier state. It lies

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within the heart of India, surrounded completely by Indian Union territory. For social and economic, no less than for political and geographical reasons, an independent Hyderabad pursuing policies at variance with those of India would be as intolerable and dangerous an anomaly as an independent Kansas or Missouri in the United States. Hyderabad has therefore throughout its history been subordinate to the strongest power in India, the British, or the Mahrattas and the Moguls.

The attempt to reach a negotiated settlement with Hyderabad — as the Union Government had reached with the other states — was repeatedly foiled by a communal faction, the *Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen,* which had seized control of the state. To remain passive, in the hope that time would produce a solution, was to let the *Ittehad,* in a state where the population was predominantly non-Moslem, continue the rabidly communal campaign in which it was engaged, employing terrorist gangs and instigating hatred between the communities. India was not disturbed by the foolish threats that were being broadcast against her, but there was a real danger that communal disorders, spreading over Hyderabad, might break out all over India. Rather than permit, through its inaction, the occurrence of a tragedy much graver than the Punjab massacres of the previous year, the Union Government thereupon reluctantly decided to move its armed forces into the state.

The Union Government, like the national movement of which it is a product, has consistently opposed all manifestations of communalism and communal fanaticism. It has not lacked the will or the strength to deal sternly with both Hindu and Sikh communalists. It is determined that India shall not be a communal state, but a secular state, as it is, with a mixed population belonging to all religions. Its Moslem citizens, numbering approximately 40,000,000, enjoy equal rights with non-Moslems and occupy some of the highest and most vital positions in the state. Pakistan, too, has a mixed population, including a considerable proportion of non-Moslems; but Pakistan owes her origin to communalism, and the communal orientation has continued to color her policies. For communal reasons, there has been interference in Indian affairs — armed intervention in Kashmir (on the ground that the population is mostly Moslem), and diplomatic and political intervention in Hyderabad (because the dominant ruling minority there was Moslem).

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In spite of these adverse factors, the bitterness aroused by the partition and its attendant disorders has gradually subsided. Frequent and friendly consultations have been held, and agreement has been reached on a wide variety of subjects. Hyderabad, under a régime that will become increasingly democratic, has ceased to be fit material for exploitation for communal purposes; and tension over Kashmir, the main outstanding subject in dispute, has greatly relaxed.

Thus although the new India got off to a somewhat shaky start, she has in less than two years magnificently recovered and stabilized herself. Political Cassandras foresaw chaos as the sequel to partition and the departure of the British. Intercommunal strife, on the one hand, and the ambitions of a multitude of sovereign princes, on the other, they feared, would rend India and keep the sub-continent in turmoil for years to come. These prognostications have been proven false. India is stronger and more united than ever. Partition, no doubt, meant a "loss," among other things, of territory and population. On the other hand, there has been a "gain" (other than national freedom) in that, through bloodless revolution, territories and populations that had for a century or more remained apart have reunited with India. Considering that they account for 48 percent of the total territory and 27 percent of the total population of the Dominion, this is no small achievement. There are no longer "two Indias" — the provinces and the states — but one India — the Indian Union, larger than either of the two, and more stable.

With the two interlocked conflicts out of the way — the conflict with the British and the conflict over partition — India is today giving herself a constitution which will reflect her new unity and freedom. Her main domestic problem is that of social and economic development, of obtaining the tools with which to carry out her projects of reconstruction. The solution of this problem, however, in all its ramifications, is inseparable from the present state of international relations, political and economic.

III

The broad facts about India's position are obvious enough. There are few parts of Asia where internal conditions are equally peaceful and stable. Her manpower and her latent resources give her an enviable advantage. Underdeveloped as she is, her organized industrial and military capacity still exceeds that of

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any nation in the east. She has no traditional enemies, nor has she acquired new ones; she has no vested interest of any sort in world affairs, except an interest in peace, a tradition of friendliness to all, and a readiness to coöperate with others for constructive ends.

Within this context, two specific objectives immediately define themselves as of concern to India: the abolition of racial discrimination and the liberation of subject peoples. They are intimately connected with her own recent experience and she cannot fail to pursue them. Her own liberation struggle was conceived, in one essential aspect, as a contribution to the freedom of all nations, and some progress has undoubtedly been made in this direction. But there are still a number of territories, mainly in southeast Asia and Africa, where the colonial status is being maintained, and the emancipation of which is being resisted by force. Racial discrimination, again, exists in more than one continent, notwithstanding the widely diffused sentiment against it, and its supporters are perhaps more outspoken and better organized than before.

In dealing with these problems, India is not actuated merely by emotion. If she has been vigorous in her opposition to the racial system in South Africa, and in her championship of Indonesian independence, it is not from any feeling of antagonism to the Dutch or the Europeans as such in South Africa. True, members of a community Indian by origin are among the victims in South Africa; and in Indonesia the victims are a people who have long cultural and historical associations with India. But more than sentiment is involved in these issues. Race discrimination and the colonial system, offending as they do the dignity of men and nations (and not only because they so offend), are essentially a part of the malaise of the world, and until they are removed there can be no health and strength in the world order.

Problems affecting dependent peoples, and involving discrimination and oppression, are specially acute in Asia and Africa. To resolve them, and promote the revival of these continents, and particularly of Asia, must therefore stand in the forefront of India's interests. Intrinsically, this is a just purpose and needs no ulterior motive to validate it, but it is bound up with the major conflicts in the world today and cannot be fulfilled in an isolated or self-contained manner. It calls basically for a new relationship with the west. For the understanding and consent of the west,

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given without *arrière pensée,* would ensure that the liberation movement advances without further violence and bloodshed, while the coöperation of the west could open the road to well-being for millions who are at present condemned to sub-civilized standards of living.

But the west is relevant to India and to the peoples of the east generally, not only because it must do its part in bringing about the peaceful transformation of an untenable relationship. It is relevant above all because, owing to the immense power at its disposal, the good that it can do is world-wide in its scope, as is the evil it can do. The initiative, on a global scale, lies in its hands. If it acts in unison and with goodwill it can guard the world against insecurity and divert incalculable resources from destructive to beneficent ends; and when it is divided, as now, the rift is a calamity in itself and may well be the prelude to the horrors of a world war. To whatever degree India may be drawn into such a war — and she will, let it be said, defend her soil and her freedom with every ounce of her strength — she is bound to incur, as she has incurred, her share of the suffering and starvation that will descend upon all nations. She has therefore a vital stake in peace. It is of paramount importance to her to avert a rupture between the colossi of the west, to mitigate the severity of the existing tensions, and to promote, as opportunity occurs, a reconciliation that can be only of benefit to the whole world.

There are conflicts and disputes in every continent today, affecting not only the local populations but the leading Powers of the west and, ultimately, the whole world. The alternative to a pacific adjustment would be so catastrophic that it is not wildly irresponsible to hold that the conflict or dispute itself may in the long run be of less consequence than the spirit in which it is approached and the methods by which it is resolved. This is not to imply that the substance of an international dispute or of its settlement is a matter of indifference to India. But, in forming her judgment, she cannot fail to distinguish between the elements of varying worth that enter into the complexity of each of these problems.

There are, first, the well-being and freedom of the people directly and immediately concerned, whose territory forms the locale of the dispute, and possibly a real disagreement over fundamental politico-moral principles (though here the area of conflict may well be narrower than one is always ready to admit).

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Secondly, there is, of course, in the case of many of these conflicts an element of preparation for future hostilities — an anticipatory manœuvring to gain, or retain, positions of strategic advantage. Thirdly, there is the political and propaganda aspect, amounting to an interpretation of what is involved in the dispute.

Naturally, this interpretation of what is at stake is couched in terms derived from the particular background, traditions and policies of one or the other of the dominant Powers; generalized to cover all disputes in all parts of the world, it tends to influence the evaluation even of problems (such as Asian problems) which have a specific character independent of the conflicts of the west. A common practice is to formulate the issue as one of preserving or extending some particular "way of life," or civilization, or one economic and social system as against another. When these concepts are presented in terms of the west, and the reference is to a western way of life, or what is called Christian civilization, or some social philosophy that is stated to be identical with them, their appeal can scarcely be compelling to the masses in India or, for that matter, elsewhere in Asia. Being herself so different from the west in many respects, Asia can receive with only mild interest any argument that appears to carry with it a totalitarian implication that the world should forego its variety and the vitality that comes of peaceful intercourse between its component parts and adopt instead a uniformity of beliefs and institutions originating in one particular region or country.

Besides, the peoples of the east who have just regained their freedom, or are on the verge of it, face unique problems of their own. They have not only to repair the damage and straighten out the dislocations caused by two world wars and arising out of the present unsettlement. They have to make up for centuries of lost time. While in subjection, their natural evolution was arrested: the changes that a free society would have effected for itself, and within itself, under the pressure of changing conditions were deferred or suppressed so long as a foreign Power was able forcibly to control the course of events. Today their problem is nothing less than the renovation of their ancient civilizations; and they will guide themselves, not by the doctrinaire prescriptions of one social philosophy or the other, but, in addition to their own inherited genius and the specific conditions prevailing in each country, by such experiences and experiments as they may consider relevant from all the rest of the world.

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Where international disputes are concerned, India, therefore, can do no other than endeavor to view them without fear or prejudice or passion; to appraise them, without *parti pris,* in the light of the specific facts of each case; to disentangle and concentrate attention on the human and moral factors that may be involved, and strive for a settlement by conciliation and agreement. This she has sought to do, notably in the cases of Korea, Palestine and the problem of atomic control. Such a critical and dispassionate approach is not compatible with a ready-made preference for policies and programs evolved in one particular capital. It rules out India's association or identification with any international grouping as such, whereby she might be regarded as having entered into commitments relative to a future war. It rules out, in short, her alignment with any power bloc.

This position has, no doubt, its drawbacks, but to abandon it would be unwise, and certainly contrary to the interests of world peace. The whole aim of nationalization in the east has been to free the countries concerned from implicit adherence to the decisions of a foreign Power. It would be strange indeed if, on attaining independence, nationalism were to consent to enter into a relationship where in the nature of things the power of ultimate and binding decision must rest with the other party. India, at any rate, is too conscious of her responsibilities, and of the need to preserve and develop the innate strength and self-reliance of her people, to participate in any arrangement that might induce a sense of dependence or compromise her freedom of action.

Moreover, the forces driving to war can be checked only by the most persistent and patient effort to bring and hold all sides together — not by helping to build up the preponderance of one side, which in itself, and through its example upon others, can have no other result than that of widening the cleavage, pulling down the bridges and pushing the world a little nearer to the brink. This conviction is the mainspring of India's foreign policy. It impels her — not toward isolationism or any fictitious neutrality — but to extend the hand of friendship to all, provided only that the price of friendship is not conformity or subservience; to retain and develop all existing friendly contacts as well as to establish new ones. It was in this spirit that she considered the problems connected with her relationship with the United Kingdom and the other countries of the Commonwealth and reached the accord announced at London on April 28.

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It is in this spirit, also, that she has adhered to the Charter of the United Nations and the organs established under it, which make possible the widest coöperation among peace-loving nations for constructive social ends and the maintenance of international security. India has participated fully in all phases of its work, and loyally accepted its jurisdiction, *e.g.* in the Kashmir dispute. Inevitably, the U.N. reflects not only the accord but the discords between nations, and the conflict between some of its dominant members is now acute enough to deprive the organization of one of the conditions of its effectiveness — continued agreement and understanding between the leaders of the wartime alliance against Fascism. To bring together the divergent points of view and seek to heal a breach which may ultimately spell disaster for mankind have been among the main aims of Indian policy in the United Nations.

IV

India's relations are bound to have a special degree of intimacy with the new group of nations coming into prominence in Asia, each as a separate entity and with an independent status in world affairs. During the era of western domination the links between them had been severed; they were cut off from each other more effectively perhaps than before the days of steam and electricity, and could not even meet together except under alien auspices. Their former contacts are being renewed gradually; and direct relations, it may be expected, will pave the way for frequent consultations and collaboration in matters of common interest and unity of action as and when needed.

For these countries have a tradition of peace and friendship among themselves. Predominantly agricultural and potentially wealthy, their resources are largely undeveloped or have been misapplied and directed to purposes other than their own well-being. They face in common a herculean task in increasing production and supplying their peoples with food, clothing, housing, education and health services. Practical wisdom dictates that they should concert measures of mutual aid in these matters. A world war — whatever it may do for others, and it will do no one any good — will mean for them the retardation for an indefinite period of their hopes of ameliorating the condition of their people. The conflicts, the animosities, the ambitions that threaten such a war are not of their making. Yet they cannot stand idly

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by, or imagine that they can insulate themselves against it; they must seek, with what power they have, to avert it, and by acting in unison secure for their joint policy an effectiveness that it would not otherwise achieve.

The distinction between the terms east and west, which we have freely used, is not merely geographical. It is more truly a distinction between peoples and governments preoccupied with the elementary needs of humanity, with food and freedom and peace — and peoples and governments preoccupied with the more complex aspirations arising out of the possession of vast power. It is the distinction, as one might say, between the spinning wheel and the atom bomb. This is what lies at the root of the protest against "power politics" that is so often to be heard in the east. A population roughly equal to that of the rest of the world is for the first time claiming its rightful influence in the councils of the world. It demands that power shall be the servant of human welfare, not its master. There are still obstacles to be overcome before its voice can be heard clearly or before it can translate itself into unity of action. But its appearance should cause no anxiety except to minds too long accustomed to think of Asia as "a tool or a plaything."

It is time for a wider recognition in the west that we have come to the end of an historical epoch. The eclipse of India in the eighteenth century was not an isolated phenomenon: it was part of the world movement by which the science and technology of Europe captured Asia and turned it, under different forms, into an appanage of the west. India's reëmergence is likewise related to the revival of the entire continent. It is not a racial movement: it is not animated by any hostile intent. It does not further the aggrandizement of any nation. Its purpose is wholly pacific and constructive — to broaden freedom and raise the standard of living. It is in consonance with all that is liberal, humane and disinterested in the western tradition. Its ultimate result must necessarily be to transform the politico-economic map of the world, and establish a new relationship between east and west. But the process is intertwined with what must surely be the supreme endeavor of our generation: to reduce and dissolve the disputes which, if widened or exacerbated, must plunge all the world into catastrophe. Whatever changes the future may bring, the Government and people of India will bend their energies to this twofold task.

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THE LESSON OF THE WORLD BANK

By John J. McCloy

THE International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, popularly known as the World Bank, is about to celebrate the third anniversary of the commencement of its operations. Those three years have been fascinating and exciting ones, crowded with problems as unique and complex as they have been pressing. Solutions have not been and are not yet easy to find; the state of knowledge about the whole business of international investment is still remarkably incomplete. By now, however, some of our experiences and some of the lessons we have learned seem worth recording.

Deceptive and unfortunate ideas of grandeur are quite naturally evoked in many minds by the designation "World Bank." I fear that in many quarters those ideas of grandeur led to expectations of rapid and spectacular achievement and to consequent disillusionment when the spectacular failed to materialize. Solid, gradual growth and development make poor news copy and thus escape public attention, but they are not for that reason to be deprecated. The fact is that, slowly but quite perceptibly, the Bank has gained general acceptance of its credit in the public markets and a reputation for objectivity, fair dealing and competence in the councils of its member states. The loans which it has granted, totalling some $650,000,000 as of the end of April 1949, have been for essential and well-conceived programs or projects which should materially strengthen the economies of the borrowing countries. Its advice and encouragement to various of its members have led to the adoption of economic and financial measures and administrative reforms which may well prove to be at least equally as beneficial as the Bank's financial help. The Bank's bonds have had a very satisfactory market record; as a result of legislative or administrative action in 37 states, the bonds are now eligible investments for almost all institutional investors in the United States and there is at present a substantial unsatisfied demand for the bonds. The Bank's earnings record has been good and has enabled a promising start to be made in building up reserves. These, to me, are satisfying accomplishments. They are not spectacular in any sense, but they represent the fruit of much intensive work.

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The Bank cannot and should not be expected to provide the answer to all or even a major part of the world's financial ills. It is beyond both the power and the purpose of the Bank, for example, to try either to cure the "dollar shortage," or to assure the maintenance of full employment throughout the world, or to satisfy short-term budgetary and balance-of-payments requirements. The Bank's sphere of activity is narrower and more precise, although it touches upon those problems. In general terms, its mission may be defined as providing the foreign financing required to carry out long-term projects which will increase the agricultural and industrial output of its member nations. That is a broad enough field for all the resources, vigor and ingenuity which the Bank can possibly bring to bear. Operating within that field, the Bank has already made a promising beginning. If given the sustained coöperation of its members and if permitted to stick to its last and not be diverted by every momentary emergency, real or fancied, the contribution of the International Bank over the years can, I am convinced, be of substantial and continuing importance.

II

What I have written may serve to dispel some of the prevalent misunderstanding as to the impact upon the Bank's activities of the European Recovery Program. There are those who regard the existence of E.R.P. as relegating the Bank to a rôle of secondary and minor importance and who tend, therefore, to write the Bank off as an ineffective instrument of international investment. This type of superficial thinking misconceives the purposes for which the Bank was established.

The Bretton Woods conference was not concerned with providing a solution to the short-run problems of Europe during what was generally expected to be a brief transitional period after the war, but rather with the creation of permanent agencies which would operate primarily in the post-transitional period. It is true, as events have proved, that both the magnitude of the short-run difficulties and the length of the period of transition were underestimated at Bretton Woods; ever since the war, Europe's overpowering economic problem has been its need of dollars to buy the sheer necessities of life, and not so much a need for external financing of long-term investment projects. But the existence of this extraordinary immediate need and the creation

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of E.R.P. to satisfy it neither impair the validity of the conception underlying the Bank nor threaten the Bank's ability to achieve its objective. The Bank was designed to meet a long-term need which will remain when the present emergency is over — the need for a continuing organization to promote international investment on a scale sufficient to ensure a balanced development of the world's resources and living standards. E.R.P. does not obviate that long-term need; to the contrary, it alone makes possible the creation of economic conditions in Europe in which the Bank can play the rôle for which it was originally intended. I confidently expect that, long after E.R.P. has taken its place in the pages of history alongside UNRRA, lend-lease, the British loan, surplus property credits and similar short-range emergency measures, the International Bank will remain as an active and invigorating influence in the long-term growth of Europe's productive plant.

This is not a matter of the distant future but of a fast-approaching present. E.C.A. is to terminate by July 30, 1952, and the amount of aid provided between now and then should, and I am confident will, be progressively reduced. The aim of E.R.P. is to enable Europe to support itself without extraordinary external assistance by the termination date. But there would obviously be serious political, social and economic consequences if aid were to continue to the end at anything like the present rate and were then abruptly discontinued. From the standpoint both of forcing the European nations to face up promptly to the gravity of the problems still confronting them and of assuring a smooth transition in 1952, a policy of definite and progressive cutbacks for the third and fourth years of E.R.P. should now be announced and subsequently adhered to.

As these cutbacks occur, it is reasonable to expect that the E.R.P. countries will again look to private investors and to the Bank as the principal sources of foreign capital for their long-term investment projects. Discussions now in progress concerning Bank financing for overseas development are a first step in this direction, and there are strong indications that the Bank will soon be called upon to consider other long-term plans involving considerable expansion of productive facilities within Europe itself. The fact that such Bank financing is now being seriously contemplated is perhaps one of the most significant measures of the extent of E.C.A.'s success.

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III

Because the most pressing needs of Europe have been met by E.R.P., the Bank has been able to devote most of its time and attention to the problems of its less well developed member countries. We have granted loans for development projects in three countries — $75,000,000 for power and telephones in Brazil, about $34,000,000 for power in Mexico and $16,000,000 for power and agricultural machinery in Chile — and we have at present under consideration additional projects in more than 20 member nations, some of which are in an advanced stage of negotiation. They cover a great variety of proposed undertakings, such as the construction of transportation and communication facilities, irrigation, reclamation and other agricultural projects, power development, shipbuilding and industrial and mining development. Each project presented to the Bank is investigated not only on its intrinsic merits but also in relation to the sound economic development of the particular country concerned. This involves immense and time-consuming effort, but effort which I think is not only worthwhile but inescapable.

Development is not something which can be sketched on a drawing-board and then be brought to life through the magic wand of dollar aid. If proof of this be needed, it is supplied by the numerous reports which have been compiled during recent years suggesting comprehensive development schemes for various areas of the world, most of which are now gathering dust on library shelves. If money were all that were required to translate those projects into reality, the Bank's primary task would have been the relatively simple one of allocating its resources among various claimant schemes. In point of fact, however, the principal limitation upon Bank financing in the development field has not been lack of money but lack of well-prepared and well-planned projects ready for immediate execution.

The explanation lies in the all too frequently ignored gap between the concept of development potentialities, on the one hand, and the formulation of practical propositions designed for the realization of those potentialities on the other. To give a concrete illustration, one of our smaller member states desires to divert water from a river in one part of the country to irrigate desert land in another part, and to generate some power in the process. But that concept as such cannot be financed. Before it

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can be brought to the point where money can usefully be employed, a great deal of detailed engineering work must be undertaken, the market possibilities for the power and the products to be grown on the irrigated land must be explored, the availability and cost of the necessary equipment must be ascertained, and the economic validity of the project in the light of estimated cost and expected revenue must be demonstrated. Comparison must also be made between the expected economic benefits of this particular project and of other proposed projects which might have to be abandoned or delayed if this one be undertaken. Finally, an organization must be created to carry out the project, and competent management must be obtained.

All of these steps take time. But expansion of productive facilities in even the most highly industrialized nations is a painstaking, time-consuming operation, requiring the most careful and detailed planning. In the underdeveloped areas, the difficulties are compounded both because there is less technical and administrative skill available and because there is less economic and statistical data on which to base judgments. Perhaps the most striking lesson we have learned in the course of our operations is how limited is the ability of the underdeveloped countries to absorb foreign capital quickly for really productive purposes.

Although it will never be a rapid process, the rate of development can, I am confident, be accelerated, and the Bank, by providing both technical and financial help, can serve as a powerful accelerating force. But it must never be forgotten that low productivity and living standards are as much the product of poor government, unsound finance, bad health and lack of education as of inadequate resources or the absence of productive facilities. The attack on backwardness, if it is to succeed, must be made on many fronts and requires primarily a sustained internal effort. External financial and technical assistance can be very helpful, particularly in the early stages of development, but it can never be a substitute for domestic action.

The resources of the Bank will, in my judgment, be ample for some time to come to finance all the sound development projects which may be presented to it and which can appropriately be financed by foreign loans which are expected to be repaid. This does not mean, of course, that the resources of the Bank are adequate to satisfy all of the world's development needs — far from it. Just as there is a vast difference between the amount of money

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which can usefully be employed for development at any given time and the amount which would theoretically be needed to exploit all development possibilities, so too there is a vast difference between the amount of money which can usefully be employed and the amount of additional external debt which the underdeveloped countries can properly assume. At best, therefore, Bank financing, which must necessarily take the form of additional external debt, can provide only a part of the foreign capital necessary for development.

IV

In my judgment, the most advantageous form of foreign development financing is private equity investment. In the long run it is only the free flow of private capital over a sustained period which can provide financial assistance in amounts sufficient to make a significant inroad on the world's development needs. Furthermore, it is desirable that a considerable part of the foreign capital employed for development purposes be in the form of equity investments in order to avoid an undue burden of fixed charges and, more important, because those who make equity investments abroad today normally provide not only money but also essential technical and managerial skills.

The many obstacles which at present impede the free flow of private international investment are well known and no purpose would be served by repeating them here. Some improvement of the situation may be expected as a result of measures designed to implement the "Point Four" program, in particular guarantees, investment treaties and tax revisions. The efforts of the Bank, too, may help to lower some of the hurdles through creating a better climate for private investment in its various member countries and fostering a greater degree of confidence among investors. But however successful these measures may be in increasing the amount of private capital flowing abroad, they are not apt to satisfy existing development requirements. In the first place, it is likely to remain true that such investments will be concentrated in a relatively few countries and industries, particularly the raw material and foodstuff export industries. Very little is apt to be invested in production for the domestic markets of the underdeveloped countries. In the second place, there are many projects basic to development — primarily in the fields of education, health, road construction, irrigation and reclamation and the

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like — which are obviously unsuited to private investment and which are yet beyond the economic capacity of many countries to undertake either out of local resources or with funds borrowed from abroad.

The existence of a need for development financing in excess of the funds available to meet the need is not a new problem: it is one which has always been and probably always will be with us. Nor is it a problem unique to the international scene, as witness the unsatisfied needs of the many underdeveloped areas of this country. Nevertheless, there is a greater sense of urgency now than ever before about raising the income level of the underdeveloped countries because, as a result of modern means of communication, the peoples of those countries are becoming increasingly aware of the great contrast between their status and that of the peoples of the more economically advanced nations. More is involved than merely economic and humanitarian considerations, important as they are; political stability is at stake as well.

Decision whether to increase the funds available to finance development is one which can be made only by the governments of those few countries in a position to provide such funds, and in the light of their own national interests. This is not a subject, therefore, on which it is appropriate for an international official to comment. However, should decision be reached to provide additional funds, the Bank's experience may shed some light on how those funds might most advantageously be utilized.

I would emphasize, in the first place, the desirability of making a sharp distinction between loans and grants. Loans should be made only where there is sound economic justification for the loan and where reasonable prospects of repayment exist. Where that situation does not pertain, any assistance given should be in the form of grants.

It is clearly not wise to saddle a country with loans which it cannot repay. In the end that will lead only to default, impairment of the borrower's credit standing and international ill-will. These were the results of the unsound lending in the 1920's; the credit standing of many countries is still suffering from the unfortunate consequences of their over-borrowing in those years. I believe it is also unwise to try to avoid these consequences by making loans which are for such a long period of time, bear such a low rate of interest and have such generous escape clauses that

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they are in reality part loans and part grants. There is a tendency in many quarters not to regard such loans as serious obligations, and they are apt to throw a cloud upon international lending from other sources. Unless public agencies, national or international, are to continue indefinitely as the principal source of international capital, steps must be taken to restore the confidence of private investors in foreign investments. This requires not only building up the economic capacities of recipient countries to meet their foreign obligations but also generating a greater regard for those obligations and the will to meet them. These objectives are better served through frankly supplementing sound loans, where necessary, with grants than through disguising the grants by wrapping them together with the loans in a fuzzy type of credit. The difference may be more psychological than economic, but it is not for that reason the less important.

In the second place, I believe it to be essential that any additional financial assistance made available for development purposes be provided in such form or under such conditions that its expenditure will not generate continually increasing demands for aid. This is an exceedingly difficult matter, for there is no readily apparent limitation, such as is provided by the profit motive in the case of private investment, which would effectively limit claims for help should a new public financing program be undertaken. At the least, there should be a clear definition of the types of need intended to be met and the economic level of the countries eligible for help. It must be made clear, too, that the assistance is extraordinary in character and is not provided in satisfaction of a continuing obligation to assure an ever-accelerating rate of development. Whatever moral arguments may be adduced in favor of the recognition of such an obligation, its assumption would under existing international conditions be politically unjustified and might in the end lead to disastrous disillusionment.

Finally, I feel strongly that any expanded program of financial assistance for development should, to the fullest extent practicable, be under international rather than national auspices. I recognize that the United States Government, which would undoubtedly be the heaviest contributor to any such program, might well wish control over the funds it supplied in order to secure immediate bargaining advantages. But the longer-term disadvantages of such control, in my judgment, far outweigh the immediate advantages. Nothing would be more productive of

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ill-will toward the United States than to have the other nations of the world over a long period of time regard the United States Government as their principal source of foreign capital. Under such circumstances, those receiving financial aid would not regard it as a favor but as a matter of right, while those who received nothing, or less than they thought they were entitled to, would consider the United States guilty of unfriendly discrimination. There would be no end to the calls made upon the United States and, should the United States itself decide to halt the program, it would be confronted by outcries from every side. To the extent that an international rather than a national agency is the instrument of investment, these consequences can be mitigated if not wholly avoided.

V

There is one other thought about the Bank which I have expressed on a previous occasion[1] but which I believe is worth repeating. In these days of knife-edged political tension, it is popular to think of international organizations as simply forums for blunt and often ill-tempered debate. The Bank's experience over a considerable period of time indicates that this need not be the case. The Governors and Executive Directors of the Bank have throughout acted with a most commendable and really hopeful display of tolerance and objectivity. And in the day-to-day work of the staff, nationalities are ignored and decisions on small and on important matters alike are made without partiality to the interests of any particular country.

It is true, of course, that economic matters traditionally arouse less acrimony than things political. It is also true that one of the two great protagonists in today's political struggles is not a member of the Bank. But there is another, equally fundamental reason for such success as the Bank has achieved in creating an effectively functioning international organization. In the case of the Bank, as distinguished from the United Nations and many other international agencies, the initiative in making recommendations and proposing action has been vested in an international staff, whose loyalty is only to the Bank itself, rather than in a group of national representatives expressing the viewpoints of their respective governments. Responsibility for making final decisions rests, of course, with the national representatives — the Bank's

[1] Address before the *New York Herald Tribune* Forum, October 20, 1948.

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Executive Directors — but they base their action and center their debates upon staff recommendations. This means, in practice, that problems are approached and decided primarily on the basis of an objective nonpolitical analysis of the issues involved rather than as a result of political compromises.

I believe that there is a lesson here with broad implications in other fields. It is a basic tenet of our democratic faith that the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes depends largely upon bringing to bear upon them an enlightened world opinion. Public debates in the General Assembly and the Security Council are an important means toward bringing an enlightened world opinion to bear on vital issues. But I suggest that the debates might well be more temperate and illuminating, and solutions to the problems made easier, if the initiative for analyzing the issues and recommending appropriate action were vested in a nonpolitical and objective international secretariat.

I do not suggest this as a panacea — there is no easy road to international coöperation. The will to coöperate cannot be created by any form of organization nor can any form of organization succeed without it. But our experience in the International Bank has at least demonstrated that, given both the will to coöperate and an appropriate organization, effective international action can be made a reality.

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INDONESIA AND THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

By H. J. van Mook

THE Indonesian problem is one out of many that were thrown up by the earthquakes and the eruptions of World War II. Like many others, it fell among a world of nations disorganized and disunited, and therefore unprepared to cope with it along the lines of an agreed and well-tested policy of peace and reconstruction. Its solution was and is primarily the concern of the Netherlands and Indonesia themselves. Unfortunately, both countries, at the end of the war, were weakened and shaken by years of enemy occupation. And as none of the Big Five carried any direct responsibility in this matter, it came to be treated internationally as a problem open to all for debate and interference. So it was exposed to the dislocations that accompanied the winding up of the war and to the growing-pains of the United Nations. But now, at last, the problem seems to have reached a stage where a better understanding of its essentials becomes possible. Agreement on the spot need no longer be retarded by conflicting views and interests among the democratic nations.

It belongs to a group of similar problems in Southeast Asia concerning dependent or semi-dependent areas in transition to nationhood. As a category they have obtained thus far very little special attention and study from the leading victors and the United Nations. They hardly figured in the fateful conferences before and just after the end of the war. If any concerted policy toward them was tentatively outlined at Yalta, Potsdam, London and elsewhere, it did not get beyond the stage of generalities. Even the Politburo seems really to have tackled these problems only something like a year ago. Ever since the final partition of "backward" peoples on this globe among the late imperialist Powers, any collective interest in Asia by those Powers gravitated to Japan, China and the oil-producing deserts of the Middle East. Peaceful and orderly Southeast Asia could be left to the care of the individual western nations concerned, it was thought, and even after the end of the Japanese occupation disclosed the ruinous effects of Japanese co-prosperity, it seems to have been

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expected of those same nations that each would clear the wreckage within its own sphere of influence.

At first glance there seemed to be sufficient reasons for this attitude. The plight of Europe, the military occupation of the enemy countries, the organization of the United Nations, and the preparation of the peace treaties constituted such a tremendous burden of issues to be solved that it would appear foolish to add to them unnecessarily. The free world had carried on without Southeast Asia ever since the Japanese invasion; the rehabilitation of the area, though important, was not one of the most pressing needs. Presently the widening rift between the Soviet bloc and the western Powers threatened humanity with a new and possibly final catastrophe and absorbed the anxious attention of the west. And, apart from all this, practically every nation had to face internal difficulties of the most serious order as a result of the spiritual and economic ravages of the war.

So the lesson provided by Japan — that Southeast Asia survives or perishes as a whole — went unnoticed for the time being. And yet no problem in this region can be properly understood unless it is seen in relationship to the problems of all the tropical islands and peninsulas in the area. In this article I can indicate only briefly a few of the reasons why Southeast Asia can and must be considered as a whole if we wish to determine its significance and shape our policies wisely.

II

If we look at the map we observe a belt of comparatively small countries — small according to Asiatic standards — stretching around the southeastern corner of that vast continent. They are Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. They have much in common, although there are great differences in geography and population. They are seagirt and easily accessible; they lie athwart one of the greatest and most ancient trade routes; they possess important natural resources. Their inhabitants, however diverse in racial origin, are generally peaceful, adaptable and tolerant. Their civilization has its roots in a long and adventurous history and was fundamentally influenced by China, India and the Arab world long before regular contact with the west was established.

The broken nature of the country kept political organizations limited in size and power, and intensified the popular character

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of their governmental institutions, even where native princes and rajahs seemed to wield absolute power. They remained outside the vast Asiatic empires of China, Japan, the Moguls, and the successors of Mohammed. Almost every world religion acquired adherents in these countries, but religious strife seems to be alien to the inclinations of the people. They are able and inventive farmers, sailors and fishermen, easily contented by the continuous yield of a bountiful soil and sea and climate, but as yet with a limited talent for trade and industry.

These lands have been more intensely influenced by the west than any other part of Asia. Ever since Sequeira entered the Straits of Malacca, and Magellan reached the Philippines, in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the fertility of these countries continued to attract the merchant adventurers of many European nations. Colonial empires were founded, and although they sometimes changed hands as a result of distant wars, they welded together extensive territories and developed a modern machinery for government, production and trade, thereby laying the foundations for the new Asiatic states that are now coming into existence. Their nationalism is of recent growth, conditioned

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by colonial boundaries and modern, democratic education; it superseded the reactionary resistance of the ancient feudal clans by a progressive struggle for nationhood of the younger intelligentsia.

Western influence has made these countries the most prosperous and the best organized of Asia. It has deeply affected their civilization, their internal structure, and, above all, their economy. They produce goods of great value for the world market, both in the west and in Asia. With not many more than 150,000,000 inhabitants, they exported, before the war, nearly twice as much as India and China together, with a population of nearly 900,000,000. When deprived of the rice of Burma, Siam and Indo-China untold numbers in Asia go hungry; without the rubber and tin of Malaya and Indonesia vast American and European industries suffer; without the vegetable fats from Indonesia and the Philippines and the tea from Indonesia and Ceylon the rations of Europe and England remain insufficient. And apart from those critical goods and other valuable products like sugar, tea, tobacco, pepper, cinchona, teak, hemp, sisal and kapok these countries can, if taken together, provide the oil, coal, iron, nickel, bauxite, timber and fibers necessary for their own industrial development.

It is easy to understand why Japan considered the conquest of these countries the essential condition for her fantastic ambitions toward world power. And if Japanese aggression proved anything, it proved that without a sound and efficient organization of their new national governments, these potentially rich and alluring domains will not be able to defend themselves against future conquerors, whether they try to subject them by force of arms or by political and economic infiltration and enslavement.

The dangers of the situation today are obvious. The newly-constituted national governments in Southeast Asia, or those to-be-constituted, must inevitably lack experience, a deficiency that will not be made good by enthusiasm alone. It would be hard enough for them merely to carry on the work done by the colonial administrations, which preceded them; but they will have to act under much graver handicaps than inexperience. Their barely acquired authority will need confirmation. With the exception of Ceylon they are faced by the most baffling internal disorders, caused by the Japanese occupation and rendered much more

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violent by an indiscriminate dispersion of arms. And if they cannot put an end to lawlessness and restore some measure of order and prosperity, their disintegrating economy will offer a standing invitation to those sinister forces that spread the seed of totalitarian Communism wherever the soil is torn up by corruption and discontent.

It is practically unthinkable that present conditions will allow them enough time to overcome the troubles of these formative years without outside assistance; long before they could hope to emerge from the trough of poverty, dissension and bankruptcy, stronger Powers would have intervened and subjected them to a new and worse domination. So the democratic nations of the west are confronted, on the one hand, with the necessity of national liberty for these countries, and, on the other, with the responsibility of offering organized aid and advice for the restoration of law and order, for economic rehabilitation, and for defense against any form of aggression.

In 1945 the democratic world was not nearly ready for such a rôle. It did not know how to combine responsibility for the internal stability of the former colonial areas with the recognition of their right to self-determination and independence. The years of imperialism, during which the fulfilment of nationalist aspirations was constantly deferred on the ground of immaturity, had left the west with a bad conscience. The western nations hesitated to interfere in order to further the realization of nationalist aims, when they had so often interfered in order to check nationalism. It was equally difficult for the colonial peoples to believe that such assistance would not have as its ultimate objective a renewed supremacy of the west under a different guise. And the propaganda of the Soviets and their agents, posing as the champions of any and every subject race, made many well-meaning people lose sight of the realities of the situation and vie with the Communists in an irresponsible condemnation and rejection of all the achievements of the colonial past.

As a result of this unpreparedness the postwar policy pursued with regard to Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Philippines and Indonesia not only varied according to the conditions in each of those countries, but also showed a different approach by the responsible European and American governments. The United States conceded independence to the Philippines on the appointed date of July 4, 1946, under certain military and eco-

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nomic conditions. At the same time it granted the new nation a large sum in compensation for damages suffered during the war, without bothering much about conditions concerning its use. The result of the grant of independence cannot be judged as long as this bounty covers the administrative and economic weaknesses that might otherwise appear. But the recent murder of Mrs. Quezon emphasizes the fact that peace and order do not reign throughout the length and breadth of the land.

The British preferred a rapid withdrawal of their influence in Burma, which obtained her full independence on January 4, 1948. The effects of this abandonment are not impressive. The country seems to have become well-nigh ungovernable, with several tribal and political factions fighting each other and an increasing spread of dacoity and Communism. A policy of liquidation was not applied to Malaya with its extremely mixed population and its vital economic importance for the foreign exchange position of the United Kingdom. In fact Malaya has remained a colony, and the restraint of Malay nationalism may well come to add its quota to the unrest of Chinese and Communist origin which broke out a year ago. In Ceylon the transition to Dominion status went ahead peaceably, but Ceylon suffered no Japanese invasion and had prospered during the war years.

In Indo-China the French ran into an extremely violent rebellion, partly Communist-inspired. The political situation still remains obscure; law and order prevail only within restricted areas. It is possible that the endeavor to maintain Indo-China within the French Empire, even with an ample degree of self-government, tends to delay the solution of the conflict and to hamstring the full coöperation of the moderates.

III

The approach of the Netherlands to the problem in Indonesia, by far the biggest and the most important of the Southeast Asiatic countries, is different from any of these. In a proclamation of February 10, 1946, the Netherlands Government put formally on record its intention to assist the Indonesians toward nationhood and independence. But at the same time it expressed its conviction that independence and nationhood can be achieved and maintained only with continued Dutch material, spiritual and administrative assistance.

The Dutch had valid reasons to reject a policy of simple

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abandonment. In the course of three centuries the Netherlands built a modern and prosperous community in Indonesia out of a conglomeration of small tribal units, divided by incessant conflicts and rivalries. Before the war Indonesia's credit was more sound, its administration more free from graft, the mass of its population better dressed and fed and housed, its highways and byways were safer than was the case in any other Asiatic country. The Dutch had invested a considerable capital in government-owned buildings, railroads, communications, forests, mines, plantations, institutes of scientific research and irrigation systems. There was also large private investment in agriculture, mining, industry, shipping, trade and aviation. Of course, all this yielded a fair though moderate income to the Netherlands, but it provided a much more important source of income for Indonesia. It shared in the products and services, and there was a well-developed and efficient system of taxation.

The Netherlands are fully prepared to transfer this inheritance to the Indonesians, but they want to transfer it in workable condition and with some guarantees for its maintenance and further development. This policy is obviously influenced, on the Dutch side, by a certain pride in past achievements, a recognition of the Netherlands' interest in Indonesia, and a deep affection for the country and its inhabitants. But it has its ultimate foundations in a relationship between the Indonesians and the Dutch that has no parallel elsewhere in Asia.

The Indonesians have shown in their history a most valuable adaptability and eagerness to learn, a sound capacity for administration, and great civility and tolerance in their social relations. They have acquired a nationalistic sentiment that can bring and hold together the various ethnological and tribal sections of the country, provided that each distinct part retains a sufficient measure of autonomy within the framework of the proposed United States of Indonesia. Their local government is well-developed and the damage done to it by occupation and unrest can be repaired. But the structure of Indonesia is still very vulnerable, especially in its economic and financial management and in the composition and authority of its newly molded federal government.

The Dutch can strengthen these weaknesses without threatening the young Indonesian nation. Numerous Netherlanders have identified themselves with the country; their descendants, pure

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and mixed, have made Indonesia their homeland. It may be difficult for an Anglo-Saxon to understand a relationship between a white and a colored people from which racial feeling is so curiously absent and which accepts the children of mixed marriages as the equals, legally and socially, of their parents. But the fact is that even now, after years of Japanese, anti-western propaganda and of revolutionary hysteria, there is no general enmity between Indonesians and Netherlanders. And the necessity of continued coöperation is widely recognized on both sides.

Why, then, did the political conflict in Indonesia drag on for so many years? Why were the Netherlands time and again denounced in the Security Council as imperialist aggressors, and accused of a colonialism that would be foolhardy and incompatible with the spirit of the people, if it had been true? In the first place, the surrender of Japan on August 14, 1945, was effectuated in Indonesia under the most unfortunate and adverse circumstances. The Netherlands had been completely liberated only since the capitulation of Germany in May of that year. As soon as a small part of the Netherlands had been freed from Germany the Government had strained every nerve to recruit and organize an army for war and liberation in the Pacific. Though the Dutch people were worn out by years of German tyranny, their response was excellent. But as long as the war lasted hardly any assistance was obtained from the Allies for training and equipment; the Dutch were even denied the use of their own ships for transportation. Consequently, they were not ready to take over in Indonesia when Japan surrendered, and remained for over a year dependent on Allied — that is to say, British — assistance.

On the very day of the Japanese capitulation the major part of Indonesia was transferred from the Southwest Pacific Area, under the command of General MacArthur, to the Southeast Asia Command under Admiral Mountbatten, whose operational theater until then included only the island of Sumatra. The change came very unexpectedly for SEAC; no preparations had been made for the new task. As a consequence the first group of British and Indian troops destined to take the surrender of 155,000 Japanese in Java and Sumatra did not land at Djakarta until September 29. It consisted of less than 1,000 officers and men.

In the meantime, a critical situation had arisen in those islands. On August 17 a group of Indonesians, partly sponsored by the

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Japanese, partly driven by young revolutionaries, proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia at Djakarta (Batavia). The Japanese Military Government, after a halfhearted countermove, let things slide; certain Japanese actively promoted the movement. An order issued by Lord Louis Mountbatten on September 6 to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in the southern area, Field Marshal Terauchi, to continue the military administration and to suppress the revolutionary movement was deliberately disobeyed. The Japanese troops began to leave their garrisons for comfortable quarters in the hills, abandoning great stocks of arms to the Indonesians. In some cases the Japanese still maintained law and order locally; here and there they clashed with the Indonesian irregulars, who in this way sometimes obtained additional arms and munitions by force.

This indiscriminate distribution of arms in a community perverted and impoverished by Japanese misrule, wrought up by anti-western propaganda, and convulsed by a revolutionary upheaval, proved the most serious obstacle on the road to political settlement and economic recovery. The Japanese had seriously damaged the nervous system and poisoned the blood circulation of the Indonesian community. They had ruined its economy, wrecked its administration, and debauched its youth by a totalitarian and militaristic system of segregation and drill. And then they crowned their destructive work by a transfer of some 50,000 to 100,000 rifles, thousands of machine guns, and thousands of tons of ammunition and explosives before the victorious Allies were able to take these dangerous weapons into custody.

Those who obtained them were not an Indonesian army of liberation. They consisted of people with extremely varied background and allegiance. Some were genuine nationalists; many belonged to the Japanese-trained auxiliaries. Others were affiliated with political parties, ranging from Communists to orthodox Moslems. A number formed the private bodyguards of individual leaders and political bosses. Quite a few were ordinary robbers and dacoits. And even the so-called regulars grew accustomed to living by their rifles, and generally obeyed only their favorite officers.

The idea of a republic seemed the embodiment of every legitimate nationalistic aspiration and spread like wildfire. The Republic as a reality, however, lacked almost all the fundamental perquisites of a genuine and responsible government. Its author-

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ity depended largely on the continuation of lawlessness and passion. Its propaganda had to picture the Netherlands as the enemy, and magnify the bogey of colonialism, in order to maintain some cohesion in the republican ranks. The *pemudas,* the armed youngsters, terrorized the public life of the community and watched over the "revolutionary spirit" of the authorities. The republican system developed totalitarian traits: an all-pervading system of spying, organized violence against political opponents, centralized direction of propaganda and the press, isolation from the outside world, if not behind an iron curtain, then at least behind a palisade of pointed bamboos.

There was, however, no ruling party; the only bond that held the warring groups together was a continuous agitation against western — *i.e.* Dutch — influence. The more moderate elements, who formed the first republican governments, were hardly able to maintain a semblance of public services and could not make their decisions prevail over the gang leaders. The internal dissensions and the general corruption grew worse as a vast smuggling trade with Singapore developed and was monopolized by certain authorities and by the soldiery. All these groups came to depend for their position on the maintenance of a state of unrest and war. And those who wanted to organize the Republic as a more or less normal administration, and recognized the necessity of coöperation with and assistance from the Netherlands, struggled in vain against the extremists and the profiteers.

This situation was aggravated by the precipitate recognition of the Republic as a quasi-independent government by the commanding officer of the first British contingent landing at Djakarta, who invoked the assistance of the republican authorities and refused to reinstall the legal Netherlands Indies Government. By this action he simultaneously set at naught the military administrative agreement, concluded between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on August 24, 1945, and relieved the Japanese of their responsibility for law and order. This officer was motivated by an understandable desire to avoid an armed conflict with the republicans and to avoid the obviously impossible task of maintaining the Japanese in actual power for any length of time. He could plead military necessity; he could even aver that the lives of thousands of Netherlands and Allied internees and prisoners-of-war depended on the establishment of peaceable relations with the Republic, for he lacked the force to

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protect these prisoners against the savage partisans. Nonetheless, the effect of this recognition was deplorable in many ways.

Whereas the moderate republicans recognized the desirability and even the necessity of the restoration of a legal and effective government, with Netherlands help, before real independence could be achieved, the recognition by the Allied Commander, however provisional, had a sufficiently international tinge to render the more extreme elements in the Republic completely intractable. It encouraged them in their anti-western attitude by creating the impression that they could count on British sympathy. And it convinced their irresponsible leaders that they could not be doing so badly in their newly acquired functions if a mighty empire solicited their aid.

IV

The Netherlands Government was quite prepared to grant self-government and independence to Indonesia. It could even see valid reasons for the acceptance of republican coöperation. But it wanted to go about the grave business of setting up a nation in an orderly and efficient way. It could not hand over its responsibility to an illegally constituted organization that showed hardly any capacity to provide justice and stability for millions of suffering common people, and was at the mercy of lawless mercenaries. The excessive and uncritical recognition of the Republic, by some of the late Allies, as *the* representative of Indonesia excited a resentment that acquired more justification as increasingly larger parts of the country rejected republican rule. And it was difficult to understand why the legal and effective procedure of restoring the pre-invasion government, before the transfer of authority to an elected national government (as was done in Burma and the Philippines), should be made impossible in Indonesia.

When after endless and patient negotiations the Republic proved unable to implement the Linggadjati Agreement, concluded on March 25, 1947; when it was clear that the republican government could not stop the ceaseless bear-baiting to which Dutch forces had been subjected within their narrow perimeters for 15 exasperating months; when murder and kidnapping of cooperative Indonesians continued and increased, the Dutch resolved to restore law and order by a police action. The moderates had been gradually either eliminated, deprived of effective

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power, or corrupted. There were too many adventurers and criminals in high places to allow a successful purge of the republican organization from within. The clinical method was no longer possible; a surgical operation was necessary to restore the normal functioning of government. The action was quite successful, but it was stopped halfway by the resolution of the Security Council. The Council may, in its majority, have been convinced that it came to the assistance of the Indonesian nationalists, who were attacked by an imperialist Netherlands Government. In reality, however, it gave renewed countenance to the anti-western, the lawless, and the Communist agitators, who could claim this intervention as their victory over the moderates and over those who sought continued coöperation with the Netherlands.

The outside world went on accepting the Republic at face value, and by doing so supported the extremists against the moderates and against the Dutch. Whatever the Republic did, it could always be sure of acclaim at Lake Success and in the public opinion of great democratic Powers. Its armed forces were looked upon as patriots, fighting for their independence. Its follies and misdeeds were systematically hushed up or ignored, even by the international agencies on the spot. So the republican government could carry on without ever being held responsible for its acts. It could consort with adventurers of every nationality, trade looted property against arms, sell opium for the maintenance of its foreign representatives, and terrorize its opponents without fear of criticism or reprisal. On the other hand, its complaints against the Dutch, which became more violent and absurd as the Government lost its grip on millions of Indonesians, were always painstakingly investigated.

As long as this one-sided attitude was maintained, the interference of the Security Council, however well-intentioned, could contribute little to the mitigation of the dispute. It did not relieve the Dutch from any part of their responsibility. It fostered distrust of Dutch intentions by almost openly doubting the statements of the Netherlands representatives. It inflated the position of the antagonists of coöperation, and branded as traitors and puppets those Indonesians who practised coöperation at the risk of their lives and those of their families. When such Indonesians organized their own governmental representation they were refused a hearing at Lake Success. Certainly, the Netherlands Government sometimes made mistakes; it sometimes showed a lack

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of perception, and sometimes of decision, when a more imaginative and firm policy might have shortened the conflict. But those mistakes were small and of a passing character compared with the fundamental mistake of the United Nations in condoning the violence, the graft and the dishonesty of the Republic, and condemning the Indonesians who sought the help of the Dutch against such maladministration.

And yet the results of Dutch policy, although continually thwarted, were not negligible. In August 1947, after the first police action, three-fifths of the country was started on the road to recovery under Dutch protection. And it is worth noticing that the elimination of political and criminal violence in this three-fifths, with 45,000,000 inhabitants, was achieved at the cost of less than one-tenth of the military casualties suffered by the French in Indo-China, where there is a population of 25,000,000. The number of civilian victims of the disturbances in Kashmir was many times larger than that in Indonesia. After law and order were restored, elections were organized and Indonesian Governments chosen in most of the area concerned. There never yet has been an election in the Republic. Production and trade revived; by April 1948 the balance of trade of the non-republican part of Indonesia became favorable. Notwithstanding the terrible financial burden of unrest the country remained solvent. And — most significant of all — the organized Communist movement remained confined to the Republic, where it had thrived from the beginning and had obtained its reward in the republican agreement concluded with the Soviet Government (in Prague) on May 22, 1948, calling for an exchange of consular representation between the two countries. This was in direct contravention of the Renville principles, and after an exchange of sharp notes with the Netherlands Government, the Government of the Republic promised not to ratify the agreement and to recall the envoy, Suripno, who had made it.

If the democratic Powers had at once recognized the necessity of concerted action in Southeast Asia in order to guarantee the peoples of that region their national freedom, and for that purpose had organized the assistance those peoples needed to stabilize their governments and defend themselves against totalitarian aggression, the Indonesian problem might have been solved much sooner. But what actually happened was for a while a case of too many doctors. Some of them gave excellent advice;

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others, however, made it almost impossible for the regular family physician to prescribe and to continue the treatment in the best interests of the patient. Others suggested that there was no disease, or failed to prevent the patient from recourse to quacks. And, with few exceptions, there was no frank consultation which might have led to agreement and acceptance of responsibility.

This course of events compelled the Netherlands Government to continue the police action for the restoration of law and order after another year and a half of fruitless negotiation. And so, at last, the reunion of the whole of Indonesia under the rule of law has become possible. And although the first reaction of the Security Council appeared to be hardly less disapproving than that of August 1947, during the succeeding weeks the facts of the case obtained a better recognition. The resolution of January 28, 1949, though strongly criticizing certain aspects of the police action, did not require the withdrawal of troops from the areas where they were restoring law and order. And as the initial confusion cleared, attention was increasingly concentrated on constructive proposals instead of fruitless recrimination.

By the end of February the Netherlands Government announced its intention to convene a round-table conference of all parties, including the republicans, in order to discuss and to implement the transfer of sovereignty to a representative, all-Indonesian government at the earliest possible date. On March 23 the Security Council, at the suggestion of the Canadian and Chinese delegations, issued new instructions to the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in which the reinstallation of the Government of the Republic at Jogjakarta was made dependent on its willingness to discontinue violence and guerrilla warfare and to participate in the round-table conference. The discussions between the Netherlands and the republican delegations then resulted on May 9 in a preliminary agreement, which can and should lead to final peace.

It was proved by this last negotiation, as had been the case once before at the conclusion of the Renville agreement of January 17, 1948, that the republicans are certainly amenable to reason once their responsibility and the consequences of evasion or bad faith are squarely put before them. In the present agreement they have explicitly promised to publish and enforce orders for a cease fire; they have formally acknowledged that the Republic is only one of the component parts, one of the states of the

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future United States of Indonesia; and they have expressed their readiness to come together, on a footing of equality, with the representatives of the other states, to discuss, with those of the Netherlands, the formation of an Indonesian government, the transfer of sovereignty, and the future relations between the two countries. In return, they will be enabled to reconstitute themselves as a state government in the Jogjakarta area and they will be accorded one-third of the number of representatives in the provisional parliament of Indonesia, which should be ample considering their loss of influence and adherents in the country.

There is still an extensive job of pacification to be achieved, but the pattern of a free United States of Indonesia, closely allied to the Netherlands, is gradually emerging from the tangle of violent designs and ambitious purposes. Much of that pattern was laid down in the negotiations with the Republic which resulted in the Linggadjati Agreement; on the other hand, a major part of the actual reconstruction originated outside the Republic, where the federalists conceived the first practical plan for coöperation at the Malino Conference of July 1946. When peace is made at last by those who want to rebuild their country on the sure foundations of justice and prosperity, the world may yet come to understand that the Dutch policy was not impelled by a senseless imperialism, and that the force applied was a necessary minimum to restore a decent nation to health and understanding. We may yet hope that after all these trials, the United States of Indonesia will be preserved as a bridgehead from which democratic liberty will expand through all the seven nations of Southeast Asia.

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SOLDIERS NEED WINGS

The Development of Ground-Air Forces

By Admiral Charles M. Cooke, U. S. Navy Rtd.

HISTORY furnishes much evidence that peace based on injustice is merely a breeder of war: the Munich settlement of 1938 is perhaps a sufficient example. From this premise, the people of the United States have drawn the conclusion that they must be prepared to use their power in support of justice, as justice is defined by the international community. Now power has various aspects — moral, political, economic, military. Of these I shall comment here only upon the last, and I shall do so by trying to answer several questions: Given the fact that we may have to exert our military strength abroad on behalf of justice, how may we prepare to do so most effectively? What kind of military establishment should we maintain? What general principles will guide us to wise actions?

To some advocates of air power, the answer seems so plain as hardly to be worth discussing: these experts would equip long-range planes with the strongest possible bombs, and prepare to dispatch them in the shortest possible time to an enemy's vital centers. It is all, for them, as simple as that. Without wishing to go over ground already almost too well harrowed by controversy, I venture to suggest that such a simplification is dangerous.

In the past, a belligerent who was able to bring new weapons or new tactics to bear against his enemy before the latter could produce similar new weapons or tactics, or develop countermeasures, usually triumphed decisively. But no matter what the nature of the new weapons, a war has tended to approach stalemate if both sides enjoyed them in about equal measure. Some such equality of weapons is possible in a combat in which we might engage. And when for this reason a stalemate approaches, even in a war full of novelties, resort must be made to fundamental factors, such as industrial capacity, manpower and will to fight. They are called into play most fully in the climactic act of warfare — the forceful seizure by one Power of the area held by another. Victory involves tearing the enemy away from the ground area which is the foundation of his strength.

The idea of "possession" carries with it a number of attributes

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— seizing, holding, using, denying use to others. In its basic sense, it implies the possession of land. Man is born, lives and gains his sustenance on land. Possession, control and use of a land area and its resources, or denial of its useful possession to the enemy, must always be the ultimate objective of both sides in a war carried to the limit. All elements of armed power may give indispensable help in accomplishing this result, but in the end possession of land must be exercised by the foot soldier. Machine guns, artillery, boats, ships and aircraft may, any of them, in a given set of circumstances, prove the greatest single factor. But the foot soldier must always be present, and if other longer-range elements are approximately balanced, the decision reverts to him. The thesis of this paper, then, is the need for the maximum development of the mobility and power of our ground force, to enable it rapidly to seize and maintain possession of land areas.

II

In 1940, when Great Britain was left alone in the field against the Germans, her enemy had a greatly preponderant air force, and a superb base for attack along the western littoral of Europe. The English targets were susceptible to both concentrated and diversified attack. But Germany was not able to project soldiers to take possession of English land areas. This failure was to prove decisive.

Later, even though air superiority passed to the Allies, the Germans, while devoting the major part of their war capacity to continental ground warfare, were still able to inflict mounting damage on England by V-1 and V-2 bombs. The struggle could be resolved only by the invasion and seizure of Germany — that is to say, only by dispossessing the Nazis.

It is frequently contended that if the Allies had devoted a greater portion of their energy to bombing, invasion of the Continent would not have been necessary. But such a theory does not take into account the fact that millions of Russian ground troops forced Germany to expend a major part of her war effort on raising and equipping similar armies. Had Germany been left free to devote all her tremendous productive capacity to building planes and strengthening her anti-air defense, which means that the struggle would have become solely an air war, the best that we could have expected would have been a stalemate. Such a stalemate would have been a victory for Germany.

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These considerations may appear trite, but that does not invalidate them; there are times, as Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "when vindication of the obvious is more important than the elucidation of the obscure." Conclusions drawn from the "obvious" may, of course, be subject to dispute. It is often pointed out that Japan surrendered before invasion by ground forces had begun. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that in similar circumstances Germany and England did not surrender. Further, the Japanese, inhabitants of an island, had seen more than half of their shipping destroyed and were vividly conscious of the inevitability of a disastrous invasion such as Allied ground forces had already imposed on Germany.

During World War I, the Germans seized a marked temporary advantage by introducing poison gas, and held some continuing advantage from the use of that weapon throughout the remainder of the war. This, however, did not prove decisive. In World War II, both sides were prepared to use deadly poison gas — and neither chose to use it. The availability of poison gas to both sides operated as a sanction to prevent its use by either. Nonetheless, the possession of poison gas by both opponents did not prevent the outbreak of a major war, which became "total." Neither side could afford not to have gas, even though in itself the use of it could result in nothing more than a stalemate.

The future will probably find all major Powers ready (in varying degree) with bombing groups, atom bombs, projected missiles, biological warfare, and so on. Will these weapons operate as sanctions to stop nations from fighting? Will they produce a stalemate because neither side can accept the counter-destruction which the enemy can wreak upon it? Or will their use be considered indispensable by both sides and cause local hostilities to grow into unlimited and total war? The prophet who will offer a simple dogmatic answer to such questions is confident indeed. Good sense requires the admission that the probabilities shade into one another.

The factors which go to make up an effective military establishment likewise interlock. The advent of the air age has added to the complex problem of gaining possession of a land area the important task of "possessing" the air space over it. Possession of a certain area of water is a much less tangible achievement than possession of a ground surface; and possession of a certain air space is less tangible still. By implication, it gives the pos-

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sessor full freedom of action in the area. Failure to achieve control of the air space in a particular region can seriously compromise the "possession" of the land below.

The positive aspect of possession of the sea is the ability to send men and materials to any port around the world. But to do this, a nation must also have cargo ships and transports. If the realization of our national purpose involves a projection of our industrial and armed power overseas, we must be fully prepared to expand quickly the equipment that will be required. The bottleneck which most obstructed our military plans in the recent war was the shortage of amphibious craft. Urgent warnings that such craft would be needed had received little attention before the war; oddly enough, President Roosevelt, who in most things was keenly alive to progressive naval development, did not perceive their importance. The result was that when we found ourselves, in due course, with ground forces ready to fight, with aircraft ready to support and protect them, and with men-of-war to control the sea lanes, the tempo of our operations had to be slowed to the rate of production of landing craft. American industry did a magnificent job in turning out these vessels; but had production started earlier, the war would have been shortened and money and lives saved. In assessing the blame, the convenient answer is to hold the "brass" responsible. In part this is correct; the military leaders should have appreciated more sharply the importance of an amphibious force, and taken more vigorous action to equip it. But the difficulty went deeper. Even as late as 1939 and 1940, the idea of preparations to send American forces overseas was not acceptable to American public opinion. Proposals that amphibious craft should be built were usually rejected with the flat answer, "Why build combat transports when we're not going anywhere?" The construction of landing craft at that time would have created a storm of criticism which, for political reasons, had to be avoided.

When we brought the war to a conclusion we had more than two billion dollars' worth of amphibious craft and a tremendous production capacity. Now both are largely gone, and we are doing little in the way of construction and development. The idea of air power has so captured the public imagination that disproportionate sums are spent to construct bombing aircraft, and little is being done for the improvement of equipment, boats and special aircraft for projecting vital ground power.

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Fortunately for Britain and ourselves, the Germans in 1940 had not foreseen the need of amphibious craft. In short, Britain after all retained some of the strategic attributes of an island Power. This is an important fact. Even though supply by sea is becoming increasingly difficult, an island position still has certain great advantages. In the recent war, the United States came to be regarded as the sole remaining major "island Power" in the full strategical sense, out of reach of attack by unfriendly Powers, and far more self-sustaining than Britain and Japan. There is a tendency now in some quarters to maintain that the increasing range and power of aircraft and rocket missiles (including those launched from enemy submarines off our coast) have deprived the United States of the advantage of her unique position, and that henceforth we must place all emphasis on protective measures in the continental United States. To correct this exaggerated picture, we may profitably study the British experience, political as well as military. The English Channel has narrowed, but its 20 miles of deep water are still an important military fact. Much more so are the stretches of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. For her own safety in times past, Britain has found it necessary to support the independence and integrity of European underdogs against aggressive continental Powers. Sea power was a potent and indispensable weapon in support of this policy, but was not always sufficient by itself. Full utilization of the possession of sea areas included the dispatch of expeditionary forces to strategic locations, an exploitation of sea power that was aided by beachheads in friendly hands. Thus ground forces were, for example, sent to the Netherlands in the sixteenth century against Spain, to the support of Central Europe against Louis XIV 100 years later, and to Portugal and Spain against Napoleon a century after that. Though such expeditionary forces were small, they exerted a leverage which multiplied their power many times, as when Moore and Wellington in the Peninsula kept alive the resistance movement of Spanish and Portuguese patriots and thus drained Napoleon's strength.

Further overemphasis of the rôle of air power in our military establishment flows from the current cult of the offensive. After World War I, many people thought that the defensive had become so strong that a resort to offensive war by an aggressive Power was unlikely, and if undertaken would prove unsuccessful against a reasonably good defense. There were writers who

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proclaimed that the defensive was to the offensive as three to one, and some believed that the disparity was even greater. A good many people, of course, disagreed with this thesis — among them those who were responsible for the preparedness of the United States.

Now popular opinion has swung violently in the opposite direction, and has embraced the theory that offensive power is so overwhelmingly great that the defensive can do little to meet it. The German blitz through Holland, Belgium and France, the advent of tanks, strategic bombing, rocket missiles and atomic warfare, have made the offensive seem irresistible. The place of the defense in the military structure is now undervalued. Such oscillations of popular opinion are to be expected; but the conduct of successful war in the past has been guided by the principle that though primary emphasis should be placed on offensive power, defensive measures play an indispensable rôle.

The recent tendency to overemphasize the offensive is less hazardous to national security than was the previous illusion about the superiority of the defense. But it is dangerous to miscalculate the degree to which our own offensive power is likely to be decisive, and dangerous to assume that defensive preparations by ourselves and our enemies are futile. Generally speaking, the defensive should be regarded as a valuable and indispensable servant of the offensive, holding here, repelling there, freeing offensive power to get on with the attack. Tactical and strategical defensive action is an element of strength when correctly adjusted to the whole military effort. It is when the posture and psychology of defense take the form of immobility behind Great Walls and Maginot Lines that they herald decay and invite destruction. In a word, the criterion of wisdom and strength, in military thought as elsewhere, is balance.

III

To say which of the three services is most important in warfare is like trying to determine which is the most important leg of a three-legged stool.

The four general types of military operations may be summarized as follows: (1) control of sea areas, including the air space over them — primarily the task of the Navy; (2) control of land areas, including the air space over them — primarily the task of the Army; (3) operation in the air space over land areas

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under the control of the enemy — primarily the task of the strategic bombing force; (4) various combinations of the above, with special emphasis on amphibious operations. With the continuously increasing part to be played by air, "amphibious" operations could more accurately be called "triphibious."

Sea power and ground power take and protect the bases from which strategic bombing can best be directed against the enemy. Sea power and ground power force the enemy to disperse his strength around the periphery of his territory, thereby decreasing the amount of effort which he can give to repelling strategic bombing attacks upon his vital resources and communications; and this in turn weakens his resistance to attack on land and sea. All components of three-dimensional military power must be adjusted to one another and to the accomplishment of required tasks. The "elements" of our military establishment cannot be divided simply into tanks, ships and aircraft. In modern war neither the ground force nor the navy can function without aircraft adapted to their particular tasks.

Strategic bombing is a special task and requires special aircraft. The airplane itself is not, however, a "task;" it is a weapon, or tool, which must be adapted to the particular job which it is called on to perform — ground-air missions, sea-air missions, and strategic air jobs, of many varieties and, of course, in many combinations. Economy is promoted when tools can be developed for general use, as some can be, but the best economy is the efficiency which results from devising and using the right tool for the right job.

Before World War II, both the United States and Japan gave much attention to the development of three-dimensional sea warfare, and as the war went on, the United States Navy further integrated air and surface operations so that efficiency and striking power improved. This development was possible because, in peacetime, a naval aviator was a qualified naval officer, and naval officers, many of them aviators, became increasingly indoctrinated in aviation. Naval officers were air-minded, and, no less important, air officers were surface-minded; without this general understanding of naval principles, and experience and proficiency in surface operation, the air officer could not understand the possibilities of his own arm. In 1920 no naval officer — aviator or non-aviator — could have predicted the extent to which ships and planes would be integrated and provide a spearhead

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for naval operations. Yet without this peacetime integration of carriers, aircraft and other naval vessels, the United States would have lost the war in the Pacific.

Similarly, to be fully air-minded, the aviator operating over land in conjunction with ground forces must take an intimate part in developing both defensive and offensive air-ground operations. It is imperative that aviation infuse into ground force problems air experience, air ingenuity, air vision and air tempo. New concepts of mobility and attack must be generated. New types of planes, new landing equipment, must be evolved from these concepts and put into production. Such things require sufficient time for development, proper organization, and unremitting application of energy and imagination. The tasks require continuity of air personnel.

It is not sufficient merely to have air groups available if war starts; they must begin now to get ready for the ground-air tasks that may fall their way 15 years from now. Years will be required to create an experienced body of ground-indoctrinated air personnel and air-indoctrinated ground personnel and to develop special equipment and methods. This growth will be accompanied by continuously changing tactical concepts, and even changes in strategic concepts, to fit in with the increased mobility and offensive power that our ground-air force will acquire.

In 1944, the paratroop landings at Arnhem in Holland were too far ahead of the ground force and suffered disaster because the surface troops could not come up quickly enough; yet in the future, thoroughly developed air-ground technique will probably permit airborne troops to be projected even farther ahead. If other nations exploit the possibilities of such integration and we do not, we may have a rude awakening from our dreams of the offensive omnipotence of air power alone.

The United States has had airborne divisions; tactical air groups have been assigned to ground commands for protracted periods; and we have had air reconnaissance of sorts. But there has been no continuity in such efforts at integration, little interchange and circulation of officer personnel, and insufficient development of air equipment to meet the special needs of ground operations. The U. S. Air Force is now in a department of its own, and the strategic bombing force profits from the new arrangement. Whether the new defense organization will be able to develop and integrate ground tactical air with the ground

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forces remains to be seen, however. It certainly will not do so unless the top command in both the Army and the Air Force place greater emphasis on its importance. Changes in organization are necessary, and must be worked out by the two services in close collaboration, aided and prodded by the Secretary of Defense. A premium must be placed on ground-air force duty which will attract talented men to it and keep them there. Such a step will not diminish the over-all amount of effort devoted to the air arm. On the contrary it will increase it, just as happened in the Navy.

With all this we cannot neglect sea power. It is, of course, our intention to continue to exercise, in conjunction with our Allies, control of every ocean in order that we may maintain our strategic frontiers abroad, and in order that we shall be able to force a continental enemy to guard an enormously extended perimeter.

A great asset in this task is the excellence of our submarine force. Among other things, submarines provide flexible and almost invulnerable platforms from which rockets can be projected. By the same token Russian submarines can threaten our shores and challenge our undisputed use of ocean communications. As long as Soviet bases for ocean operations were confined to the ports of Eastern Siberia and the Arctic coast of European Russia (none of them a warm water harbor) the Russian submarine personnel, of doubtful efficiency in any case, faced such handicaps that we were relieved of a serious submarine menace. If, however, North China and Yangtze Valley ports are added to Dairen, Port Arthur and North Korea, and, further, if Western European ports were occupied by Russia, the threat could become serious. Mr. Churchill in the second volume of his recent memoirs relates how his fears of the German submarine menace (after the fall of Norway and France had opened up ports outside the North Sea) exceeded even those anxieties felt about the German air attack and invasion. It seems obvious that the prudent and forehanded defense against Russian submarines rests upon a foreign policy, and a supporting military structure, that prevent a wide extension of Russian submarine bases.

Sea power not only enables us to trade with and assist our friends, but provides flexibility of attack: with the triphibious forces we can strike in any direction we desire. But we can do so only if we have powerful and mobile ground-air units ready to send to selected beachheads. The ground force, or ground-air

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force, is the ultimate and decisive element that can bring a major war to a successful conclusion. The strategic air force weakens the enemy's will and industrial power. Sea power forces him to spread himself thin. The ground-air force cashes in. The United States should have the most effective army in the world, though not the largest. The criterion of effectiveness is the ability to move rapidly and to deliver from one or more unexpected directions the overwhelmingly powerful attack which is commensurate with our overwhelmingly great industrial strength.

Our political objectives as well as our military needs require that these mobile ground-air forces always be in readiness. Generally stated, our prime political objective is to establish a comity of free nations in which each is able to contribute its part to the enrichment of a composite world civilization. But the plight of the world community is similar to that of the frontier communities of the American West a hundred years ago. It was necessary on the frontier to form vigilante groups to protect the community from bandits. The *posse comitatus* was usually led by a strong and determined individual, and the members of the posse always had to be ready to take up arms until such time as the community had matured and a régime of law had been established. The United Nations, the instrument of political organization through which the slowly developing world community aims to achieve its purpose, has, as yet, only limited powers of decision, and it has no military power for enforcement. In the event of a flagrant assault by lawless elements on peaceable members of the emerging world community, the United States must be ready to provide leadership to the posse of law-abiding nations.

We cannot meet our duties as a World Power without physical strength and fortitude of spirit. If our strength is to have maximum effectiveness, we must make sure that the elements of our military power are flexible and in balance. We have the largest and best navy. We must keep it so. We have the best strategic air force. We must keep it so. The integration of our ground forces, which are first rank in quality, with an expanding ground-air element, is today the most pressing task of our military leaders.

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THE REBIRTH OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

By Julius Braunthal

IN 1920, when Great Britain attempted to intervene in the Russian Revolution, Ernest Bevin, then leader of the English dock-workers, organized Councils of Action and strikes to prevent intervention. In 1948, Ernest Bevin, by this time British Foreign Secretary, signed the Brussels Treaty and, a year later, the North Atlantic Alliance; and although both these pacts are unmistakably designed for defense, they are fraught with the possibility of war with Russia. In 1920 as in 1949 Ernest Bevin was supported by the overwhelming majority of the British working class and by most of the Social Democratic Parties on the Continent.

This change in the attitude of European Social Democrats toward Communist Russia is of comparatively recent date. Until the eve of the Second World War, Social Democrats looked upon the Soviet Union as the great revolutionary Power — the first and only country in the world which had abolished capitalism. There were few illusions among the rank and file, and still fewer among the leaders, as to the despotic character of the Communist dictatorship in Russia. The first Congress of the reinstituted Labor and Socialist International, meeting at Hamburg in 1923, stated in its resolution on Russia that while the Congress "considers it to be the duty of the world's workers to combat with all their strength all endeavors by the imperialist Powers to intervene in the home affairs of Russia. . . ." it nevertheless demands "complete abandonment of the system of terrorist party dictatorship and adoption of a régime of political freedom and democratic self-government of the people."

The tendency, however, was to extenuate the Russian dictatorship. The theory was that Russia had never in her history established liberal and democratic traditions, that the masses of the illiterate and superstitious peasants and workers were not yet ready for democracy, that the rapid transformation of the Russian semifeudal agricultural society into a Socialist industrial society was only possible by the coercive force of a dictatorship, and that, in face of the most violent social ferment and the terrible economic dislocation into which Russia had been thrown in 1917, the alternative to the terroristic Communist dictator-

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ship was not a democratic régime but a terroristic counter-revolutionary autocracy. This theory was given an optimistic interpretation in the corollary that since the Communist dictatorship had emerged from war and economic collapse, and had hardened under the threat of war and economic strain, it might become less rigid, and even evolve in the direction of freedom, as soon as Russia's security was no longer menaced and her industrial resources had been more fully developed. This hope was expressed in the Manifesto of the Executive of the Labor and Socialist International on the occasion of the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the foundation of the First International, on September 28, 1924: "With genuine sorrow we see that the dungeons and places of exile of Tsarist Russia have not disappeared. . . . Thus on this memorial day the International expresses . . . deep grief because we not only have to protest against the persecutions of our capitalist enemies, but also against those who once stood at our side. But this period of confusion will pass. . . . The sooner Russia is freed from her isolation the sooner will the result be attained."

The sympathy for Russia was strongest in the Socialist movements of Great Britain, Switzerland and Austria — countries with insignificant Communist Parties. In Norway and Italy the friendliness carried the majority of the Socialists into the Third International. However, the German Social Democratic Party, faced by a formidable Communist movement, felt a deep resentment against Russia; and so did the Socialists of Poland (remembering Lenin's attempted conquest of the country in 1920) and of Hungary (where a short-lived Communist régime had collapsed in 1919). Yet all members of the Labor and Socialist International accepted the axiom that the Soviet Union was a powerful anti-capitalist fortress, and therefore that the duty of the working classes the world over lay in defending it if it were attacked by the imperialist-capitalist countries.

Moreover, the history of European Social Democracy between the two world wars was dominated by an earnest desire to bridge the gulf between the Second and Third Internationals and to reunite them into an all-embracing Socialist International. And although the Communist International answered these overtures with an intensification of its assaults on Social Democracy, abusing the Socialists as "social traitors" and even coöperating with the Nazis in the downfall of German Social Democracy, Euro-

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pean Social Democracy still thought that the way to stem the rising flood of Fascism was to repair the breach between the two Internationals. Social Democrats welcomed the change of policy of the Communist International when, after Hitler's advent to power, it proclaimed its willingness to coöperate with them against Fascist aggression. The French Socialists gladly concluded a working agreement with the Communists and accepted the support they offered to Léon Blum's first Government in 1936. Stalin's pact with Hitler was a shock, but caused no basic change of attitude. Social Democrats still upheld the principle that war against the Soviet Union must be considered a war against the sole noncapitalist country and therefore should be resisted. And when, during the Russian-Finnish War in the winter of 1939–1940, influential circles in the British Government urged active support of Finland by British military forces, the suggestion was firmly rejected by British Socialists. A war against Russia, they declared, would split the working class and indeed the country itself from top to bottom.

This feeling toward Soviet Russia changed to deepest sympathy when she was attacked by Hitler Germany, and in turn to profound admiration when she emerged triumphant from her ordeal. Forgotten were the vacillations of the Communist policy, the harm it had done to the European working classes, and even the barbaric features of the Communist dictatorship. And when the British Labor Party took power a few weeks after the war ended in the summer of 1945, European Socialists ardently hoped that the result would be a sincere understanding between Britain and Russia and a final reconciliation between Socialists and Communists.

Scarcely three years later, however, the Socialist Government of Britain, and the Governments of France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, in all of which Socialists participate, have concluded the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance.[1] True, both pacts are interpreted by most Social Democrats

[1] The Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance have not as yet been endorsed by the Committee of International Socialist Conferences, nor is it to be expected that they will be, because the Socialist Parties of Sweden, Switzerland and Austria stand for the neutrality of their countries. The International Socialist Conference, meeting at London in March 1948, declared: "In view of the developments recently produced in various European countries by the joint action of the Cominform and the Soviet Union, the Committee (of International Socialist Conferences) affirms its determination to construct a democratic and Socialist Europe, free from the menace of internal tyranny or external aggression wherever it may lie. It is convinced that the voluntary coöperation of all

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as moves to redress the balance of power and to preserve peace by restraining further Russian expansion. Nevertheless, the contingency of war against the Soviet Union is not excluded, and the Socialist Parties have indicated their resolve to support such a war if it should occur.

It remains doubtful, however, whether the Socialist parties would actually be able to carry the entire working class with them. The rank and file certainly realize the necessity of resisting further Russian encroachment. Yet there is a strong feeling in the labor movements of France, Italy, Britain, Belgium, Norway and Denmark that a military clash should not be permitted to occur. Despite this, it would be as disastrous a blunder for Russia to derive encouragement from these instincts as it would be for the western Powers to neglect them. The mere fact that the Socialist movements of Western Europe actually did accept an alliance with capitalist America against Communist Russia denotes a most significant change of attitude.

II

The cause of this change is, in the first place, the new awareness of the intrinsic nature of Communist expansion. Until 1947 or 1948 European Socialists did not fully picture what the real consequences of Communist conquest might be. They looked on the Communist Parties of their countries as national parties, affiliated, of course, with the Communist International and bound to its decisions, yet retaining a degree of national independence. It was assumed that should the Communists gain power in a European country, they would, to be sure, destroy democracy and transform the capitalist economy internally by the instrument of dictatorship, and externally, establish most intimate relations with the Soviet Union; but it was also assumed that they would maintain the national sovereignty and integrity. A Communist state would, of course, coöperate with the U.S.S.R., but it would not merge with it. No Socialist, and probably few

peoples in the urgent tasks of European reconstruction will best succeed on the basis of democratic Socialism." At its meeting at Vienna in June 1948, however, it denounced the so-called "people's democracies," and declared: "Politically, these governments are the negation of the civil rights and of the fundamental freedoms. Economically, they are inclined to substitute state capitalism for private capitalism. They betray both democracy and Socialism which they claim to represent." Note should be taken of the fact that the Socialist International has not as yet been properly reinstituted. There is only a Committee of International Socialist Conferences (COMISCO) of which the Socialist Parties are members.

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Communists, ever visualized the possibility that countries under Communist government would be submerged by the Soviet Union, losing their identity and becoming mere Russian provinces, ruled by governors appointed by Moscow.

Yet this was what actually happened in all the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans which came in the Russian sphere of influence. The three Baltic States were straightway incorporated into the Soviet Union and reduced to provinces of the Russian empire. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and even Czechoslovakia became in fact, if not in legal form, Russian colonies. True, their Governments are, like the Government of the Soviet Ukraine, composed of natives. But although they are formally elected by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of their countries, like the Government of the Soviet Ukraine, they are in fact appointed by the men of the Kremlin. They enjoy cultural autonomy like the Soviet Ukraine; and, as any colonial government, they enjoy a certain latitude in administration. But they are beyond question subordinate to the needs and orders of the Russian Government. The final proof is that Jugoslavia, a Communist country which attempted to retain a certain degree of independence, is being treated as an enemy state.

This was a new experience. Even some left-wing Socialists who were inclined to interpret the Communist triumphs as stages in the spread of world revolution now recognize them as stages of Russian conquest. Since the very structure of the Communist Party in every country secures the absolute supremacy of the Kremlin, it follows that should the Communists conquer power in the major countries of the Continent, Europe will become part of the Russian Empire. Such a prospect is by no means repulsive to Communists. They feel that they are members of an international community, and of a militant army to which various countries and nationalities rightly contribute divisions. They naturally assume that the interest of any country in which they win power must be subordinate to the needs of the Communist world revolution.

But such a prospect has little attraction for Social Democrats. In countries directly threatened by Russia — in particular Germany and Austria — Socialists passionately oppose Communism as a menace to national independence. The objective of Marxist Socialism has been a revolution which would transform the

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capitalist countries of Europe into a federation of free and equal Socialist states, inspired by the nations most advanced in the economic and cultural fields. This is very different from the idea of a Communist revolution which would subject the European people to the dictatorial control of the state which is economically and culturally most backward. In the prewar years many European Socialists felt resentment toward Soviet Russia because they considered her responsible for the split in the working class; but it was not until 1945 that the U.S.S.R. became a threat to the liberty and independence of all European peoples. Now it is plain that Communists in the various European countries can no longer be looked upon simply as the most ardent defenders of the Soviet Union. They are the instruments of aggression by Russia. This change of attitude toward the Soviet Union is the most striking feature of the changed ideology of the reborn Social Democracy.

III

There was thus a new perception of the values of liberty and democracy among the Socialists of the Continent, as they emerged from the trial of Fascism and war. Until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Social Democrats had assumed that liberty and democracy were implied in all Socialist principles, Marxist or non-Marxist. The goal of Socialists everywhere was a fully developed democracy based on universal suffrage. Political power was to be gained through the instruments of political democracy, and the strength of the state used to transform the fictitious democracy of capitalist society into the real democracy of Socialist society. Until 1917 the conflict between Marxists and Reformists, as well as between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, did not take the form of "democracy versus dictatorship." The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party indeed split at its Second Convention at London in 1903, but the cleavage was the result of a difference on the question of party organization. Lenin, the leader of the majority (Bolsheviks) pleaded for a closed group of "professional revolutionaries," while George Plekhanov, Paul Axelrod and Julius Martov, the leaders of the minority (Mensheviks), desired a workers' mass party on the pattern of the German Social Democracy. Lenin remained a democrat until the eve of the November revolution in 1917.

The Reformists believed in the possibility of a peaceful evo-

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lution of capitalist society into a predominant Socialist society, while the Marxists — in particular those of Germany and Russia — maintained that a proletarian revolution was inevitable, because the ruling classes would never permit the free development of democracy, would never yield to a Social Democratic government even if it should be supported by the majority of the people, and would if necessary break democratic institutions by force.[2] Yet Marxists as well as Reformists, Mensheviks as well as Bolsheviks, upheld the principle of democracy as expressed in the teachings of Marx and Engels. Of course, Marx and Engels held that the antithesis of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was not democracy, but the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie;" they saw in the Paris Commune the pattern of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," which was based on universal suffrage, supported by the majority of the electorate and regulated by public opinion as expressed in frequent elections and the people's right to recall their representatives. "Nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchic investiture," wrote Marx in his "Civil War in France." Still less, until 1917, did Socialists doubt the concept of civil liberty. The idea of freedom was considered no less essential to Socialism than the idea of equality. It symbolized a society which would make possible a fuller and freer expression of individuality than could class-divided capitalist society.

But after 1917 three factors shook the belief of Socialists in the concepts of democracy and freedom. The first was the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on Socialist thought of Western Europe. In Russia a tiny minority of the people, organized in a monolithic party, had seized power by force and had used it as an instrument to uproot the ruling classes and to destroy the remnants of feudalism and the nascent capitalism. Many Western

[2] This view, which guided the policy of the German Social Democratic Party up to 1914, was most forcibly expressed by Friedrich Engels in his famous preface (dated 1895) to a new reprint of Marx's "Civil War in France." "The irony of world history," Engels remarked, "turns everything upside down. We, the 'Revolutionaries,' the 'Rebels,' we are thriving far better on legal methods (by the successful utilization of universal suffrage), than on illegal methods and revolts. The parties of order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves. They say despairingly with Odillon-Barrot: *la légalité nous tue;* whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles and rosy cheeks and seem to have eternal life; and if we are not so crazy as to let ourselves be driven into street fighting, in order to please them, then nothing else is finally left to them but themselves to break through this legality so faithful to them." "Selected Works of Karl Marx." Moscow: 1935, Vol. II.

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European Socialists assumed that it had thus cleared the road to Socialism. This triumph of the Bolsheviks powerfully challenged Social Democracy, for it demonstrated that the control of the state could more easily be taken by force than by the instruments of democracy. It also demonstrated that Socialists do not necessarily need the support of the "immense majority," as Marx had said; they could achieve their aims by the bold strategy of a minority, as Blanqui advocated.

The second factor was the failure to carry through the democratic Socialist revolutions in Germany and Austria. Although the Social Democrats succeeded to a limited degree in infusing political democracy with a new meaning by an extension of welfare legislation, they were unable to change the capitalist structure of society. They failed above all in their efforts to secure full employment by planned economy: there were 6,000,000 unemployed in Germany, and in Austria a fifth of the industrial population was out of work (at the peak of the crisis nearly three-quarters). To these vast impoverished masses democracy and even liberty lost their meanings.

But what contributed most to disillusionment was the inability of democracy to uproot the forces of autocratic reaction in the bureaucracy and the judicial apparatus. In Hungary (1919), Italy (1922) and Poland (1925), democracy was speedily conquered by Fascist or military dictatorships. In Germany and Austria democracy was paralyzed by sabotage by the bureaucracy, magistracy and big business, and ultimately crushed by Fascist movements. Marx's thesis, that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purpose," but would have to "smash it," received a new meaning in the light of these experiences. The lesson, for example, which the reborn Hungarian Social Democratic Party drew from this experience was graphically expressed by one of its leaders, Emanuel Buchinger, in a speech to the Conference of the German Social Democratic Party in July 1947:

> We are about to build up democracy in Hungary. But it cannot be like the English democracy, which has developed in the course of centuries. Let us assume that the British Labor Government were defeated by the Conservatives at the next election. Its defeat would, at the worst, slow down the pace of Socialist transformation of Great Britain. Should, however, the old reactionary classes regain power in Hungary, there would be not enough trees in the forest of Bakony on which to hang honest democrats and Socialist workers who would be doomed by a counter-revolutionary régime. Three million landless peasants who

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have been settled by a land reform on the vast estates of the big landowners would again be reduced to serfs, the coal mines and foundries which have been nationalized would be returned to their former capitalist owners, and the industrial workers would be thrust back into the misery from which they are now emerging. Our country, which has never known freedom under the Hapsburgs' domination, has been poisoned by the reactionary spirit of Horthy's counter-revolutionary dictatorship and Fascism, which ruled the country for a quarter of a century.[3]

Since Bolshevism exterminated democracy no less ruthlessly than did Fascism, there was thus engendered a new understanding of the value of liberty. Socialists had clearly perceived the limitations of the charter of human rights based on property relations, inherited from the liberalism of the rising middle classes in England, America and France; but they had never cast doubts on its intrinsic value. They had not desired to diminish its scope, but to extend and deepen it by liberating the poor from their dependence on the rich. It can truly be said that the charter of human rights retained its primacy in the Socialist order of values in those countries where it was not yet accepted —(as, for example, Tsarist Russia) or in those countries (as imperial Germany or the Hapsburg Monarchy) where it was not fully implemented by a system of democracy. But after Tsarism had been overthrown and democracy had been established in Germany and Austria, the workers' struggle for social security and economic reconstruction had been put first in the scale of values. In the inter-war years there was an unmistakable tendency in some quarters of the labor movements of Central Europe to consider democracy not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. Even the concept of freedom was subordinated to the objective of keeping power in the workers' hands. A distinguished school of Socialist thought maintained that should an emergency arise in the course of revolutionary struggle which would compel the working class to break up the bureaucratic-military machine of a state by a working-class dictatorship, civil rights would have to be sacrificed. But it was of course assumed that civil liberties would gradually be restored, once the emergency had passed and the transformation of the capitalist into the Socialist society was no longer endangered.

[3] "Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands Vom 29. Juni Bis 2. Juli 1947 in Nürnberg." Hamburg: Auerdruck, 1948, p. 29. About a year after this statement the Hungarian Social Democrats merged with the Communists.

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The experience of Bolshevism in Russia made plain what the consequences of that theory are. It showed that a working-class dictatorship is indeed an effective instrument for breaking up the bureaucratic-military machine; but it also showed that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" develops almost irresistibly into the dictatorship of the party which seized power, and that the dictatorship of a monopoly party develops into a terroristic despotism. The result is inevitably a new "hierarchic investiture." The experiment of Bolshevism has further shown that it possesses the power to destroy the capitalist fabric of society, but not the creative force to transform it into a Socialist commonwealth. Communism substituted state capitalism for private capitalism, and replaced the system of wage labor (which at least leaves to the worker his civil liberties) with a system of state servitude in which every trace of those liberties is extinguished.

The realization that the abolition of private capitalism by means of Communist dictatorship could be purchased only at the price of fundamental human rights produced a revaluation of democracy and freedom. This revaluation was most forcibly expressed by the head of the Marxist school of Socialist thought, the late Austrian Socialist Otto Bauer, in the statement on democracy and liberty which he made as the rapporteur of the last Congress of the Labor and Socialist International held at Vienna in 1931. He said:

> Various ways of attaining Socialism are conceivable. There is the way of violence, of dictatorship, of terror, along which the historical example of the Russian Revolution is beckoning wide masses of the workers in all countries. Yes, we will not deny it — for the case of Russia proves it — by this means the means of production can be torn from the hands of the capitalists, the monopoly over property and education possessed by the propertied classes can be broken, and an attempt can be made to substitute a planned organization of social production for capitalist anarchy.
>
> But we all know — for the Russian example proves this as well — that advance along this path must be bought at the price of the most terrible deprivations for decades, must be bought by renunciation of the blessings of personal and spiritual liberty, which are the most valuable gains of centuries of struggle by humanity for freedom, and by the shedding of rivers of blood. . . .
>
> This way of violence, of dictatorship, of terror, is not our way. . . . We have always desired, and we still desire, to advance towards Socialism by a quite different, by an opposite path. . . . We do not wish to give up democracy, the right of the people to political self-determination, for the sake of Socialism, but to use them as foundation and the means of building up a Socialist society.

Soon after this statement the dark night of Fascist barbarism

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descended upon Europe. Millions of workers on the Continent lived in a terrible world in which all human rights were blotted out, and this experience led the Socialist Parties to a still more searching reëxamination of the relation between democracy and Socialism. Although Social Democrats had considered civil rights and political democracy inherent in the Socialist doctrine, the institutions which embodied this freedom were seldom objects of special concern. Most Socialists were wont to regard economic domination as the sole or, at any rate, the supreme evil, and to reason that when this was destroyed, the forces of freedom and democracy would automatically be released. The lesson of Fascism as well as of Communism not only aroused a need to reaffirm the creed of political democracy, but also to study more carefully the institutions in which it is embodied. This new trend of thought was expressed in the resolution of the International Socialist Conference held in Vienna in June 1948:

> The Parties represented at this Conference will stand together in their fight for the preservation and extension of political democracy. . . .
>
> They are opposed to the one-party state and to any system of government based on it.
>
> They consider that political democracy implies recognition of the dignity of the human personality which finds expression in: freedom of conscience, opinion and speech; free access to all sources of information; freedom of association; legal security and protection against the arbitrary action of individuals or of society; equality before the law, free from any political interference; complete freedom and security of elections; the right of opposition; political and juridical equality of all citizens irrespective of class, race or sex.[4]

That was the first time in history that an international Socialist conference defined democracy and freedom in unmistakable terms and pledged its parties to stand together in their defense.

IV

Until the rise of Fascism, most of the continental Socialist movements were inspired by Marx's concept of history. The doctrines of Marx fascinated idealist youths, impressed many middle-class intellectuals, and gave the workers certitude in the final triumph of the Socialist cause. This assurance has been shaken by events since 1933. Marxism has by no means been discarded; in England, for instance, the Marxist school of thought has penetrated political writings, the science of history

[4] Socialist Information and Liaison Office. London, 1948, Circular 105.

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and social science deeper than ever before. But the lesson of events since 1933 has made necessary a reëxamination of Marxism, and of the fundamental principles of Socialism.[5] Two features of this discussion are of particular significance. The first is a rebirth of the humanitarian tradition of Socialism; the second is a revival of Christian Socialism.

The rebirth of the humanitarian tradition is the natural reaction to the nihilistic revolution of National Socialism. Marxism, like every school of Socialist thought, is derived from the Western European tradition of Christian and liberal ethics. The Christian and liberal tradition was strongest in British Socialism, the liberal and humanitarian tradition — most conspicuously represented by Jean Jaurès, Emile Vandervelde and F. Turati — was strongest in French, Belgian and Italian Socialism. But until the rise of Fascist nihilism, the school of ethical Socialism developed in contradiction to Marxism, particularly in Germany. It opposed the Marxist conception of class struggle and the primacy of economics in social processes and, above all, Marx's conception of history. Under the impact of Fascist nihilism (as under the blows of Communism after 1945), Marxist Socialists also felt the urge to return to the ethical and humanitarian sources of Socialist thought.[6] Fascism institutes a new type of economic and political servitude which destroys man's dignity and reduces the individual to a cog in a vast machine. There have been significant attempts by Socialists — in journals and pamphlets, particularly in England, France and Germany — to reëxamine the relations between the individual and the state and between the individual and the nationalized industries. The implications of the growth of the power of the state are deeply felt and noted, and the dilemma of social democracy — the simultaneous effort to extend the power of the state and to develop the freedom of the individual — is fully recognized. There is an intensive search

[5] As part of a first attempt at a general reëxamination of Marxism may be mentioned Paul Sering's "Jenseits des Kapitalismus," Nuremberg, Nest-Verlag, 1948. See also Joseph Schumpeter, "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy," New York, Harper, 1942; Arthur Rosenberg, "Democracy and Socialism," New York, Knopf, 1939; Otto Bauer, "Zwischen zwei Weltkriegen?" Bratislava, Prager, 1936; G. D. H. Cole, "The Meaning of Marxism," London, Gollancz, 1948.

[6] See, for example, Léon Blum, "For All Mankind," New York, Viking, 1946; John Strachey, "A Faith to Fight For," London, Gollancz, 1941; Ignazio Silone, "Atto di Rinascita," Rome, 1945; Harold J. Laski, "Faith, Reason and Civilization," London, Gollancz, 1944; Victor Gollancz, "Our Threatened Values," London, Gollancz, 1946; Arthur Koestler, "The Yogi and the Commissar," New York, Macmillan, 1945.

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for new forms of economic and political democracy that will secure the effective participation of the individual in economic and political affairs and prevent industrial and governmental bureaucracy from becoming the master of the people.

From this criticism of the modern industrial and political state has emerged a significant shift of emphasis in Socialist thought, away from the economic and scientific side of Marxism, and toward its ethical and humanitarian aspects. In Germany especially this tendency is expressed among Socialists in a critical reëxamination of Marx's theory of economic materialism; in its stead is revived the ethical conception of Marx's early writings. Tendencies toward irrationalism and transcendentalism in Socialist thought are also discernible in the revival of the *Bund religiöser Sozialisten* in Germany and in the formation of the Catholic association *Esprit* in France. It is interesting to note that, for instance, one of the items of the agenda of the *Kulturtagung,* organized by the German Social Democratic Party at Lübeck in July 1948, was devoted to the discussion of "Conciliation between *ratio* and *religio*." In Holland this trend of religious thought produced a reconstruction of the old Social Democratic Labor Party in 1946: the Catholic *Christophorus* movement, the Calvinist Christian Democratic Union, the hitherto independent group of Protestant Socialists and the old Socialist Party all merged in a single Socialist Party of Labor.

V

Most Socialists ardently desired to see a United Socialist Europe, based on an agreement between Great Britain and the Soviet Union and embracing all the countries from the Atlantic to the Russian border, emerge from the holocaust of the war. But the idea of the unification of Europe was opposed by the Communists even before the fighting stopped; they saw in it simply a potential bloc against the Soviet Union. And the high hopes of wartime received a death blow when Eastern Europe and Czechoslovakia were incorporated in the Russian system.

But European Union remains a major Socialist objective. Social Democrats support efforts to form the structure of a federated Europe by setting up a Council of Europe and an all-European Federal Parliament. The 1948 International Socialist Conference at Vienna agreed to press forward to place "the major sources of economic power in Europe under international

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control;" it set up a special commission to make detailed recommendations. A permanent trade union organization, representing the metal workers and miners from France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland, has already been formed to influence the future organization of the Ruhr. The International Socialist Conference declared as "its profound conviction that it would be greatly in the interest of European peace and prosperity if the German people decided for the Social-Democratic policy of putting the basic industries of the Ruhr under public ownership and Socialist control. Under no circumstances must these industries be allowed to return to private capitalists of any nation."

In their advocacy of a United Socialist Europe the Social Democratic Parties are guided by three major considerations. The first flows from the conviction that Europe will never regain prosperity without the economic integration of the Continent, and that only under a Socialist economy can full employment, social security and a steady rise in the standard of life of the working classes be attained. The second stems from the conviction, most forcefully expressed by the French and British Socialists at the recent Conference, that "the reintegration of Germany into Europe's productive effort and into the world community . . . is one of the essential conditions for the effective reconstruction of our continent." The corollary is that Germany must not be divided. "Socialist parties," the resolution states, "cannot agree to a definite partition of Germany, whose effect could only be to provoke a recrudescence of nationalism, militarism, and the break-up of European unity by the consolidation of 'blocs.'" [7]

The supreme consideration, however, which influences the international policy of European Social Democracy is the need for the preservation of peace. Any European citizen, Socialist or non-Socialist, abhors and fears a third world war, for he believes that the terrible devastation it would produce would bring civilized life in Europe to an end for ages to come. But only a war with the U.S.S.R. is conceivable — and the possibility of war against Russia confronts European Social Democracy with a tragic dilemma. Such a war, should it occur, would essentially be a war between capitalist America and Communist Russia, with the countries of Western Europe supplying the field of operations. For Socialists, this raises the serious problem noted at the beginning of this inquiry. Socialists realize that since the

[7] *Cf.* Circulars 104 and 70 of S.I.L.O. London, 1948.

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attempts at an understanding between Social Democratic Britain and the Communist Soviet Union have so far failed and the U.S.S.R. has never laid down her arms, the west cannot remain unarmed. They also realize that the redress of the balance of power requires coöperation with the United States of America. But many Socialists are aware that since the United States would inevitably play the chief rôle in a war between the west and the Soviet Union, because of her overwhelming economic and military power, the United States would naturally also determine the shape of the world after the war.

Such a contingency was discussed in a memorandum, signed by Otto Bauer, Theodor Dan and Jean Zyromski, and submitted to the Parties of the Labor and Socialist International, before the Second World War. The memorandum urged the Socialist Parties to support the imminent war against Hitler Germany; but it said further that should the western imperialist Powers turn against the Soviet Union in the course of the struggle, then it would be the duty of the Socialist Parties to oppose the war. Now Britain is no longer inspired by imperialist aims, but is a Commonwealth in Socialist transformation. And nearly all European countries outside the Russian orbit are governed by Social Democrats or by governments in which Socialists participate. Social Democrats do not desire to see Europe submerged by the totalitarian dictatorship of Russia. But on the other hand, they do not wish to see Europe reduced to an American colony, Russia dismembered, the debris handed over to reactionary-military dictatorships, and the capitalist structure of society restored. In either case, Social Democracy would perish.

Thus the urge of self-preservation no less than the force of principles and humanitarian considerations makes the preservation of peace the supreme aim of any international policy of European Social Democracy. Socialism is inspired by the hope that once the balance of power is reëstablished and Social Democracy has proved its creative strength as a method of Socialist transformation — as increasingly in Britain — a basis of agreement between the Socialist Western Europe and the Communist east may be found.

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THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND WESTERN UNION

By Lord Altrincham

I HAVE been reading a book by Raymond Aron, a very distinguished representative of French political thought, which discusses with much insight the effect of the ideological division between the United States and the Soviet Union upon the world in general and France in particular. In his view there are but two great political systems in the world, with the rest of us forming a no-man's-land between them. "The whole of Europe" between the Russian frontier and the Atlantic is, he says, "comparable only to the Balkans before 1914," because it consists of weak and divided countries for control of which the two great "empires" are contending.[1] He does not actually name England as one of these Balkan states; but he presumably puts her in that category since the British Commonwealth, of which she is part, is not in his opinion a world factor worth mentioning.

There is always something tonic in the clear-cut quality of French thought; and this example of it is indeed challenging. Only six years have passed since the British Commonwealth was standing alone but united against a Power which had all Western Europe at its mercy — only six years since, in truth, the existence of that Commonwealth altered the course of European and world history. Yet here is a distinguished French thinker dismissing it without discussion as nonexistent. Is he right or is he wrong?

No one will dispute one cardinal point in M. Aron's analysis, to wit, the utter insufficiency of isolated nation-states either for self-defense or for self-maintenance as prosperous economic units in the world of today. But he himself will not, I am sure, deny that the term "isolated nation-state" requires some substantiation when used to describe any of the nations of the British Commonwealth. Their association may seem to foreigners to rest upon a tissue of imponderables which cannot be convincingly evaluated, as can a written federal constitution which combines a number of provinces or states under a federal government with overriding powers. Yet the fact remains that their moral unity has been twice tested in the awful flames of war, and that their leaders have quite recently reaffirmed their determination to preserve

[1] Raymond Aron, "Le Grand Schisme." Paris: Gallimard, 1948, p. 18.

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that moral unity in a postwar situation which is certainly not free from the danger of a third world war. In some sense, then, its nation-states must constitute an entity; and if England is part of that entity, she is something more than an isolated state in a Balkanized collection of European nations. The Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R. are in fact the only existent polities in which nation-states are united by constitutional links; and they demand comparison, both with each other and with other "empires" of our time.

There can be no question (to consider the Russian system first) that while imperialism has been waning in the west, it has taken new and vigorous life in the east through the outward urge of the Soviet Revolution. The impulse behind it is partly one of conquest in its ancient form, partly one of self-defense, partly one of militant ideological fanaticism; and it aims at the subjugation of civilized even more than uncivilized and backward peoples. It is, in fact, the expression of an aggressive faith, like Islam in the first century of its existence, and its ultimate goal is world revolution. But in other respects it differs little from the older imperialisms, since its aim, in the immediate future at least, is to assert the supremacy of a single Power over as wide an area as possible. It has not, however, succeeded as yet in absorbing any states resembling those of Western Europe, with their long tradition of independent power and growth; and most of the ancient or modern nation-states which it has provisionally woven into its system of power are showing signs of resistance to the denationalizing process on which the Communist ideology insists.

The Soviet effort to assimilate other states will in all probability succeed or fail in inverse proportion to the success of the western world in organizing nation-states for common action on its own non-Communist principles. If, moreover, we can succeed in doing this without destroying the individuality and vitality of ancient nation-states, the example of the west may influence Poland, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia against the denationalizing processes to which they are at present exposed. The multi-national polity of the British Commonwealth has hitherto been universally accepted as, in some real sense, a constitutional and organic whole; but its nation-states are unquestionably independent and sovereign. Does it then present a model which may be followed in the creation of other multi-national associations, adequate for dealing with the problems of the postwar world? Or

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is it just one of those "empires" which have played their parts with greatness but are now doomed to decay?

II

The British Commonwealth of Nations, though its territories were originally acquired (like those of the United States) by conquest and annexation, bears no resemblance in its character to the historic conception of an empire, or, in its development, to the normal processes of imperialism. The Latin word "imperium," from which imperialism derives, denoted first the overriding authority of a Roman military commander. Later, it came to stand for a widespread system of centralized government, the spacious domain of the Roman emperors, which included the whole of the civilized world. Now it is true that all modern political systems which include a variety of peoples have been created on the Roman model; but it is also true that modern international society, at any rate outside the fold of Communism, has come to regard as obsolete and even as immoral the permanent government of one people by another. If, therefore, new systems of power are formed, such as union of the Western European nations, they will not be formed, where western sentiment predominates, by the method of imperialism — that is, by extension of a single people's power over other peoples.

Only two of the older modern empires, the British and Austro-Hungarian, have varied in any important way from the Roman model; and it is just that variance for which I beg attention, because it illustrates the special problem created by nation-states within an empire. The Austro-Hungarian Empire under the Dual Monarchy of the Hapsburgs held two nation-states together with some success for 50 years; but it failed to give recognition to the other peoples within its jurisdiction which were nations in embryo, and it was accordingly destroyed by the passion for self-determination which swept the world in 1918, with President Wilson as its foremost interpreter. The Spanish and Portuguese Empires might have held within their orbits the kindred peoples of South America when they rose to nationhood; but, for reasons which are sufficiently familiar, they failed to do so. The other Empires — French, Dutch, Belgian, German and Italian — had within them no embryo nations of European character and tradition, though the French and Dutch are now confronted by Asiatic nationalist movements with European ideals and aims.

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It is therefore the British Empire alone which has held nation-states together in effective unity up to the present time. Despite their sovereign independence of each other, its members have preserved a sense of responsibility to each other and to the system out of which they grew; and they were thus inspired by a common impulse to act together instantaneously in defense of it. But the Empire to which they belonged was not an empire, or was only in part an empire, in the historic sense of that term. I will, of course, admit that part of it, England, was still an imperial country in the older sense, since she controlled immense dependencies in Asia, Africa and elsewhere, which gave her invaluable support in war. India alone, for instance, despite the opposition of the Indian nationalists, produced in the last war an army of more than 5,000,000 volunteers; the African and other colonies in proportion did equally well. But the power which governed all else and turned the scale was not England's imperial power; it was, as a distinguished Canadian[2] has recently written, "the joint action of five free nations," which decided at the sudden crisis in 1939 "to do the same thing at the same time for the same reasons," and held to their decision through all the strain and peril that ensued. The more closely the system which produced that moral unity is examined, the more clearly it is seen to be a polity without resemblance to any empire of the past or to any other empire of our own day. Let us then review the differences which have given it that special character.

It is certain, in the first place, that there runs through the nation-states of the British Commonwealth a vein of family sentiment, stronger in some than in others according to the proportion of the population that is British by origin, but powerful in all. This sentiment is only partly racial; it was not, for instance, British racial sentiment which moved the South African Parliament to declare war on Germany in September 1939, since the small but decisive majority for war contained many Dutch South Africans and was led by General Smuts. Nor is it British in the sense of being something other than Canadian or Australian or New Zealand or South African sentiment; on the contrary, it is profoundly nationalist. Canadians feel it as Canadians, Australians as Australians, and so on, if they feel it at all; only a very small minority feel it as loyalty to a country other than their own. It is therefore not inspired by devotion to Britain but by

[2] Vincent Massey, "On Being Canadian." London and Toronto: Dent, 1948, p. 102.

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devotion to the system, the way of life, the political family from which all are sprung. It is, in fact, a sense of "belonging together" as members of a family without any touch of subordination to the eldest one.

The constitutional position corresponds exactly to that sentiment and was in fact created by it. This is an empire — or, as it is now more accurately named, a Commonwealth — without a central government of any kind. Its springs of action are in its several nation-states, since they are all equal and independent sovereignties. It has, in fact, only one central institution, the Monarchy; but that institution represents the unity in diversity of its member states as no other institution could, since the King is constitutionally the head of every nation-state and in that several capacity head also of the Commonwealth as a whole. In accordance, moreover, with the constitutional principle under which the King acts only on the advice of his Ministers, each nation-state freely defines those whom it will acknowledge as its citizens and freely also declares that its citizens are British subjects or lieges of the King.

The next point to be emphasized is that the Commonwealth of Nations was not built up by direction from the center but by spontaneous action in its various states. In the great constructive movement which brought the modern Commonwealth to birth, it was not England but Canada which took the lead. All the Dominions, as they came to be called, played important constructive parts; but Canada as the senior was always so much in the van that the Commonwealth owes as much to her for its vitality and form as it owes to Britain for the long decades of security in which it grew and gathered strength. The special relationship which binds the nation-states of the Commonwealth finds its clearest expression in two ways, and in both of them Canada set the tune. One of them is its only definite constitutional link, the Crown, in whose name the whole process of government and law in every nation-state is carried on. The Canadian constitution was the first example of a federal system combined with constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government in the traditional British form. The union of the provinces under a federal government was naturally inspired by the American model; and if majority opinion in them had been republican, the new constitution would inevitably have taken a republican form. Only a small minority, however, ever toyed with that idea.

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John A. Macdonald, Canada's Founding Father *par excellence,* regarded the Monarchy as the very foundation of the British system, in which he believed with all his soul; and that sentiment has always remained dominant, not only in the British Provinces, but for good reason in Quebec as well. Macdonald indeed proposed that the new federation should be known as the Kingdom of Canada, but was dissuaded by British Ministers who feared (I must believe, unreasonably) that so outspoken a declaration of the monarchical faith in North America might offend the United States. Canada therefore became the Dominion, and that title (now very properly disused) came to stand for the sovereign national status which Australia, New Zealand and South Africa a generation or so later achieved. Had Macdonald's views prevailed, the title would have been "Kingdom status," which would have better expressed the constitutional fact that the King is King of Canada, not because he is King of Great Britain and therefore of Canada as a British Dominion, but because Canada is one of his kingdoms by her own will and in her own right, and also because he is head of the Commonwealth to which, by her own will and right, she belongs. Canada's loyalty to the King is, in other words, Canada's own affair, a direct relation between her sovereign people and the Throne; it is not imposed upon her by Britain or by subordination to any form of imperial power. In accordance with this principle Canada approved and ratified by an Act of her own Parliament the alteration made necessary by the abdication of King Edward VIII in the law regulating succession to the Throne; and simultaneous action was taken to the same effect by all the other nations of the Commonwealth.

It is significant that federation in Canada was closely followed by adoption of Macdonald's "national policy," which gave tariff protection to her development as an independent state, and also by the building of the Canadian-Pacific railway, which united the people from coast to coast. Protection for herself was not, however, Canada's only original contribution, even in early days, to the fiscal system of the Commonwealth. Just before the end of the nineteenth century another Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, established a preference on British goods imported into Canada and sustained a tariff war with Germany in order to make his policy good. In the first five years of the twentieth century Canada's initiative was followed by Australia,

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New Zealand and South Africa, and responded to in Britain by Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign. The British Conservative Party was not, however, united on it, and the Liberal Party blankly refused tariff coöperation in any form when it succeeded to power in 1906.

But in and after the First World War the principle of Imperial Preference made gradual way until it was applied throughout the Commonwealth by the Ottawa Agreements concluded in 1932. It thus became the most important active expression of the Commonwealth family relationship inherent in common allegiance to the King, and was recognized as a constitutional right pertaining to the nations of the Commonwealth by all other Powers. I shall have more to say about it when I come to the problems confronting the Commonwealth at the present time. The point to be emphasized here is that it was not a policy imposed by Britain upon the other nations of the Commonwealth, but a policy originated by the younger nations, and only after long resistance adopted by the senior one. Here again, then, is an example of the way in which the unity of this unprecedented Commonwealth has been fostered by the common action of all its nations, and not by a centralized imperial power.

III

It will be clear from this brief survey that the British Commonwealth of Nations is a polity without resemblance to any other empire, past or present. The future of this loose system may seem precarious in a world which is becoming more and more intent upon clearly articulated regional combinations, because its members are scattered across the globe and must in wisdom adapt themselves severally to new regional or continental developments; but its moral unity has up till now proved stronger than that of any other form of international concert, whether it be a concert bound by alliance and treaty obligation or a concert united under a Charter such as that of the United Nations. That alone entitles it to high consideration as a factor in the balance of power. Like every other human institution, however, it is now confronted by a new set of problems, and its future value to the free world will depend upon its success in solving them.

First of all comes the fear that closer organization may make of it a bloc and thus hamper its several members in playing their proper and essential parts in their own regional environment.

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This fear always governed the views of Mr. Mackenzie King, who has just retired after long and most distinguished service from the premiership of Canada; and it would have real substance if those who want some improvement in the methods of Commonwealth coöperation had ever wished them to be in any way exclusive. In the long declaration upon the subject which he made in 1944, Mr. King based himself mainly on the view that the nations' security for peace would best be served by single-minded loyalty to a world-embracing charter and organization; but that was to rely too much on the sudden emergence of a new world order, as after the First World War. The hope has faded now by no fault of the free nations, and they have reached a general agreement that security for peace must be built up in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter by regional organization in which Canada is playing an important part under the leadership of Mr. St. Laurent.

Much stronger is the argument that Canada must be free to pursue her duties and interests without let or hindrance in the continental system of America. In that respect Canada's interest in North America is very similar to England's interest in Europe; and it is clear that loyalty to the Commonwealth must not be inconsistent with either. If membership of the Commonwealth were in any sense exclusive of membership in other regional or continental associations, it could justly be regarded as a restrictive and (in the international field) antisocial obligation. But one of the greatest virtues of the Commonwealth system is precisely that it is entirely consistent with participation in other coöperative systems, and enhances rather than impairs the usefulness of every one of its members in their own environments. England would be of much less value as a member of Western Union if she were not also a member of the Commonwealth, and so would Canada, in her own North American neighborhood, as her founding fathers saw. Both countries, in fact, are middle countries combining continental with Commonwealth obligations. "Canada," says a brilliant Canadian writer,[3] "has been the product of the balance between east-west and north-south pulls. Let no one be deceived in this matter. Canada will not cease to be both a North American and a British Commonwealth nation." That declaration can be made with equal force for England. Let no one be deceived in this matter. England will not cease to be both a

[3] Anonymous article in *The Round Table,* March 1944.

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European and a Commonwealth nation. Both, therefore, have an ambidextrous rôle to play. We shall see a little later, when discussing alternative systems of multi-national association, that the Commonwealth system has advantages in that connection which no other can claim.

IV

Next among the Commonwealth's problems is that of working the new Asiatic nations into an association which has depended largely on the fact that its members derive from their history a fundamental kinship in feeling and thought. The Monarchy, for instance, which figures in the Statute of Westminster as the Commonwealth's most important link, appears to Indians as a symbol of the alien domination from which they now are free. The issue has recently been made acute by Eire's decision to break the vague and tenuous attachment to the Monarchy which alone gave her status as a member of the Commonwealth, after the passage of the External Relations Act in 1937. It seems unlikely that Pakistan and Ceylon will wish to take that course, but in India feeling is different. The Congress Party which forms her Government has long been hostile to every sign or symbol connected with the Raj, and until quite lately it seemed difficult to conceive of any solution which would satisfy Indian sentiment without making India a completely foreign state.

Eire had deliberately chosen that course; and though a bill has since been introduced under which Eire's citizens will be regarded in Britain neither as British subjects nor as aliens, but as "non-aliens" with practically all a British subject's obligations and rights, the case of Eire has not been regarded as comparable to that of India for the simple reason that India, unlike Eire, wishes to remain a member of the Commonwealth. There were vital reasons why that desire should be met — vital to the older nations and vital to India herself. While, moreover, the Union of India would have a president as its head, its Constitution, apart from that one difference, was closely modelled upon the British parliamentary system; and all the nations of the Commonwealth recognized the critical importance of supporting that system against the tide of Communism setting in against it from the Far East. They have accordingly not been deterred from their aim by the fact that the head of the Indian Union will be elected by the Indian nation whereas, in all the other nations, the King

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is head of each state and represented in his absence by a viceregent of his constitutional functions, who is chosen by the national Government and nominated by the King on that Government's advice. What did profoundly concern the older nations was that no innovation should be made which could in any way prejudice their own allegiance to the King either as head of their domestic systems or as the constitutional symbol of the family relationship which distinguishes the Commonwealth as a whole from all foreign unions or empires or states. The declaration issued unanimously by the nine sovereign Governments of the Commonwealth with the King's wholehearted approval has been almost universally endorsed, because it does in fact describe their different feelings on this essential point. In it India, while reaffirming her intention to become an "independent sovereign republic," declares and affirms her desire "to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of the King as the symbol of the free association of its independent members and as such the Head of the Commonwealth." The other Governments, declaring that "the basis of their membership of the Commonwealth is not thereby changed," accept and recognize India's continuing membership. It is a decisive act of statesmanship on the part of all, and, like many such Commonwealth decisions in the past, a creative act of faith.

There are other problems to be met, but not of a kind to present insuperable difficulty, when once the principle of the Commonwealth is established as the best available pattern for Western Union and for other regional associations. In this, however, as in all things, the first essential is full agreement and understanding between the Commonwealth and the United States, and unhappily there are two very crucial issues in which American and Commonwealth opinion are still far apart. The first of these is the American belief in federalism as a method of association between nation-states; the other — which is a natural reflex of the first — is the American belief in customs unions as economically and even morally superior to the method of mutual tariff preference. Division on these two issues cuts deep; and a danger of grievous misunderstanding will always underlie Anglo-American relations so long as the present American opinion and policy persist, because acceptance of them by the Commonwealth would spell its dissolution and demise. I have discussed them for many years with Americans who sincerely thought that the world had

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more to gain from American policy in these matters than from the survival of the British Commonwealth. It is impossible for an Englishman to be objective on that issue; but here in summary are the chief considerations which inspire his faith.

All who share the view that the secret of the British Commonwealth of Nations has been freedom of growth believe that democratic progress is inseparable from the vitality of nations as sovereign entities controlling their own lives. In the modern world the nation has become an extension of the family with a strong community sense such as distinguished, at an earlier stage, the village or the mediæval town. In a book written during the German occupation, a French author whose nom de plume disguises a man of wide international contacts and knowledge of the world, says very truly that nations are "born of the humblest and most essential relations in human life — those imposed by climate, language, labor, common risks and necessities, kinship of blood. They are daughters of the spirit and also of the flesh; and that is why each has a life which is individual and its own." [4] And that also is why their spirit withers under remote or foreign rule.

Nationalism, born of democracy in Europe, is now one of the most potent forces in the world. Among the less advanced nations it has the self-centered intolerance of youth — as witness its intensity in Asia and the Middle East. Among the more advanced it has given birth to a social conscience which embraces the whole nation, striving within that manageable framework to foster opportunity and security for all. Communism is strong today because it appeals to a universal yearning for better conditions of life among the underprivileged and poor. It thus harnesses to its chariot the only sentiment which compares in strength with nationalism in the forces now shaping the course of human affairs. But in doing so it is compelled by its own unyielding and adamantine creed to iron out the individuality of peoples, to clamp a remote and inaccessible dictatorship upon them — in a word, to denationalize. We who believe in the principle of national freedom which has made the British Commonwealth are convinced that if western democracy does violence to the national spirit of its peoples in seeking to make itself secure, it will destroy its own greatest virtue, the very secret of its growth, and will thereby sacrifice the most potent force which it possesses for resistance to the Communist attack upon it.

[4] Jacquier-Bruère, "Demain La Paix." Paris: Plon, 1945.

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The greatest need of western democracy today is therefore to choose and perfect a method of multi-national association which does not extinguish or even seriously impair the vital spark of nationalism which has reared democracy from its cradle in ancient Greece and has saved it twice from annihilation under remote and reactionary rule. Does federalism meet that need? We believe that it cannot do so, because it involves a sudden and peremptory change from national freedom to national subordination, from a form and scope of government which each national democracy can control to a form and scope of government in which national individuality with its sense for national needs and traits and ideals is bound to be destroyed. Federalism has never yet been tried as a method of uniting ancient nation-states. What it has done is to weld scattered provinces without national consciousness into proud and conscious nation-states, not one of whom is now willing to subordinate its democratic independence to a multi-national federal power. The American Union is one of the great triumphs of democracy; but it will not be a model for federal union among nation-states until its President and Congress, and more particularly its Senate, are willing to part with their responsibility for all the most essential functions of national government. The Senate, we know, is tenacious of its rights; and so is every Parliament in the British Commonwealth. The great existing federations are therefore no example to Europe of willingness to subordinate the nation to multi-national rule.

I do not criticize their attitude because I believe that it is sound. England and Canada cannot allow themselves to be absorbed in any larger federation or union because, whatever wider society they joined, it would exclude them from another in which they are vitally concerned. The Canadian objection to blocs is a natural product of Canada's ambidextrous responsibilities, and England is in exactly the same case. Indeed, one of the further objections to federalism as a cure for the isolation of smaller nations is that in destroying national independence and thereby creating a new union it would form another closed circle in international society: it excludes no less powerfully than it includes. Customs unions, which go with federal unions, create a free trade area at the expense of the rest of the world. It passes English comprehension why Americans should on grounds of principle prefer that wholesale method of exclusion and discrimi-

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nation to the method of tariff preference, which is many-sided and flexible, leaving each of its participants free to regulate as it pleases its trade with other nations and to keep its social and economic development subject to its own will.

There is another aspect of Imperial Preference which is even more vital to the life of the Commonwealth. The younger nations of the Commonwealth are still in a comparatively early stage of development, with great resources to exploit and abundant energy to exploit them. But like the United States at a similar stage, they cannot realize their promise without adding greatly to their manpower by immigration; and they naturally desire British immigrants above all others. There is at present no lack of willing immigrants in England, and a growing realization that it may be wise for her to have fewer mouths to feed if she is to maintain her present standard of life upon her own production both of home-grown food and of exports to pay for imported food and raw material. Her very high standard is at present being maintained by foreign aid, and that cannot continue. Canada, Australia and New Zealand are all making plans for British settlers, and they obviously have the first claim upon them. Both in war and peace they have come to this country's aid with even greater generosity than the United States, in proportion to their wealth and population, though the American people have shown a vision and magnanimity unexampled in the realm of foreign relations; and we must come to their aid in every possible manner.

It is natural, therefore, that English opinion, and more particularly Conservative opinion, should be disturbed by the fact that the conditions attaching to American aid have greatly limited the country's power to further settlement and development overseas, since that depends in many ways upon the support of Imperial Preference. From the Conservative standpoint we seem to have bargained ourselves into two strait jackets — one of them limiting our power to help our own family, the other compelling us to an extensive system of state purchase in place of normal trade facilitated by tariff preferences. If we believed that multilateral trade and the process of general recovery were likely to be better served by creating more closed areas under customs unions than by the much more open and elastic system of groups coöperating internally and with each other by means of tariff preferences, we would subordinate the narrower to the larger ideal. No country has a more vital interest than ours in

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multilateral trade and general prosperity. But our belief, on grounds which we regard as conclusive, is the precise contrary.

V

There are many other facets of the argument for the Commonwealth system of coöperative multi-national groups in preference to exclusive customs unions and federations which deserve attention; but I must come to a conclusion. Here, then, in brief is the position held by a great majority of Englishmen.

We believe that the nation-states of the free world must form themselves into regional associations under Article 51 of the Charter in order to prove that democracy is not suicidally fissiparous and in order to stem the tide of Communism by giving security and prosperity to all coöperating peoples. From the British standpoint, the unity of the Commonwealth as a family of nations comes first and foremost; but we believe that its unity and example can do much to reinforce the other necessary associations. These are, in the first place, Western Union, supported by the North Atlantic Treaty, and then some coöperative system in the Middle East and among the countries flanking the Indian Ocean, where India holds a central position.

In the view of British "imperialists," two conditions are essential to the success of these associations. Our purpose, in a famous American phrase, is "to make the world safe for democracy" by proving that national democracies can combine and coöperate effectively without destroying freedom, the immediate jewel of their souls, or killing within each nation the family sense of social responsibility. Democracy was cradled in nation-states, and still depends on their vitality, their family sense and conscience, for assuaging the strife of classes and defeating the Communist ideal. The individual elector, upon whose civic sense the success of democratic freedom depends, must exercise his responsibility within a national setting which he understands, if he is not to feel himself an atom without influence upon the government which orders his life — or maybe his death — and thereby lose all sense of democratic responsibility. The nation-state is still the largest political unit within which it is possible to maintain close contact and understanding between a people and its leaders, between a voter and the men to whom he is invited to consign his fate and that of all about him. It is therefore still the largest unit within which true democracy can function. The nations of the British

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Commonwealth have realized this instinctively since democratic national consciousness was born in them. Subordinate any national democracy to a remote government which it only partly creates and in which its representatives would be bound to form a minority; subordinate it, as the federation of Western Europe would require, to a majority necessarily alien in language and thought to the minds of voters in its tenements and villages — and what would remain but a mechanical union, like those produced by Communism, in which true democracy would wither?

I might prolong the argument by dealing with the crucial problem raised by differences in national standards of living, in which national electorates are more concerned than in any other matter. I expect, however, that the difficulties of this kind which are preventing the conclusion of a customs union between two countries as close as Holland and Belgium are already familiar to American readers. For England in any case, her system of social security and her standard of life are of the first importance, since they represent an achievement in which all parties have had a creative share and which no party will willingly abandon to the leveling lowest-common-denominator processes of a multi-national federation.

The conclusion follows that national self-determination in those things which most closely affect the homes and lives of the people is a condition of democratic vitality; and therefore, while it is true that nation-states must work closely together if they are not to be destroyed in isolation, it is equally true that they must find some way — as the British Commonwealth has done — of working together without prejudice to national self-government and sovereignty.

The other indispensable condition is that the new associations should not be self-centered blocs either in the sense of closed economic rings, or of a political exclusiveness which would make it impossible for states like England to play their part in two associations simultaneously. I have earlier in this article emphasized the importance of that point from the standpoint of the Commonwealth. It is no less important for Europe. All western opinion is agreed upon the danger constituted by the Iron Curtain which the Kremlin has drawn between its sphere of influence and the rest of Europe; and it must surely be one of the objects of western statesmanship to make it as easy as possible for eastern Germany, the satellite states and Russia herself to enter into closer and

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more fruitful economic relations with the west than are at present permitted by Soviet policy.

If Western Europe is organized for economic coöperation on the model of the British Commonwealth, its system can be adapted without difficulty to permit of participation by the eastern states in western plans for recovery to any degree which they find acceptable. Their present mood is rigid; but their economic difficulties are considerable, and their mood may change as the Marshall Plan matures, if the doors are not closed against them. The question whether or not freedom in Europe is to be finally destroyed by Communist aggression and a third world war will turn in no small measure upon the trend of national opinion in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia; and it is of the first importance to show those countries, not only that the west is recovering its strength and stability under Marshall aid, but that they themselves also can gather strength as nations, whatever their internal régimes, by coöperation with it.

With these essential conditions federalism is incompatible; but they can be fully met by the organization of multi-national groups on the coöperative and preferential basis exemplified by the British Commonwealth. In a remarkable passage in the book already quoted, Jacquier-Bruère argues cogently that economic coöperation depends upon the political formations under which it works. The worth of technical institutions, he writes,[5] "is the worth, and no more, of the political formations which support them. If those formations are closed worlds, empires, continents, concerned above all in increasing their internal strength, the institutions, whatever their technical efficiency, will only energize the egotistic instincts which grope for power and make for war. But if, on the contrary, the political formations are like those which are born of the sea, open associations communicating freely with each other, the technical institutions will reflect their independence and help to make peace secure."

Because it was born of the sea and can play its part in fostering its own free method of association throughout the world, the British Commonwealth system is the only one capable of setting the example of multi-national coöperation by groups to countries lying outside M. Aron's two "empires," the closed economic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union. England can

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 170.

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represent this Commonwealth system in Western Union; England and Canada in the North Atlantic Pact; England and South Africa (if the latter chooses) in North Africa and the Middle East; England, Australia, New Zealand and its Asiatic members including India (if the latter chooses) in the Indian Ocean and the further east.

It will be observed that England is a necessary factor in all these associations. She is, therefore, with great respect to M. Aron, no mere Balkan state. But her influence and usefulness depend upon the strength and moral unity of the Commonwealth, and the most imperative of all her duties and interests is to foster its welfare and development. In its own sphere, moreover, each of the Commonwealth's nation-states counts the more for good and peace in its own neighborhood because it is part of the Commonwealth. If this be "imperialism," it is certainly not imperialism in the old historic sense. It is, on the contrary, the only form of political cement which can bring modern nations together in free coöperative groups without sapping their vitality and destroying the growth of true democracy by remote and inaccessible control. It is also the only form of political cement which can bring modern nations together in coöperative groups without dividing the world into watertight economic blocs.

I believe, therefore, that the British Commonwealth has even greater service to render now than it has rendered in the past; and I trust with all my heart that America's natural attachment to federalism and equally natural dislike of "empires" will not continue to impair that unity of purpose between the English-speaking peoples which is indispensable to the survival of their democratic faith.

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THE TEST OF YALTA

By McGeorge Bundy

AMERICANS, indulging their taste for self-criticism, are much given to writing and reading discussions of the effect of their foreign policy on other peoples. The journalist or critic who wishes to arouse an American audience can always attract attention by remarking that this or that aspect of our policy is costing us friends abroad. We are used to hearing that in one way or another words and actions are endangering what Wendell Willkie called our "reservoir of good will," and we attach importance to such charges.

If the leaders of Soviet Russia have a similar habit, there is no record of it, and we therefore have from Russian sources no proper study of one of the most remarkable achievements of recent years — the way in which the leaders of Soviet Russia have contrived to lose friends and alienate people, especially Americans. Yet the topic is not without importance, particularly at the present time, when there is talk of a change in Soviet policy, or at least in Soviet tactics. From the western point of view, of course, the story of events since 1945 is familiar, but for this very reason it may perhaps be profitably reviewed once again now. Sometimes the most prominent part of a familiar landscape is the very aspect which ceases to be remarked upon, or even noticed. And the fact is that the landmark of Russian-American friendship in 1945 — the terms of the Yalta Agreement — remains no less prominently a point of reference for American-Soviet hostility in 1949 and for any present estimate of real Soviet intentions.

It is not easy, in these days of charge and countercharge, in which the Communists and many of their opponents have exhausted substantial stockpiles of epithets, to recall the state of mind of the west at the time of Yalta. In the early spring of 1945 no nation had more friends abroad than Soviet Russia; not Communists alone, but ordinary men everywhere were eager to find cause for confidence in the people and leaders of the Soviet Union.

This was the high tide of the Grand Alliance. The results of the Yalta Conference were announced — or announced in part — at a time of victories and approaching triumph, but Yalta was cheered less as a successful council of war than as a clear har-

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binger of peacetime coöperation. It provided reassurance to the world, and particularly to Americans, on the great question of the day — can we get along with Russia? To understand the extraordinary importance of the Yalta meeting, we must reconstruct the image of Russia in the minds of average Americans in February 1945.

Most of us knew already that Soviet Russia was governed, as the President had said to the Pope, "by a dictatorship, as rigid in its manner of being as is the dictatorship in Germany," but the knowledge had been pushed into the background. After all, the Nazi enemy was not considered harmless, nor was Russia an unimportant ally. We knew that the Russians had shown extraordinary unity in what they called the "great patriotic war;" it seemed at least possible that their dictatorship was merely the peculiarity of a foreign nation, and that they were sincere when their spokesmen said it was not for export. Only the naïve thought the dissolution of the Comintern had made Thorez or Browder independent agents, but it seemed at least possible that they were to be used merely as pro-Soviet advocates of a new policy of collective security, not as front-line fighters in a Communist attack on western society. The war had put a heavy damper on the usual Soviet oratory about imperialism and monopolies, and on our side too there had been a moratorium on gratuitous insult. American officials and private publicists alike, except for a few incorrigibles, had avoided any insistence that we could not get along with Russia, and the country clearly shared the President's belief that a working friendship was worth considerable effort. The desire to study the Russian language was widespread, and in every university there were men who wanted only an opportunity to develop, as a public service, friendly contacts with the students and scholars of the U.S.S.R. The idea that at some future date, Communism and "the American way" might meet on some middle ground combining the best features of both was attractive to many, and in any event few were afraid of a peaceful competition between the two systems, so long as both sides respected the Marquess of Queensberry rules in their dealings with other nations. Russian adherence to the Atlantic Charter and repeated professions of peaceful intent by the Kremlin were taken as hopeful signs, and there was widespread agreement that in the case of her neighbors Russia was entitled to insist on "friendliness." One of the disturbing problems before Yalta was whether

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"friendliness" and the Queensberry rules were compatible, but the average man hoped for the best.

And he thought he had it, from Yalta. The agreements published after the Crimea Conference were heartening not only on the general ground that they were agreements, though this was important. They were particularly welcome because they seemed to meet American doubts on the two most important issues of the time — the future of Eastern Europe, and the establishment of a new world organization. These were the two questions to which discussions of peace in the American press and American forums returned again and again, in this last year of the war, when it was evident that the shape of the future was not to be determined by the fiat of the paranoiac in Berlin. Would the Communist dictatorship respect the American belief that the small nations which border Germany and Russia are, by right, free countries? Would the Communist dictatorship subordinate its doctrinal objectives to the joint effort of the world community of nations to set up and successfully operate a world organization in which might would not make right?

In the American view, these were the points of reference for judging the direction of Soviet aims. By the terms of the Yalta Agreement, the aims of the U.S.S.R. pointed toward peace and coöperation. The "Declaration on Liberated Europe" contained most specific guarantees that the small nations between the Great Powers were to be permitted self-government determined by free election and secret ballot, under the protection of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, acting together; and it was also announced that the three Powers had reached agreement on voting procedure in the projected United Nations Organization, the only major question in regard to the new world agency which had remained unsettled after Dumbarton Oaks.

Thus it seemed that the Soviet Union, in enlightened self-interest, was prepared to engage in the building of peace on terms acceptable to western democrats. The importance of these two touchstones for measuring Soviet sincerity and American good will cannot be overemphasized. The autonomy of Eastern Europe, and genuine coöperation in the United Nations were the preconditions of American willingness to deal cordially with the Kremlin. For these two things the Americans were willing to give much. It is notable that the terms of the Polish compromise, like those of the voting compromise in the U.N., were generally

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accepted as legitimate concessions for the greater purpose. Praise of Yalta was well-nigh universal, running from Herbert Hoover to Henry Wallace by way of Governor Dewey. Many a man was aware that the proof of the pudding would come in the eating, but few indeed were prepared to deny that a good beginning had been made. When Russian and American soldiers met in comradeship two months later, the satisfaction of the United States was enormous. The reservoir of good will was full.

It is now fashionable in this country to look back at Yalta as a time of wishful thinking, in which American statesmen were outsmarted by Stalin. Critics of Yalta have never shown that Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Churchill granted anything that they were in a position to withhold (except perhaps the Kurile Islands). The object of the western statesmen at Yalta was to persuade Stalin that the common interest required genuine coöperation on the basis of self-restraint by the Great Powers. It seemed for a moment that he was persuaded. In the event, we have seen that he was not. Perhaps the western statesmen, and the peoples whom, in this, they truly represented, should not have believed peaceful coöperation between Russia and the rest of the world a practical possibility, but it is hard to deny their central conviction: that such coöperation would have been to the great advantage of all concerned. In any event, they did in fact obtain agreements which, if kept, would have amounted to a pledge of lasting peace.

II

The Yalta agreements had a short life. Within two weeks after the Crimea Conference had adjourned, the Russians had begun to drain their reservoir of good will. Even before Mr. Roosevelt had reported to the Congress, Mr. Vyshinsky had intervened in Rumania, personally, unilaterally and imperiously, to replace a coalition of moderates with a puppet régime. That a two-hour ultimatum brought the Communist-dominated Government to office has never been disputed. (Less well known, but hardly less revealing, was Mr. Vyshinsky's reply, in Bucharest in January 1946, to the comment that the political methods he required the Rumanian authorities to use would not be well received in the United States and Britain. He said: "Let the sparrows twitter." [1])

[1] H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, "Soviet Imperialism in Hungary." *Foreign Affairs*, April 1948.

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Shortly afterward it became clear that the Polish agreements were not intended by the Kremlin to lead to any genuine coalition of democratic parties. Meanwhile, at San Francisco, Mr. Molotov, in his first western appearance, was intransigent in his demands for a free hand for the Soviet Union in the world organization. The two central pillars of the Yalta settlement — self-government in Eastern Europe and coöperation in the United Nations — seemed already shaken. Indeed, the information that came to the American Government was more disheartening than anything made available to the public (an official reticence which continued for about two years), but both citizens and officials were disturbed. At this juncture the new President sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow.

The Hopkins mission to Moscow is one of the most interesting episodes in American diplomatic history.[2] Harry Hopkins saved the U.N., and he patched up the Polish problem (for a while). But the point of greatest interest in his extraordinary conversations with the Generalissimo is his eloquent, persistent and wholly unsuccessful effort to direct the attention of Stalin to the fact that the Kremlin was making trouble for itself with American public opinion. Over and over again Hopkins warned Stalin, in friendly and diplomatic language, that the future of the Roosevelt policy of coöperation depended on a favorable public opinion, and that the Polish question, with others, was creating grave doubts among the very people who had been, and wished still to be, friendly to the Soviet Union. As plainly as he could be expected to do, given the conciliatory purpose of his mission, Hopkins indicated that the trouble lay in Soviet actions, not just in misunderstanding. And always he came back to his central point — Americans who had rejoiced at Yalta were now seriously disturbed, and for this reason the whole future of Russian-American relations was in danger.

If Generalissimo Stalin understood this point, he never showed it. First he taunted Hopkins genially with hiding behind the shield of public opinion. Then he indicated that as between colleagues in statecraft, he was ready to make adjustments in order to help Churchill off the Polish hook. But he never made any reply which indicated a serious interest in the central point of Hopkins' mission. He never asked why Americans were disturbed, or what Soviet Russia might do to calm them down.

[2] Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins." New York: Harper, 1948, p. 887–912.

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American public opinion, whose controlling influence in all American policy Hopkins was trying to communicate, seemed to Stalin either a weapon in bargaining or a problem for management by western statesmen. Neither the value of its support nor the cost of its opposition seems to have struck him as very important. There is no greater error in statesmanship than the underestimation of a significant force. Much — if not all — of the frustrated confusion into which Soviet foreign policy had worked itself by 1949 was the result of the total Soviet disdain for the attitude of the west which underlay the failure of communication between Hopkins and Stalin.

The men in the Kremlin had three choices after Yalta. One was to accept its principles and to devote themselves to the construction of a sincere peace, based on mutual respect for vital interests, and self-restraint in other areas. The second was to pretend to accept the Yalta principles — in other words, to make an effort to conserve the advantages of the reservoir of good will — while continuing under the surface the great contest for the world ordained by Stalinist theory. It may be that Soviet leaders thought this was in fact the course they were following. But the course that seems most nearly to fit the actual record of Soviet behavior since Yalta is a third one — a policy characterized by an apparent decision to disregard as unimportant the good will of the non-Communist west and to proceed as energetically as possible to expand and consolidate Communist power.

The reservoir of good will, in 1945, had many ingredients; none was more important than the general belief that Russians and Americans could "talk the same language." The Soviets proceeded to use a vocabulary which, for the westerners, turned language inside out. (The "free flow of ideas" became a "Fascist" proposal, and so on.) But there was nothing ambiguous about Soviet actions. By early 1946, whatever Americans might think of Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech at Fulton (and many were critical then who would find it mild today), it was hard for anyone to deny his plain words that "this is certainly not the liberated Europe we fought to build up." Privately, the Russians sometimes offered explanations; Stalin at Potsdam, for example, remarked that free elections in Eastern Europe would result in a hostile régime, which he could not permit.[3] But publicly, abroad

[3] Philip E. Mosely, "Face to Face with Russia." New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1948, p. 23.

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as at home, the Russians merely proclaimed that the "new democracies" were models of virtue. Anyone who expressed doubt of this was an enemy of peace; anyone who referred to Yalta was answered by violent explanations that "true" freedom (the blanket qualification which is so often used to smother men's liberties) had been safeguarded. This sort of talk tended merely to confirm for Americans the evidence of their eyes: that one basic premise of Yalta — an autonomous Eastern Europe — was being deliberately and cynically flouted.

The question of behavior in the United Nations offered the Soviets a more complicated problem, for the forum was worldwide; and it was impossible to sing two songs undetected. But the disdain for American good will seemed no less evident in Russian procedures. When the storm blew up over Iran — the first major disturbance in the Security Council — nothing could alter the fact that the Soviet Union had directly violated an agreement. Soviet rage was educational, but, alas, in a left-handed way. Had Mr. Molotov studied the record of the Japanese in 1931, he might have gained a new perception of the possibilities of a soft answer in such matters. And the Iranian episode was only the beginning. On atomic energy the Russians were completely recalcitrant (and abusive); and with the indiscriminate use of the veto they brought to a stop the work of the Security Council — that agency of the United Nations which is responsible for the prevention of aggressive war. These actions are on the record. There are elements of a case for the Russian position both on atomic energy and on the veto; there is no case at all for the manner and evident intent of their actions in both fields. Since the success of the United Nations was an issue closer to the heart of Americans than perhaps any other in the field of international relations, the effect on the reservoir of good will need scarcely be described.

The rigidity of the Soviet bloc was apparent in the United Nations long before the west had solidified against it. Could there not have been some variety in the dance of the puppets? Soviet critics have never been impressed by what they regard as the spurious independence of Brazil or Mexico, but they need not have thought that others were equally unimpressionable. A little planning might have produced a most pleasing and harmless effect of diversity. And however that may be, the decision to ignore and avoid all of the specialized agencies of U.N. except

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one (W.H.O., from which they have now withdrawn) seemed to set the final mark of Communist disdain on the new world organization.

No doubt it was thought dangerous for a country devoted to a policy of hermetic isolation to get heavily involved with some of those agencies; but it is hard to believe that a few trained seals could not have been sent to meetings of UNESCO, for instance, with orders to "come and go, talking of Michelangelo." Just a little of this sort of thing would have been a most powerful reinforcement to the eager hopes of thousands of intellectuals in the west. This failure to exploit the cultural opportunities of 1945 and 1946 is the more surprising because Marxists have not ordinarily misunderstood the importance of friendly intellectuals.

But more important than anything done or not done in U.N., from the point of view of its effect in the United States, was the decision to reimpose an iron discipline of aggressive hostility upon all the Communists in the world. Here again we have a decision of policy, not a question of "public relations." Yet the very purpose of the policy was to influence the west. Apparently the deliberate choice was to influence the west toward hostility to the Soviet Union. Apparently the Politburo reasoned that what was lost in good will would be made up by gains from the tactics of boring from within, in the various non-Communist countries. It was a queer decision for rational men to make even in Italy and in France, but it was preposterous in Great Britain and the United States. Ever since 1933, when Franklin Roosevelt talked to Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Government had been on notice that Americans of good will felt strongly about Soviet-dominated agitators in the United States. Only men blind to reality, or possessed by a frantic need to sharpen conflicts, could have thus surrendered an appeal to the amiable in favor of an appeal to the non-existent revolutionary masses. When Foster replaced Browder, a very heavy drain on the reservoir was opened.

III

The Iron Curtain, the veto and the revival of aggressive world Communism, all of them accompanied by a mounting din of self-praise and denunciation, had combined by the end of 1946 to kill the war-born hopes of Americans. Meanwhile the sessions of the Foreign Ministers had continued, and out of their ups and downs

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had come a conviction that Secretary Byrnes was correct in his prescription of "patience and firmness."

The detailed points at issue in each of the sessions — London, Moscow, Paris, New York, Moscow, and London — need not concern us here. What is interesting for our present purpose is the premise on which the Soviets constantly sought to strike bargains: it was the premise of two-Power domination — the premise of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement. When Mr. Byrnes registered protests against Communist behavior in Eastern Europe, Mr. Molotov wondered audibly what bargain he was trying to drive. Disregarding non-Communist opinion in their policies and propaganda, the Russians seemed to disregard it also in their efforts at negotiation. They never seemed to understand that Mr. Byrnes was responsible to American opinion, and that he had neither asked nor received any commission for the expansion of American imperialism, or any authorization to conclude even the most advantageous two-Power agreement at the expense of the rest of the world.

One result of this misunderstanding was that Russian proposals and counterproposals, Russian public statements and private comments, were seldom framed attractively even on the rare occasions when they were designed to please. Many agreements were reached during the first four sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but neither the process of negotiation nor the upshot of many of the agreements added to the reservoir of good will. By the latter part of 1946 the Russians had succeeded in relieving Mr. Byrnes of one earlier difficulty: he was no longer under constant and heavy pressure to get agreement for the sake of agreement. With the completion of the satellite treaties, the knotty problem of Germany was about to come on-stage. UNRRA was ending. (Was it intelligent for the Soviet Government to give no syllable of thanks for UNRRA?) But in China the scales were still in uncertain balance; in France and Italy the Communists were still in the Governments. Peace was certainly not made, but for most Americans the period of hostility had not begun.

The year 1947 brought in succession the Truman Doctrine in March, deadlock in Germany in April, and the original Marshall proposal in June. All three were indications of a new American policy: Americans were determined not to leave the initiative with the Soviet Union, or even with history. Here were strong hints

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that the course of Soviet conduct had produced untimely results. The Russians responded in a way which not only disarmed the critics of the Truman Doctrine, who were many, but made the necessary friends for the Marshall Plan.

Let us grant — though it is only to save space — that Soviet policy required open hostility to the Truman Doctrine and complete intransigence on Germany. The Russian decision not only to stand apart from the Marshall Plan but to employ against it every weapon short of open war in the armory of Communism remains incomprehensible. For it is clear that this was the indispensable evidence needed to persuade the average American of two great facts: first, that Soviet Russia was wholly hostile to the idea of peaceful reconstruction in any part of the world not under Communist government; and second, that such reconstruction must be pushed ahead, not only on its own merits, but for the purpose of containing Communism. And the hearty approval of the average man in America was a *sine qua non* of the Marshall Plan. How much of the original impetus of the plan would have survived if Molotov had really sat down at Paris, deployed the enormous retinue he took with him (and one still wonders what they were doing there if this notion was not considered) and coöperated in form but not in fact? Seldom have so few contributed so much to so many as the men in the Kremlin who made Molotov tough in Paris and Zhdanov tougher in Warsaw when the Comintern was revived.

Whatever the considerations which governed these decisions — and we may speculate endlessly on this point — it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they were made without proper calculation of their effect on opinion in the west. No effort was made to soften them; no credit or mention was given to the good intentions which filled the hearts of average Americans. And to cap the climax, Mr. Vyshinsky presented to the General Assembly in September a list of American warmongers at which Americans could not decide whether to laugh or cry, such was its vicious absurdity. What Vyshinsky said in New York had been said a hundred times already, but mainly for domestic consumption in the Soviet Union. When he said it on the world stage it could be taken only as proof that the Kremlin was not merely doping its own masses and its Cominform agents. Either it was doping itself, or it was engaged in a cynical and brutal assault on the whole fabric of non-Communist society — or possibly both.

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Finally, we come to the Czechoslovak putsch. In retrospect, it is difficult to overestimate the value of Beneš and Masaryk and their relatively free government and people to the Soviet Union, and it is almost impossible to overestimate the damage done to Communism in the west by the coup of February 1948. In the United States it ensured the creation of an effective E.C.A.; in Italy it helped to turn the scales in the crucial April election; all over the world it had an impact greater than anything done before or since in the satellite countries. Whatever was feared from a continuation of parliamentary democracy in Czechoslovakia, and whatever was hoped of Gottwald, was the extinction of Czechoslovak independence worth the price the Politburo paid for it?

IV

Whatever the particular conclusion as to Czechoslovakia, the general import of that question has at last, apparently, engaged the students of revolution in the Kremlin. Behind each of the Russian actions we have thus summarily recalled, there lay, of course, a policy consideration. No skill in public relations could have made the Iron Curtain invisible or attractive, nor could Litvinov himself have been lovable if it had been he who was tying the U.N. in knots. Until the middle of 1947 the course of Russian policy was such that a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" could have retained some — possibly no little — Russian good will in the west. After the decision to attack the Marshall Plan, that is no longer true. But if it was true after 1945 that even within the Soviet choice of policy there was room for different public relations, may it not also be true that even within Soviet grand strategy there was room for different policies? We must conclude that Stalin's failure to understand what Hopkins said about American opinion was only a part of a broader and deeper failure — a failure to understand the very nature of western society. And one of the results of the last four years of Soviet behavior is that millions of Americans have in fact reached this conclusion.

It must be admitted that two years ago it seemed far from clear that an all-out Communist effort would fail to capture any one of the western nations; criticism of Russian policy now has the great advantage of hindsight. But it is just such criticism from hindsight that illuminates the cause of Soviet failure. For what saved

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Western Europe from Communism was American public opinion, and it was the Russians, not Wall Street, that armed this mighty force. The tide in Europe runs toward the west, and the United States has confounded Soviet calculations by displaying timely energy and remarkable constancy. It is at least possible that the Soviet leaders have begun to understand how greatly they and their agents have contributed to this result.

But the record of the last four years remains. How shall we summarize it? Shall we say that we are grateful for a lucky escape? The thought of what might now be happening to Europe if, after 1945, the Russians had chosen words and tactics designed to allay and not to arouse American public opinion is not a pleasant one. And if we are grateful, are we perhaps also safe, for the present, from the effects of a policy of deceptive friendliness by Russia? Perhaps we have learned that the basis of Soviet conduct since Yalta is a concept of human society not merely alien, but actively hostile to our own. If this is one of the lessons we have learned, the Soviet leaders now have not three choices, but two: they may meet the terms of Yalta in good faith, or they may refuse them; it is too late for them to say one thing and do another.

Writing in 1947, a statesman who had long urged conciliation with Soviet Russia came to the reluctant conclusion that there could be no lasting settlement until the men in the Kremlin *should "either change their minds or lose their jobs."* [4] They have not lost their jobs; it remains to be seen whether — and how much — they have changed their minds. The basis of American hopes in 1945 was the double commitment of Yalta: self-government in Eastern Europe, and coöperation in the United Nations. Nothing that has happened since 1945 has made this double test of friendship less important. If it now seems stern, that is perhaps a measure of the distance that Soviet leaders have traveled from the path toward peace. The test of lasting settlement is still the test of Yalta.

[4] Henry L. Stimson, "The Challenge to Americans." *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947.

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MEASURES TO PREVENT A SLUMP

By Roy Harrod

IN the economic sphere, the world is about to enter a new phase. It is already evident in the United States that the period of the postwar transition with its special characteristics is drawing to a close. In Great Britain an over-all balance of trade has been achieved, although a large deficit against the dollar area remains; inflationary pressure has almost ceased and British industry is no longer gravely impeded by material shortages. On the Continent also there are signs that the inflationary pressure has eased. No doubt vast work remains to be done and many years must elapse before the ravages of war are repaired. But the period of extreme shortages and high pressure may be deemed to be over. It is not only in the United States that signs of depression are likely to appear.

This, therefore, is the time to take stock of such arrangements and plans as we have for international economic coöperation. Machinery was created some five years ago, and modes of procedure agreed upon, with some hope that they would enable the nations to tackle their economic problems in a spirit of closer coöperation than in the thirties. Nonetheless, as the time draws near for these plans to be put to the test, there is a suspicion that the agencies and procedures may not be adequate to the occasion. Governments feel that they may have to increase import restrictions and take other unneighborly measures, if faced with a severe depression. In the economic field, no less than in politics, the momentum of internationalism appears to have decreased. The political reasons are too well known to need repetition here. But in the economic sphere, the failure of one or more Powers to be fully coöperative ought not to prevent collaboration by the others. It may be that the plans themselves were not entirely adequate.

Partly owing to waning faith in economic internationalism, and also owing to the unexpectedly formidable difficulties of the transition period, there has recently been a tendency to turn in another direction and recommend regional coöperation, an example of which would be a European Union. Provided that ambitious plans for federal political institutions are strictly eschewed, it should be possible to make good progress in Euro-

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pean collaboration. A beginning has been made under the stimulus of E.R.P., and it should be possible to proceed further in such matters as mutual currency convertibility and the relaxation of import restrictions between the European countries. It would be a happy thing indeed if the European nations could so far overcome prejudices and genuine difficulties as to aim at a free trade area.

When one considers this regional proposal, however, one sees at once that regional groupings of this kind must not, like nations, be mutually exclusive in area. Britain would be part of a European grouping, but part also of the British Commonwealth and Empire, and there would thus be an overlap. Nations cannot overlap one another — even nations with federal constitutions; there must, therefore, be something organically different in the conception of such a regional grouping from the conception of a federation. It must be emphasized that in order to get free markets of continental scope for their manufactures, European nations should aim at a free trade area, and not, as has sometimes been suggested, at a customs union. A customs union would be inconsistent with the position of Britain as an integral part of each of the two groupings. Britain would be unwilling to treat the produce of her Commonwealth and Empire much less favorably than that of the European continent. If she reduced her duties on Commonwealth and Empire produce to a very low level or to zero, she would be obliged, in accordance with her obligations, to reduce her tariffs on goods from outside countries also, so as to avoid increasing preference margins. Britain would, in fact, have to be a relatively free trade country.

In a customs union, member countries have to have identical duties against the outside world. The continental nations would never agree to reduce their protection against the outside world to this extent. Consequently, the idea of a customs union has to be abandoned, and that of a free trade area, with each nation adopting a separate and independent policy in its external tariffs, substituted for it. No solution could be found by bringing the Commonwealth and Empire within the European customs union, even if such a plan were acceptable to the United States, because the European nations would refuse to accept Commonwealth and Empire produce duty free, and the British Dominions would refuse to accept European manufactures duty free. This may serve to illustrate the point that the institutional arrangements of

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a regional grouping must and can be adapted to meet the problems of a possible overlap.

Such proposals as those for a European Union and for closer Pan American coöperation suggest the division of the world into large blocs. This is a dangerous tendency, and it is fortunate that the special relations of Britain to her Commonwealth and Empire completely upset the tidy and symmetrical idea of the formation of mutually exclusive regional groupings. But once it is recognized that groupings need not be mutually exclusive, large new vistas open up. What a "grouping" means, in essence, is close economic coöperation — and the benefits of close Anglo-American economic coöperation, not only to the partners, but also to the world as a whole, are obvious. In the writer's opinion, no other instance of international economic collaboration offers such possibilities of general usefulness as this; and once we accept the idea that international groupings of smaller ambit than the whole world need not be mutually exclusive, it follows that Anglo-American coöperation need not be inconsistent with the European Union. The two procedures are not alternatives. We should proceed with the utmost energy along both paths. The significance of the British Commonwealth and Empire, in this respect, is that it exists as a going concern, and has developed procedures which reduce unneighborly action. The main objective in a European Union would be to remove obstacles to trade within the area.

II

In considering Anglo-American coöperation, I suggest that, to focus our thoughts and plans, we take as the leading idea the prevention of world-wide slump. Nothing has happened since 1939 to make it seem any less likely that boom and slump will continue to follow one another as of old. The great postwar boom suggests that, sooner or later, we may be faced with a tendency toward an unprecedented slump. How near such a development may be is not germane to the argument, for it is clear that effective remedies need careful and lengthy preparation. Furthermore, there is one school of thought which holds that the world of free enterprise may have to face a period of "stagnation," that is, of chronic depression. Its arguments are strong, and those who take the other view can hardly hold that they are quite certainly incorrect. Thus we are beset with grave dangers. If a slump were

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allowed to assume major dimensions, this would be a great disaster. The Russians await precisely this dénouement, and smile sardonically meanwhile. Are we really sure that we have done all the thinking and planning that are needed to secure ourselves against it?

The case for close Anglo-American coöperation is precisely that this is the sole available method for averting the disaster in question. An American policy which prevented the development of a large recession in the United States would be an important contribution to world stability. By itself it would not be enough, but the dollar-sterling area as a whole bulks so large in the non-totalitarian world that stability in this wide region would probably suffice to reduce fluctuation in the whole world to manageable dimensions. Neither Power could create a stable world alone; by a joint effort they should succeed in doing so. It may be objected that action taken by agencies of still wider scope would be still more effective. The answer is that at present these agencies lack sufficient powers, and that there is not sufficient confidence in them to make nations, great or small, willing to give them the extra powers which they would need.

This lack of confidence may be in part mere old-fashioned prejudices; nonetheless, if it exists, we must take it into our reckoning. But it may also have reason behind it. Effective anti-slump action must be timely, bold and large in scope. Such action, if ill-considered, might have appalling results. To get well-considered action, it is necessary to have a common point of view, a common basis of economic doctrine, as well as mutual trust and understanding. These conditions do not appear to be fulfilled in the larger circle of nations, but as between Britain and the United States, they are possible. (I assume that the British Dominions would be closely associated in this activity.)

No doubt there would be political objection, on both sides of the water, to close Anglo-American collaboration leading to vigorous action in the international sphere. When the war was still on, Americans were especially anxious, for political reasons, to make it plain that there would be nothing exclusive in the Anglo-American discussions under Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, and that all nations would be brought in on an equal footing as quickly as possible. There might well be loud outcry against arrangements for joint international action by the United States and Britain, in which other nations were not full

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and equal partners. This is the unhappy offspring of age-old prejudices; we are dogged by history. Nevertheless, if the danger which we face is sufficiently grave, surely a way can be found. Two important points could be emphasized. One is that the plans would be framed so as to reduce to a minimum specific commitments requiring legislative support. The other is that, although the planning, management and decisions would be Anglo-American, the consequential benefits would be open for all to enjoy. It would be an Anglo-American service for the world at large.

This coöperation should take two forms. There would be needed a continuous and detailed concerting of policy at a high and intimate level, and there would also be needed some kind of international agency. When the slump gains ground, the United States Government will develop policies in the internal and foreign fields. So too will the British. It is important that these two Powers should know, not merely in terms of statements dressed for public consumption, but in terms of most secret motives, what those policies are. An initial difficulty that might be encountered on the American side is that, in a certain sense, the Government may have no concerted policy of its own. The great Departments in the United States Government have been likened to independent sovereign powers — an arrangement that has a connection with the Constitution itself, and serves to make more difficult encroachment by the central power upon the liberties of the individual.

It would undoubtedly be dangerous to undermine this valuable safeguard. Generations of political writers have given praise to the flexibility and efficiency of the British Constitution, by contrast with the more rigid American structure, but I believe this opinion is now undergoing a change. Lovers of liberty see weakness in the elasticities and informalities of the British system, and a bulwark of defense in the written Constitution of the United States. Nonetheless, Americans may feel the need for a greater coördination of policy, at least for the specific purpose of concerting measures to combat trade depression. The weaknesses in the American anti-depression policies of the thirties are now generally well understood. The British administrative system already has more internal cohesion, with its strong Cabinet, its Treasury which occupies a strategic position among the Ministries, a useful Cabinet Secretariat, and good interdepartmental committee work.

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III

I give, merely for example, a plan for securing the kind of coöperation which I have in mind. Congress, when passing the Bretton Woods Act, set up a National Advisory Council on Monetary and Financial Problems, to watch the policy of the international agencies in relation to American policy. This body is composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, as chairman, the Secretaries of State and Commerce, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank. It has established a working Staff Committee and Secretariat composed of officials of the agencies represented on it and of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and it may be relied on to have full information on current United States problems and policies. The British should set up a similar body, and these two bodies should have frequent, say monthly, joint meetings. There should be mutual consultation and revelation of plans, with the same kind of intimacy that existed at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings. The problem of combatting depression is not unlike that of combatting an "enemy:" there are frequent surprises and changes in the situation, and quick adaptation is needed. Such a body should be attended by Dominion representatives also, sharing the same intimacy.

It ought to be possible to set up this machinery without meeting too serious legislative problems. The purpose of the joint effort would be to find solutions for economic difficulties, within the field of what is "politically possible" in each democracy. But the combined group would be charged with the duty of pushing the discussion to a point at which all were satisfied that plans were adequate to the situation and that the two nations, by their joint and several policies, could effectively prevent depression from gathering force within their own borders.

This by itself would not be enough to meet the threat of world-wide economic depression. Some Anglo-American agency would be required. Surveying the scope of existing agencies, one finds two notable gaps. There is no international Central Bank with powers of "credit creation," and, despite abortive discussions, there is no master plan for dealing with the commodity problem. An Anglo-American Central Bank need not poach upon the ground of the International Monetary Fund; indeed, it might

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make it easier for the Fund to carry out its tasks effectively. The Fund has duties somewhat different from those of a Central Bank; its primary concern is with the equilibrium or disequilibrium in the balances of payments of various countries, with the maintenance of exchange parities or their orderly adjustment, and with the rules whereby the convertibility of currencies is assured or, when need be, modified. Above all, it should preserve the balance between creditor and debtor countries by constraining the creditor countries to play their part in any needful adjustment, through the operation of the scarce currency clause. Owing to the difficulties of the transition period, the Fund has not begun to function as it normally will; it has had to adapt itself to difficult times. If more orderly international relations are achieved, it will have most important tasks to perform.

The essential features of a Central Bank proper are: 1, that it carries assets and liabilities many times as great as the subscribed capital; and 2, that it can vary the size of its total assets from time to time in the pursuit of its own policy of stabilizing business conditions. The International Monetary Fund has neither of these features. Whether there was a genuine "credit creating" power in the clearing union as originally drafted by the late Lord Keynes may be disputed. Be that as it may, it would have been easy to graft upon his institution, as and when experience showed the need, a credit-creating power. But the constitution of the International Monetary Fund, which is in some ways the converse of that of a Central Bank, seems to preclude the possibility of credit creation, without a change so radical as to involve rebuilding it afresh. It cannot expand its aggregate assets at will, to suit the phrase of the trade cycle. Its constricted shape is probably due to the American fear that any money which the United States might have on deposit there would be in the nature of a "handout" to needy countries, rather than an excellent and valued asset. This point of view may still obtain. Yet, so long as it does, it is impossible to create a genuine international Central Bank or realize all the benefits that might flow therefrom.

It would seem the wiser course, therefore, to maintain the International Monetary Fund as it is (though, we may hope, with enlarged resources), in order that it may play a more active and important part when conditions are normal, and to set up alongside of it a central banking agency, the primary purpose of which would be to expand and contract credit as occasion

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required. Yet, once again, we must note that this would be impossible if the Americans continued to regard a deposit in the Central Bank as a "handout." This is one of the most important reasons why it seems needful to have a joint Anglo-American institution. Might not Americans regard their holdings in an institution jointly controlled by the two Powers as valuable assets? All turns on this.

The basis of operation of the agency would be that the Federal Reserve Banks and the Bank of England would treat deposits in it as cash. It would thus stand in precisely the same relation to these two institutions as they bear to the member banks of their own countries. Any other national Central Bank would be free, if it wished, to hold deposits there. I postulate that the Bank would expand its assets during recessions and contract them during periods of revival. By itself it could not deal with the "stagnation" problem; that can be solved only by the direct action of national governments. But there would be close coördination between the policy of the agency and the employment policies of the United States and Great Britain.

The agency would operate in sterling and dollars. What means should it use to expand and contract credit? It could and should buy and sell gold, but gold holdings are now too concentrated for such operations to have ramifying effects. In modern times Central Banks operate mainly through the purchase and sale of government securities, but in the case of an international bank this would raise complicated problems. If the Central Bank wished to have widely dispersed holdings, its portfolio would contain paper of doubtful value, and this would bring us back to the American idea of a "handout." Moreover, the various nations would themselves intensely dislike an institution which set out to hold large quantities of their several securities and, from time to time, to sell large quantities of them in such markets as it could find. This was indeed a bone of contention in the original discussions about the International Monetary Fund and was an important reason why its powers were restricted. The phobia in this matter was mainly on the British side.

What is required is that the Bank should be able to buy and sell, over a wide area, assets which are not earmarked as specifically national in character. Gold is ideal for this purpose, but gold is not enough. Then why should the Central Bank not buy and sell standard commodities other than gold? These would

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provide amply sufficient media for expanding and contracting credit. At the same time, it is widely agreed that the commodity problem must be tackled internationally. I assume that the proposed Bank would establish a wide margin between buying and selling prices, within which private trade could flourish. It would aim at ironing out oscillations, while ensuring a steady downward (or upward) movement of prices in accordance with fundamental conditions of supply and demand. It would take no cognizance of restriction schemes. The individuals of all nations would be free to buy from it and sell to it.

It should be emphasized that such a plan would not constitute the sum total of Anglo-American coöperation to prevent depression. This activity would be ancillary to their domestic plans, which we assume to be closely concerted. For Americans the agency would have the advantage of taking the agricultural support price policy off the shoulders of taxpayers, save to the extent that they were unwilling to see domestic agricultural prices conform in the long run to the world trend. It would relieve the taxpayers of the heavy burden that must come to them, if the domestic support price policy has to be carried out through a severe world depression. What Americans and British would be asked to contribute would be: 1, a moderate capital for the agency; and 2, the excess of storage costs, if any, over the profits on turnover. The latter would be at all severe only if there were a long-continued downward trend in the prices of all or of the majority of the commodities dealt in.

IV

There remains to consider the question whether this agency should compete in the field marked out for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. All depends on how the International Bank evolves. The correct timing of development projects should play some part in the conquest of the trade cycle. The Charter of the International Bank contains no reference to the duty to provide such timing, but there is no reason why it should not do so. If its resources could be enlarged and its policy geared to the objective of ironing out the trade cycle, the Anglo-American agency could leave this field entirely to the International Bank. That institution exists, and duplication is undesirable, always provided that American investors are prepared to contribute sufficient funds to it. It is to be hoped that the

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British will also soon be in a position to make their own financial contribution to the work of the International Bank. For Americans and British to tend to concentrate upon separate fields of investment may be undesirable; some intermingling of plans and responsibilities is needed, and this might be effectuated either through the International Bank or through the Anglo-American agency.

At present these two Great Powers pursue unrelated and divergent policies, and I have attempted to illustrate only certain possibilities of coöperation. Who can doubt that there would be an immense revival of hope and enterprise throughout the non-totalitarian world, if the two Powers were known to be working closely together? Soon the drama of the trade depression will begin to unfold. There will be new strains and stresses, new forms of restriction and new threats to the very existence of free enterprise. Surely it is evident that this will call for a pooling of all there is of economic intelligence, resourcefulness and planning capacity in these two Great Powers. But we should not wait for the troubles to come. Britain has still very difficult postwar problems before her, connected with her "sterling balances" and the question of convertibility. She should take the United States fully into her confidence in regard to these matters. Joint consultation about them might be a first step to more far-reaching economic coöperation.

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MILITARY ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ATLANTIC PACT

By George Fielding Eliot

THE preamble to the North Atlantic Pact sets forth that the parties "are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security." To give practical effect to this resolve, Article 9 of the Pact provides for the establishment of "a council, on which each of [the parties] shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty." The council "shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5." Article 3 deals with self-help and mutual aid, and the maintenance and development of "individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Article 5 provides for common action, in case of armed attack against any of the parties, "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

The tasks of the council and of its defense committee are therefore to survey the resources of the parties to the Pact, and to make recommendations for the most effective use of these resources in developing the "individual and collective" military power of the parties, and plans for common action "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area" in case an armed attack upon one of them actually takes place. These are tasks of almost unbelievable complexity and difficulty.

II

In coördinating the military efforts of a coalition of independent states, not only must there be agreement by the governments as to political objectives, and agreement by the military leaders as to the best method of attaining these objectives, but the military plans are subject to the constant pressure of governments for change in direction or character under the influence, at times, of purely local and individual considerations. In war, this is particularly likely to be so during a defensive phase, when each of the allied Powers or coöperating forces expects the enemy attack to fall upon it alone, and each is therefore desperately determined to retain every resource for its own defense, and reluc-

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tant to part with any of its resources for common purposes, even for the establishment of a common reserve whose commitment to action it cannot wholly control.

The basic character of the North Atlantic Pact is, by definition, defensive. Its intent is to provide unified security for 12 states against armed attack on any one of them. But it is only human nature for each state, especially on the continent of Europe, to imagine itself as the object of such an attack and therefore to seek from the less exposed states (the United States, Britain and Canada) the largest possible allocations of weapons, reinforcement and other support. In coming to an agreement on this point, the responsibility of each government concerned for the security of its people and the safety of its territory is directly involved.

It will be no easy matter for representatives of the general staffs of all the parties to come to agreement as to the ideal plan, from the purely strategical viewpoint, for making the most effective use of the total resources at the disposal of the alliance. It will be infinitely more difficult to induce the various governments to accept any such plan simply on the basis of its over-all military efficiency, for complications coming from individual national interests and feelings of insecurity will inevitably arise. There are three general principles affecting military coalitions which experience suggests will have to be taken into account, and constantly kept in mind by all concerned, civilians and military, if the task set before the council and its Defense Committee is to be accomplished. These principles, like the principles affecting the conduct of war, are simple; it is their application to variant situations that will call for genius.

The successful conduct of war by a coalition, and therefore preparation of a coalition for the common defense, requires:

(1) Political and economic coördination, in which the governments of the Parties agree on a common objective, and establish agencies for the survey and pooling of their total resources, and for common diplomatic action.

(2) Strategic coördination, in which the military staffs of the parties prepare plans for the military use of their forces to achieve the common objective, and establish an agency for the constant revision of such plans to meet changing conditions, and for the exchange of military information.

(3) Unity of command in any theater of possible operations

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where the forces of two or more of the parties may be concurrently employed.

Examining these principles in the light of experience, we find that in most military alliances preceding World War I, there was little more in the way of political and economic coördination than a general expression of a common aim, reinforced by occasional consultations in which it was rare for complete confidence and frankness to prevail. Strategic coördination was generally limited to "staff talks" between the parties, with occasional joint manœuvres or other military exercises, and the exchange of military observers. Unity of command was simply not thought of as a practicable arrangement in time of peace, and only rarely became so in war. The success of military coalitions of this era was in general dependent on the presence of some one dominating military personality, such as Marlborough, Washington or Wellington, who could by sheer force of character and recognized genius weld the disparate parts of the allied forces into a working military machine, while retaining the confidence of the several governments to a sufficient degree to give him the necessary freedom of action.

The alliances formed against Frederick the Great, and the earlier coalitions against Napoleon, lacked any such controlling personality and were dismal failures in consequence. The alliance against Russia which won the Crimean War was fortunate in its logistical advantage, and in the fact that the Russian command was as divided and inept as its own. Bismarck began the Franco-Prussian War only after securing the agreement of the South German states to a common military command, which in effect meant placing their armies at the disposal of the Prussian General Staff, and subordinating their policies to that of the Prussian Government.

The alliance against Germany in World War I was almost destroyed for lack of political coördination, which was brought about only in the aftermath of disaster, following the Italian defeat at Caporetto and the collapse of Russia in the closing weeks of 1917. Then the Supreme War Council was set up, and subsequently the principle of unity of command found expression in the appointment of Foch. It is not generally realized how much of his success Foch owed to the fact that he had a single political master. Two previous attempts at unified command, under Joffre and Nivelle, had failed largely because of the lack

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of such a central agency of political coördination. Without it, strategical agreement and unity of command were not sufficient.

In World War II, the Allies were supremely fortunate, at least as far as the United States and Britain were concerned, in finding their political coördination ready-made, as it were, in the extraordinary personalities of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. These two men worked together informally, but effectively. As necessity appeared, they created agencies for allied coöperation — dealing with food, shipping, fuel, blockade, economic warfare and other essential matters. For the higher strategical direction of the war, they brought into being the Combined Chiefs of Staff, that astonishing military instrument which seems for all time to have disproved Napoleon's scornful dictum that you cannot win a war with a committee.

In each theater of operations an Allied commander-in-chief was appointed — Eisenhower in Europe, Nimitz in the Pacific, MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, Mountbatten in Southeast Asia, Wilson in the Mediterranean. Thus in the conduct of this war, all three of the great principles of coalition warfare were generally observed, and almost unbroken success was the result. Yet it is notable that whenever any of these principles was disregarded — as in the closing days of the war in the Pacific, when MacArthur's and Nimitz' commands came together, and no arrangement was made for preserving the principle of unity of command — difficulties at once resulted. Nor was it ever possible to observe any of these principles in dealing with the Soviet Union, save intermittently and very partially, so that such coöperation between the western and eastern Allies as actually existed was largely a matter of luck and of the waning strength of the Germans, which forbade the Nazis taking advantage of offered opportunities.

Analyzing these lessons of the past, we cannot help but see that our three basic principles for military coalitions are not only imperative in character, but are interdependent; to observe only one of them, or two of them, is not enough. The greater the demands of war upon the national resources, the more diversified its techniques and the more globe-encompassing its operations, the more complex becomes the machinery of supervision and control required for its successful conduct. But the principles remain. The added complexities only create additional occasions for disaster resulting from their nonobservance.

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III

We have drawn our lessons almost altogether from the experience of war itself, because it is only in war that these principles have heretofore been seriously tested and applied. The North Atlantic Pact is in this respect a unique experiment. Never before have 12 sovereign nations sought in time of peace to create so complete and interlocking a structure of military unity as is contemplated by the terms of this Treaty.

What kind of agencies, and how constituted, must the parties to the Pact create to insure that unity of action upon which their security will be based? Clearly, the council provided for in Article 9 will be charged with the task of drawing together the views of the several governments as to the objectives to be sought, and with the creation of such subordinate bodies dealing with specific political and economic questions as may be found necessary. In this, no doubt, the considerable experience of the Allied Powers in World Wars I and II will be extensively drawn upon. In the field of strategical coördination, the first task may well be to examine existing military agencies involving two or more parties to the Pact, with a view to determining their continued usefulness and whether they or any of them can be consolidated, or whether arrangements can be made to coördinate their work to serve the purposes of the Pact. These existing agencies are as follows:

(1) The Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, which consists of representatives of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union. The last two are not members of the North Atlantic Pact; two of the members of the Pact (Italy and Portugal) are not members of the United Nations. Moreover, the underlying reason for the existence of the Pact is assuredly fear of Soviet aggression. Thus it seems unlikely that the Military Staff Committee can in any way be drawn into official relationship with any military agency which the parties to the Pact may bring into being. Its chief usefulness to the parties may well be found in the experience which so many officers of three of them have gained in working out military problems together, and in the personal relationships which have thus been established during the past four years.

(2) The Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, which

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still exists, though as a cadre establishment. Under this arrangement, senior representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff are stationed in Washington, with a small group of assistants, maintaining close touch with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problems being immediately dealt with relate very largely to questions affecting the standardization of arms and equipment and to the joint occupation of Trieste. But the nucleus for expansion is there, and the invaluable experience of the war years has not been dissipated.

(3) The American-Canadian Permanent Joint Board of Defense, with offices in Washington and Ottawa, which deals with matters affecting the common security of the two major nations of the North American continent.

(4) The rather vague but effective military relationship between the United Kingdom and Canada, of which the products are a common military doctrine, the exchange of information and of officers for training, and a kind of general military "understanding" which is not implemented by anything like a Combined Staff. Suggestions for an Imperial General Staff to include all the Dominions have frequently been made, but, within the Commonwealth, military policy remains a subject for discussion at the political rather than the professional level.

(5) The various military agencies of the Western Union, which includes the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Since this is a recent effort, and still largely in the formative or rather the experimental stage, the experience of this group provides a useful yardstick and may well be examined in some detail.

Western Union has been organized with due regard for the three principles of political coördination, strategic coördination and unity of command. Political coördination is undertaken, primarily, by the Consultative Council, which normally consists of the Foreign Ministers of the five members, but may be attended by the Prime Ministers in case of need. Under the Consultative Council is the Permanent Commission, with its Secretariat; this Commission is composed of permanent officials dealing with day-to-day problems of common interest. Another committee has been set up to deal with fiscal and economic problems; it includes representatives of the appropriate Ministries of the five governments. In parallel with the Consultative Council, there exists a Committee of Defense Ministers, in which the civilian Ministers

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of Defense of the five members deal with political and military relationships. This body is essential to preserve that control of the military by the civil power which is traditional in all the members of Western Union. The Defense Ministers are the connecting link between the purely military agencies and the governments which those agencies serve in common.

Under the Defense Ministers' Committee there is a Chiefs of Staff Committee, sitting at London, on which the Chiefs of Staff (army, navy and air) of all five members are represented — save that Luxembourg has only an army representative. The permanent military planning agency is the Military Committee, which is the subordinate both of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and of the Permanent Commission. The officers who form this committee are permanently assigned to it, and represent all the military services of the member states. A Military Supply Committee, including both representatives of civilian ministries dealing with supply questions and of the supply branches of the military services, has also been organized. Finally, there is the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, called Uniforce, which is located at Fontainebleau, near Paris, under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. It includes a Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces (General de Lattre de Tassigny of France), a Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces (Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb of Britain), and a Naval Flag Officer (Vice-Admiral Jaujard of France). It was decided not to appoint an officer with the title of Naval Commander-in-Chief, due to the world-wide responsibilities of the Royal Navy and the consequent reluctance of the British Admiralty to accept the implications of such a title.

This may seem a complicated and clumsy organization when set down on paper. However, Western Union — as already observed — is still in the experimental stage, and the various agencies thus far created are those for which need has been shown as the experiment proceeded. It may be confidently expected that the closest attention will be given by the North Atlantic planners to the experience thus far gained by Western Union — an attention which will be facilitated by the fact that American observers have been working closely with it.

Certainly similar difficulties will be encountered in implementing the North Atlantic Pact, perhaps in an aggravated form. The problem created by the fact that the British Navy has re-

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sponsibilities far beyond the scope of Western Union's geographic limits reminds us that every one of the major North Atlantic Powers has responsibilities and military anxieties far outside the geographic limits of the North Atlantic Pact. The security of the Middle East is vital to the United States, Britain, France and Italy. The first three of these, and also the Netherlands, are imperatively concerned in the security of Southeast Asia and its adjacent islands. Britain has certain well-understood responsibilities to the various Dominions in the matter of military security, and only one of the Dominions — Canada — is a Party to the North Atlantic Pact. Several of the Parties have African and Pacific colonial possessions of great value and importance, and the basic strategy of the Alliance is dependent in part on maintaining a foothold in all North Africa and in the Mediterranean region as a whole. Thus hardly any of the Parties (the only exceptions are Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg and Iceland) can unreservedly and without thought of other commitments and other responsibilities place the whole of its resources at the disposal of the Alliance.

Another example of the sort of trouble that may have to be ironed out is seen in recent reports of friction between Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery and General de Lattre de Tassigny over General Montgomery's desire to be definitely designated as Commander-in-Chief of all the forces of Western Union rather than merely Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee. General de Lattre, true to the traditional French attitude which counts as really worthwhile only those forces which can be actually deployed on the frontiers of France, is said to feel very strongly that the security of France cannot be committed to the hands of a general representing a nation which, however powerful at sea and in the air, is not prepared to make a major and immediate contribution to the armies which must secure France from being invaded again.

It is reported that there would be less French reluctance to accept an American commander-in-chief, should the appointment of an over-all commander be considered desirable by all the Parties to the Pact. But there is certainly a very definite French determination to maintain the structure and character of Western Union as such — within the terms of the North Atlantic Pact, but preserving its own identity, and not having its agencies merged in those of the larger body. Difficulties of the general

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character illustrated by these examples may cause many headaches to those who are developing the military organization of the North Atlantic Pact. But they will all, it is safe to say, pale into insignificance before the central strategic problem: the allocation of American forces and the priority of their employment in case of an armed attack on Western Europe.

IV

Groups of staff officers can, of course, quite easily decide in the cold light of military logic that such-and-such a country's territory cannot be initially defended, and must therefore be abandoned, to be "liberated" when American fighting power has been sufficiently built up for the purpose and when air bombardment has reduced the aggressor's power to deal with such a counter-effort. But it will be next to impossible to sell such an idea to the government of the country concerned, a government which is not only primarily responsible to its people for their national security, but is composed of individuals who would very likely be among the first to be liquidated by the invading forces.

It is not within the province of this paper to examine in detail the many questions which can arise for discussion and decision under this general heading. We may, however, profitably reflect on the political repercussions of these problems, and the effect they may have on the international policies of the parties and upon their internal decisions in the field of military policy. As just one example, we might note the pressures that are engendered by a realistic examination of the present grave shortage of ground forces available for the security of Western Europe against a possible aggressor whose greatest strength is in ground forces. An effort to meet this problem will perhaps not only result in recommendations for speeding up the dispatch of American weapons and equipment to our Allies in Western Europe, but may well cause a reëxamination of the allocations of our own military budget with a view to increasing the number of available American divisions. Likewise, such considerations would provide a strong argument against any proposal which may be made by the Soviet Union or anyone else for the withdrawal of existing American ground forces from occupied Germany.

The procedure to be followed in preparing the initial military arrangements of the Pact will perhaps follow some such lines as these: First, a political directive, couched in very general terms,

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will be agreed upon by the governments of the signatories. Second, in the light of this directive military consultants will seek agreement on very general and broad-gauge plans for achieving the objects set forth in the directive under a variety of possible contingencies; these plans will in the first instance be based on purely military grounds, after a thorough survey of available military resources. Third, there will be consultation between political and military leaders, both within each government and within and between the agencies of the Pact, to trim and fit these military proposals to political and economic requirements and possibilities. Fourth, an agreed military policy having thus been outlined, much more detailed and concrete plans will be prepared by the military to execute that policy. Fifth, the constant survey and revision of these plans to fit changing conditions will be provided for.

This is a process which involves a vast amount of discussion, study and interchange of ideas. Within the military establishment of each country, agreement must be reached between the three Chiefs of Staff (land, sea and air) as to what part that country should play, and what should be expected of the others. Possibly such agreements can be facilitated by discussion with the staffs of the other Parties. The Chiefs of Staff of each country must then secure the approval of their political superiors, who in turn must come to agreement with the governments of the other parties on the political level. Out of all this, presently, the outlines of a workable organization will begin to emerge, but those outlines will for some time be constantly changing, contracting and expanding here and there as experience in this novel enterprise makes necessary. There will be many mistakes to be corrected, false steps to be retraced, disagreements to be resolved.

It is certainly not even remotely feasible to predict in any detail what form the final organization of the Pact's political and military agencies will take. It does seem certain, however, that they must include, in one form or another, most or all of the following: (1) a council composed of Foreign Ministers or their representatives, with a permanent Political Committee as its working agency; (2) a Defense Committee composed of Defense Ministers or their representatives, charged with maintaining close touch between political and military considerations; (3) a central military planning group, composed of Chiefs of Staff or their representatives, with a permanent combined staff

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as its working agency, and including sections dealing with operational plans, intelligence, standardization of armaments and logistics; (4) either the actual designation of commanders-in-chief for possible theaters of operations, or at least the appointment of nuclear staffs to study problems peculiar to these theaters; (5) a Military Supply Committee, and other bodies subordinate either to the council or to the Defense Committee, to deal with specific problems of coöperation, such as shipping, raw materials, manpower, food, communications, and no doubt many others.

The problems of policy, strategy and command presented by the Pact are enormous. On the military side, at least, the signatories are fortunate in still having at their disposal the services of many distinguished officers who have had experience in the conduct of war by a great coalition, and in political-military relationships. Names which come readily to mind, among others, are those of Generals Marshall, Eisenhower and W. B. Smith and Fleet Admiral Nimitz in the United States; Field Marshals Alexander and Wilson and General Ismay in Great Britain; General McNaughton of Canada and General Juin of France.

The challenge of the North Atlantic Pact is a challenge to freedom itself — a challenge to the ability of free nations to create effective instruments for common action to preserve their free institutions from the threat of aggression, or from actual attack. It is a challenge to deep-rooted traditions, to time-honored reluctance to assume military commitments in advance, to all the ingrained distrust of free peoples in military alliances, to vested interests and to the old persistent idea that to prepare for war is to endanger peace. The North Atlantic Pact is a long step forward on the road which Americans, and all those who share our heritage of freedom, must tread together if peace is ever to become more than a pious aspiration. The problems which it presents are not easy of solution, but they can be solved, given a reasonable measure of good will and determination and the spirit of unity in a common cause. Their solution will present the world with the first instrument of true collective security which it has ever seen.

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MUKDEN TO PEARL HARBOR

The Foreign Policies of Japan

By Joseph W. Ballantine

DURING the decade and more preceding Pearl Harbor a conflict went on within the Japanese Government between a dominant group in the Army, which insisted upon plunging the country into a course of forcible expansion, and civilian and Navy leaders, who were either opposed to such a course or perceived grave risks in it. Each successive step toward the fulfillment of expansionist aims was taken on the initiative of the Army, often in defiance of constituted authority, until finally the moderates lost control of the situation altogether and an Army-dictated Cabinet under Prince Konoye came into office in July 1940. The complete story of this struggle and of the victory of the Army was revealed for the first time by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which on November 12, 1948, completed the reading of its judgment in the trial of the 25 major Japanese war criminals, on which the Tribunal had sat for over two years. Many of the essential facts are still little known, and the full significance of the revelations seems scarcely to have been appreciated in the United States.

It is an amazing record of how a reckless, determined and ruthless military group succeeded in imposing its will upon an irresolute nation; of how that group relied upon an extraordinary abuse of power in order to gain its ends, and resorted freely to intrigue, duplicity, terrorism and assassination. It shows that the opposing majority, apprehensive lest the military, if crossed, be aroused to take extreme measures, supinely tried to placate and appease the warmakers. A review of the record suggests that the sequence of events that carried Japan inexorably one step at a time toward the fateful decision to go to war against the western Powers falls into three stages. The first reached from 1928 until February 1936, when expansionist moves were made by the Army on its own initiative without awaiting, and often in defiance of, government orders. The second was from March 1936 until September 1940, when the Japanese Government itself adopted a policy of expansion but with substantial reservations. And September 1940, when the Japanese Government decided to

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proceed with expansion even at the risk of war, marked the beginning of the final stage.

II

In 1928, General Giichi Tanaka, who had become Prime Minister the year before, announced what he termed a "positive" policy toward China. By the use of the term he probably intended to make a distinction between the course he proposed to follow and the courses of his predecessors in office during the previous seven years, when liberal influences in the Japanese Government were in the ascendant. Tanaka was far from being the sinister figure that he was supposed to have been by westerners who had accepted the so-called Tanaka Memorial for what it purported to be — an English translation of a confidential Japanese state document, presenting for the consideration of the Throne a plan for a course of far-reaching conquest. Neither in the Tokyo trials nor previously, to the present writer's knowledge, has reliable evidence ever been produced that there ever existed a genuine original document. It is true that Tanaka favored a policy of Japanese penetration in Manchuria, but he proposed to further it through conciliating local Chinese leaders. It was in fact while he was negotiating with Marshal Chang Tso-lin that the latter was murdered by Japanese army officers, impatient over Tanaka's policies. His efforts to punish the officers responsible were resisted by the Army General Staff, which was at that time under the influence of a movement among extremists to take the Manchurian question out of the Government's hands. In the face of the opposition to the Cabinet in the General Staff and of continuing disorders in Manchuria, Tanaka resigned on July 1, 1929.

The Army extremists organized a plot for the seizure of Manchuria, which was carried out by the Army in a well-organized campaign, following a framed-up incident and a coup at Mukden on September 18, 1931. The story is so well known that it needs no recounting here; but we may note that the home government opposed the plot. Tokyo became aware of the preparations when they were in their last stages, and instructions were issued to the Army to stay action. It went ahead in defiance of these instructions. The Government, thus confronted with a *fait accompli,* chose to ratify the action, doubtless in the conviction that if it did not a revolt of the Army would ensue. Gradually

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the moderate elements in the Government managed to strengthen their position at home, but they had little success in checking the Army's activities in Manchuria and across the border in China proper, where efforts were being directed toward extending Japanese domination to the five northern provinces.

Eventually the restiveness within the Army over the efforts of the Government to curb it found expression in the outbreak of an insurrection among Army forces stationed in and near Tokyo. This was the incident of February 26, 1936, when a number of statesmen of moderate views were assassinated. Premier Okada barely escaped death and the incident precipitated the downfall of his cabinet.

The second stage in Japan's commitment to courses of expansion began with the advent of the Hirota Cabinet, which succeeded the Okada Cabinet on March 9, 1936, and which was more acceptable to the militarists than its predecessor. This stage was marked by a degree of mutual tolerance between the two opposing forces in the Japanese Government. Although the militarists abandoned neither their ultimate aims nor their initiative, they showed a greater readiness to keep within bounds of constituted authority, while the civilian and Navy leaders made material concessions to the Army standpoint. This does not imply that Japanese leaders differed on any moral issues. Japanese naval circles had for years championed the view that Japan's future lay in the south in distinction to the Army's advocacy of northward or continental expansion. The Navy had, however, a wholesome respect for the prowess of the British and the American navies, and along with the civilian leaders had a clearer perception of Japan's weaknesses and of the strength that would oppose them than did the Army with its more parochial attitude. The issue between the Army and its opponents was over questions of method and timing.

The Hirota Cabinet reached an agreement on what should be the fundamentals of national policy on August 11, 1936, when it was decided at a Five Ministers' Conference that, among other things, the efforts of "national defense" and diplomacy should be combined to acquire for the Empire a solid footing on the continent of Asia and the islands to the south, and to eradicate the Soviet menace. But it was specified that cordial relations with the Powers should be maintained, and, as regards expansion southward, that Japan should move gradually and by peaceful

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methods so as to avoid arousing other nations. This policy decision, be it noted, had its origin in a draft proposal drawn up jointly by the service ministers some two months earlier. The draft proposal corresponded in every material respect with the final decision, but was more bluntly worded.

The outbreak of the all-out attack on China on July 7 of the following year grew out of a minor incident near Peiping, provoked by and enlarged upon by the Japanese military. Although the Army had thus chosen the time and place of the attack, it was a natural consequence of fixed national policy calling for establishment of a solid footing on the continent. No serious effort was made by the Japanese Government to localize the hostilities, and on July 26 Prime Minister Konoye revealed to the Diet the Government's intention of achieving "the new order" in East Asia and of obtaining a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations. From the outset of the hostilities there was no serious conflict within the Government on Japan's declared objectives in China, attainment of which would have reduced China to a vassal state.

During this period active efforts were made by the military party for a closer political alignment with Germany, or a military alliance, but these efforts were frustrated by the unwillingness of the Navy and of certain civilian statesmen to accept the obligation of giving Germany military aid in a war against the western Powers. The relatively innocuous and purely defensive Anti-Comintern Pact had been concluded in November 1936, and thereafter every successive Japanese representative in Berlin approached the German Government on the subject of cementing a still closer relationship. Japan's earlier overtures were directed to obtaining an instrument aimed primarily at the Soviet Union. Japan also wanted German recognition of her special position in China, and she offered in return to give Germany "especially favorable" treatment in that country. Germany was unwilling to settle for less than an instrument that included provision for mutual assistance in the event of an unprovoked attack upon one of the signatories, and, being dissatisfied over the systematic discrimination to which German interests in China were being subjected at the hands of the Japanese authorities there, wanted more explicit and formal commitments with regard to commercial privileges than Japan was prepared to give. Consequently, nothing came of the first Japanese efforts.

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In May 1939, Hiranuma, who had become Prime Minister, took a fresh initiative toward Germany with a declaration in the form of a personal message to Hitler, expressing a desire for an agreement to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact. This offer was coldly received by the Germans because of a reservation made by Hiranuma that Japan was unable at that time or in the near future to extend to the Axis Powers any effective military aid. He did, however, promise that Japan would gladly support them in that way if a change of circumstances made it possible. General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, an Army appointee, was asked by von Ribbentrop whether, in the event that Germany and Italy went to war with another nation, Japan could be considered at war with that nation even though she could not provide any military aid. Oshima replied in the affirmative, without referring the question to Tokyo. About the same time, a new proposal for an alliance that came before the Japanese Government, purportedly emanating from the German Foreign Office, turned out to have originated in the Japanese General Staff. The Foreign Minister objected to Oshima's having exceeded his authority and to the sharp practice resorted to by the Army, but no backing was forthcoming from Hiranuma, who took the part of the military.

From this point on Hiranuma began to lose control of the situation. His stand was displeasing alike to the opponents and to the proponents of the alliance. While favoring an alliance, he clung to his reservation. When the German Government pressed Oshima in Berlin and the War Ministry in Tokyo for a quick decision, the War Minister, Itagaki, in his zeal to get the alliance sanctioned, falsely represented to the Emperor that the Foreign Minister had come around to supporting the proposal. The Emperor learned of Itagaki's duplicity and taxed him with it. Itagaki then realized that he could make no headway so long as the project was opposed by the Foreign Minister, the Navy Minister and the Emperor. He talked of resigning but was persuaded by the Home Minister to make one more effort to prevail upon the Cabinet. The Cabinet met on August 8, but was still unwilling to go as far as the Germans required. Itagaki then planned to have the Japanese Ambassadors at Berlin and Rome act under his instructions and to keep the Foreign Minister out of the matter until the Cabinet could be confronted with a negotiated agreement that could be represented as being within the frame-

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work of what had been only a tentative decision by the Cabinet. Before Itagaki's plan could be carried out, the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was announced on August 23. This was a mortal blow to the Hiranuma Cabinet, for its thesis for a German alliance had rested on the idea of securing an ally against Russia. In its dying gasps the Cabinet instructed Oshima to protest Germany's action as a violation of secret clauses of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Oshima was slow to act, but he finally delivered the protest in such a manner that it could be accepted informally as a matter of information.

The succeeding Cabinet under General Abe sought to reorient policy toward better relations with the Anglo-Saxon Powers, but as Japan still adhered to her fixed policy of aggression the attempt failed. The Cabinet lasted only four months. Admiral Yonai, who had been Navy Minister in the two preceding ministries, now took the helm, but found it hard to steer between conflicting national and group interests. The morass into which the Japanese had got themselves in China had a good deal of effect on their domestic policies and their international relations. Japanese leaders saw in the preoccupation of the European Powers in the war a golden opportunity to realize their dreams of empire in the south, and were fearful lest if they failed to act promptly they would be forestalled by a victorious Germany marching eastward. To gain freedom of action for the southern venture the speeding up of the conquest of China was imperative, and this called for cutting off the National Government of China from American and British aid. The United States and Great Britain (which also stood in the way of an advance southward) now took the place of the Soviet Union as the chief Japanese enemies. Although Yonai was still averse to Japan's becoming involved in the European war, his objections to the alliance with Germany on that ground were harder to sustain in the face of mounting anti-American and anti-British public sentiment. Moreover, he found it difficult to combat the argument that the alliance would make secure Japan's rear against Russia, cow the United States into noninterference in the Far East, and enable Japan to obtain German scientific and engineering aid.

These considerations brought about a change in the Cabinet's attitude. The Foreign Minister, Arita, opposed as he had been to the Army's proposals, came out with an announcement of a more forward policy. The Army, which was already committed

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to the overthrow of the Yonai Cabinet, interpreted the announcement as an effort to retain power by attempting to gain public support at the Army's expense. It charged the Cabinet with reversing policy, and forced Arita to modify the original text of his statement. When, on the following day, the chief of the Foreign Ministry's Press Bureau disclosed the original text of the announcement and the fact that the Army had forced its alteration, the press chief was arrested and subjected to questioning by the military police. A plot was hatched to assassinate Premier Yonai and other opponents of the military faction, but it miscarried and the plotters were arrested. This incident shows clearly that the issues between the contending factions were not on question of principle but of method.

The incident failed to daunt the Cabinet in its effort to prolong its life by seeking to consummate an entente with Germany. A special emissary, Naotake Sato, a former Foreign Minister, was sent to Berlin to make a fresh approach to the German Government. He pointed out to von Ribbentrop, among other things, that for three years Japan had served Germany by diverting British and American attention to the Orient; that the threat of Japanese action had kept the American fleet in the Pacific; and that it was Japan's policy to contain the United States in the western hemisphere. Sato explained, however, that Japan could not afford to provoke the United States too far, and that avoidance of war with America was to the best interests of both Germany and Japan. The Japanese emissary dwelt upon the desirability of economic coöperation between the two countries, and proposed that Japan be host to Germany in dispensing economic privileges in China.

Von Ribbentrop, who had been given the cue that a change in cabinets in Japan more favorable to Germany was impending, made a discouraging and noncommittal reply. He instructed the German Ambassador in Tokyo, however, that the Japanese proposals were quite welcome to Germany, which no longer required military help in Europe but desired above all the continued neutrality of the United States. The Ambassador passed the information on to the Japanese military group, which forthwith set in motion the wheels for toppling over the Cabinet. Since the positions of the two Japanese service ministers could be held only by a general officer and a flag officer respectively, all that needed to be done was to cause the War Minister to resign and then

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withhold the nomination of a successor. This the Army did. The Yonai Cabinet fell July 16, 1940, and Konoye came into office for a second time. The way was now prepared for the alliance.

Although the new Cabinet had strong pro-German leanings, there were still obstacles ahead, chiefly the opposition of the Navy and of the Emperor. Nevertheless, the new Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, entered into negotiations with the German emissary, Stahmer, who had come to Tokyo for that purpose. Stahmer made it clear that Germany desired to end the European war quickly, that she did not for the moment require Japanese military assistance, but that she did want Japan to restrain the United States. He said that Germany and Italy would help provide Japan with equipment. He assured Matsuoka that Germany respected Japan's leadership in eastern Asia and that all German interests there were in the economic field; and he promised to assist in bringing about a rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union. Though the European war might end quickly, Stahmer declared, there was destined to develop a struggle for world supremacy against the whole Anglo-Saxon world, and in the long run war between Japan and the United States could hardly be avoided. He said that he envisioned the alliance as a long-term arrangement for coöperation in the coming struggle, and that he therefore desired its consummation before the war with Great Britain was ended.

Stahmer and Matsuoka drew up a draft of a treaty, which was laid before the Privy Council on September 16, 1940. The Navy held back its approval until some days later. The Cabinet still had to obtain the sanction of the Emperor, who strongly relied upon the advice of Prince Saionji, the last surviving elder statesman and a bitter opponent of the alliance. Kido, who, as Lord Privy Seal, was charged with keeping the aged and ailing Saionji informed of the negotiations, failed to do so, and the old statesman was left completely in the dark on what was going on. In this way the Emperor's sanction was obtained, and the Tripartite Alliance was signed on September 27, 1940. Saionji upon learning what had been done was sorely aggrieved and felt that the Emperor had been betrayed.

III

The conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance marked Japan's transit from the second to the final stage of a course of unreserved

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expansion, and war with the western Powers, if necessary. The plans for action as drawn up by the Foreign Office and approved by the Cabinet early in October called for: 1, the early successful settlement of the China affair; 2, the negotiation of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union; 3, the incorporation of the countries of Southeast Asia and the islands of the Malay Archipelago in the so-called "Co-Prosperity Sphere" (*i.e.* the establishment of domination or control there). At a Four Ministers' Conference held on September 4, even India, Australia and New Zealand had been marked for inclusion in Japan's sphere of influence.

All possibility of a settlement with Chiang Kai-shek was destroyed by the conclusion two months later by Japan of a "treaty" with the puppet régime of Wang Ching-wei at Nanking. And in April of the following year a neutrality pact, rather than a non-aggression pact, was concluded with the Soviet Union.

For the realization of the expanded Co-Prosperity Sphere two plans were worked out, to be pursued along parallel lines or alternatively, according to exigencies. One plan called for reliance upon "diplomacy" (if that term can be rightfully applied to the tactics of chicanery and intimidation contemplated and attempted), and the other upon military action. Each of the two plans focused upon Singapore and the Philippines, presumably because it was believed that the rest of the area coveted would fall like a ripe plum into Japan's hands. The diplomatic plan, fantastic as it may sound, was to make an offer to Great Britain to mediate the European conflict in return for British recognition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (including surrender of Singapore), and to propose to the United States that Japan would recognize Philippine independence in return for United States recognition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan intended to occupy Singapore and Malaya in any case, along with the Netherlands Indies, but not the Philippines or Guam unless war broke out with the United States.

The military plan for taking Singapore contemplated first the securing of advance bases in Indo-China and Siam by means of concluding protective treaties with those countries. The next step would await a settlement in China or a German invasion of Britain — whichever occurred first — or, failing either, some substantial German military successes. In January 1941, Japanese and German military experts agreed that attack on Singapore

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should follow occupation of Saigon and a landing on the Malay peninsula. Aerial photography was undertaken in the latter area to collect data for a landing. Military currency was printed for use in the countries along the line of advance. On February 10, 1941, Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador that an attack on Singapore had been planned; three days later he instructed the Japanese Ambassador at London to inform Foreign Minister Eden that a report communicated to him by the British Ambassador at Tokyo of impending Japanese action was a ridiculous fantasy. On February 22, the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin told von Ribbentrop that preparation for attack on Singapore would be completed by May, and that for safety's sake preparations had also been made for war against the United States and Great Britain.

The preparations for war against the United States envisaged a plan for the destruction of the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese relied on seizing all points in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans before the United States could prepare a counterattack. They expected that the United States would weary of a prolonged war and negotiate a peace settlement on the basis of recognition of Japanese supremacy in the territories that had been seized. In January 1941, the Commander of the Combined Fleets approved and transmitted to Imperial General Headquarters a plan for a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor while the two countries were at peace. In late May the Japanese Navy began training for the attack, and dive-bombing was practised at Kagoshima.

By June 1941, Japan had received a number of setbacks to her hope of achieving southward expansion through diplomacy. A settlement in China had failed to materialize. Negotiations with the Dutch to obtain large quantities of oil and other materials from the East Indies had broken down, and Japan's reserves of war supplies were in danger of depletion. Germany had failed to invade Britain, and the British had rebuffed a Japanese approach looking to the mediation of the European conflict. Although the United States had expressed a willingness to explore the possibilities of a comprehensive Pacific settlement for which the Japanese had asked, Secretary Hull had made it clear that this Government would not enter into any agreement that disregarded the rights and interests of other countries. This meant that there was little hope that the United States would recognize

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the program of annexations politely called the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

These discouragements failed to divert Japan from her fixed purposes. When Germany attacked Russia on June 22, some Japanese leaders proposed postponing the southern project in favor of an onset on the Russian Far East, but they were overruled at an Imperial Conference on July 2. Here it was decided to continue diplomatic negotiations while completing final preparations for military action. The troops that later made landings in Malaya and the Philippines began practising along the China coast and in Hainan and Formosa. Attention was devoted to experimenting with and perfecting a shallow water torpedo, and refueling at sea was practised so that the more secluded northern route could be used for sneaking up on Pearl Harbor.

Japan's occupation of southern Indo-China was declared by Japan's Foreign Minister on July 26 to be for the purpose of winding up the China affair. He alleged that Japan had reports of an intended encirclement of Indo-China that would interfere with that purpose. The Tribunal found no evidence of any such intended encirclement, but did find conclusive evidence that Japan's reason for advancing into southern Indo-China was to secure bases for attacking Singapore and the Netherlands Indies. Such bases would also threaten the Philippines. The conclusion coincides with that reached at the time by the United States Government, prompting it to freeze Japanese assets on July 26. In a memorandum of the Department of State of May 19, 1942,[1] it was explained that "by this further expansion in southern Indo-China Japan virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes. This constituted an overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other Powers that were at peace with Japan. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. . . . . Under those circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with Japan had become an appropriate,

[1] "Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941," Vol. II, p. 342.

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warranted and necessary step — as an open warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense." The British and Netherlands Governments also froze Japanese assets.

On September 6 the Imperial Conference decided that Japan should endeavor to gain acceptance of certain "minimum" demands incidental to achieving the purpose of southern expansion through negotiations with the United States and Great Britain, and, in the event of the failure of the negotiations by October, a decision on the opening of hostilities should be made. Japan's "minimum" demands were as follows:

(1) Noninterference with Japan's efforts to settle the China affair, including discontinuance of assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and the closing of the Burma Road.

(2) Abstention from action in the Far East to threaten Japan's national defense, from establishing any military "interests" in Siam, China, the Netherlands Indies and the Soviet Far East, from strengthening armaments in the Far East; and the recognition of Japan's special relationship with Indo-China.

(3) Coöperation with Japan in obtaining supplies of materials and the restoration of commercial relations.

In return, Japan would engage to make no military advance beyond Indo-China except toward China, to withdraw her troops from Indo-China after an equitable peace had been effected with China, and to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

IV

This proposed basis of a settlement, with minor variations, formed the essence of the terms put forward by Japan to the United States on successive occasions, including the final set of terms delivered on November 20, which the Japanese Foreign Minister described in his instructions to Ambassador Nomura as an "ultimatum." They called upon the United States and Great Britain to abandon China to Japan, and provide Japan with the materials for a Japanese advance into American, British and Dutch territories in the Far East. The reciprocal commitments that Japan offered to make, even if the Japanese Government had been one that could be trusted, were valueless, since Japan proposed to determine unilaterally what constituted an "equitable" peace with China and expected British and American recognition of Japan's "special relationship" with Indo-China.

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With such American, British and Dutch demilitarization in the Far East as Japan demanded, there would have been no need of moving Japanese troops beyond Indo-China. Acceptance of the Japanese demands would have meant that Japan gained all that she sought without fighting.

When the Japanese Government received the American Government's communication of October 2, which made clear that Japan's proposed basis for an agreement was unacceptable, the question of opening hostilities was again discussed; at the Imperial Conference of September 6 it had been decided that this question would be settled early in October. The Navy had misgivings as to whether it could carry out the mission that would fall to it without more oil than it had. Despite the strong insistence of War Minister Tojo upon making a definitive decision for war, Konoye was unwilling to assume this responsibility until the Navy considered itself better prepared, and he tendered the resignation of his Cabinet on October 16.

Two days later Tojo was installed as Prime Minister with a new Cabinet. The final preparations for attacks upon Pearl Harbor, Singapore and other American, British and Dutch possessions in the Far East were completed by November 1. At an Imperial Conference on November 5 it was decided that if by the 25th (later extended to the 29th) of the month the United States had not accepted the Japanese terms the Japanese Government would inform its allies that a decision had been reached to open hostilities with Great Britain and the United States. Nothing was said of a negotiated settlement. On the same day there was issued a Combined Fleet Operation Order, which began as follows:

> The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War."

The order then continued with instructions that upon the announcement of Y-Day all fleets and forces, without further special orders, would organize and complete battle preparations, and when directed by their commanding officers would proceed to their rendezvous and wait in readiness for the attack. The order went on to say:

> The time for outbreak of war (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General

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Headquarters Order. This order will be given in advance. After 0000 hours, X-Day, a state of war will exist. Each force will commence operations according to plan.

On November 10, Vice-Admiral Nagumo, who was to command the carrier task force in its attack upon Pearl Harbor, issued his order to the task force to rendezvous in the Kurile Islands. The order directed all ships of the task force to complete battle preparations by November 20 and proceed to the rendezvous under strict security regulations. Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 3 of the same day fixed December 8 (Japan time) as X-Day. That was the day when after 0000 hours a state of war would exist. On November 22 orders were issued to the Japanese task force in the Kuriles to proceed to Lat. 40 N. and Long. 170 W. so as to arrive there on December 3. Accordingly on the morning of November 26 the task force moved out on its mission.

It seems quite clear from the facts brought out in the trial and judgment of the Tribunal that at no time during the period after Japan's occupation of Manchuria would it have been possible to have brought Japan to abandon her policy of territorial and political expansion through measures short of the application of superior force. After 1932, Japan was determined to hold her grip on Manchuria. After 1937, it became Japan's fixed policy to subjugate all the rest of China as well, and, after 1940, to dominate the whole of the Far East and the western Pacific region. It is also abundantly clear that after the summer of 1941 Japan's leaders, with their reserves of oil running lower and with the golden opportunity to realize the dreams of a rich empire slipping by, would brook no delay, and that the United States could not have gained more time by further exploration of the issues and the possibilities. The Japanese were not offering to negotiate a reasonable settlement by processes of agreement; they were presenting demands, to be accepted or rejected. The United States had only two choices: either to yield to the Japanese demands and sacrifice principles and security, or to decline to yield and take the consequences.

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THE SUDAN EMERGES INTO NATIONHOOD

By Margery Perham

IN August 1947, in the episodic manner of a flash in a newsreel, the affairs of the Sudan were thrown into the glare of world publicity when Egypt accused Britain, among other things, of depriving her of the Sudan. When the case was being discussed by the Security Council there were certain dark and fine-looking men at Lake Success, speaking excellent English and, with one impressive exception, wearing European dress, who claimed to represent the Sudanese nation and to decide its destiny. Unfortunately they did not all claim the same destiny. There was an Umma Party demanding complete independence, and some parties demanding various degrees of association with Egypt. Spectators whose attention was not immediately monopolized by the next item on the newsreel, Greece or Indonesia, may well have wondered whether a new nation were being born in this obscure part of Africa, and, if so, what were its expectations of success or even of life.

The problem of the Sudan which baffled the Security Council can be understood only with some help from geography and history. Between Egypt and Kenya a vast indeterminate region stretches from the desert of the north through a land of precarious rain-grown crops to the green hills and bushlands of the equatorial belt. The three zones are threaded but not linked by that astonishing trickle of water, the Nile, which goes on to give life to Egypt. Until quite recently this formless region had little history, except perhaps near the rivers, from which seeped some traces of the events in ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome and Christendom. When, in the later Middle Ages, Arab tribes entered the Sudan and spread into the harsh immensity of the northern plains, they brought religious uniformity but no political unity, and they did not reach the equatorial and Negro south. It was only in the early nineteenth century when a vigorous Albanian, ruling Egypt nominally as viceroy of the Turkish Sultan, led his restless Turkish and Balkan soldiers to easy victory over the disunited tribes and princedoms of the Sudan that the region attained a central, if alien, government. The oppressions of this

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government and those of its scattered garrisons, and the raiding of the helpless pagan tribes in the south for slaves, became an international scandal. Just when Egypt, herself in chaos and rebellion, fell under the control of Britain as represented by the able administrator, Lord Cromer, the northern Sudanese, under the fiery religious revivalist, the Mahdi, threw off Egyptian rule. This occurred in 1882–1883. To the British it seemed that merely putting Egypt to rights was task enough, and there could be no thought then of a costly reconquest of the misgoverned province. It was in evacuating — or delaying to evacuate — the garrison early in 1885 that General Gordon fell to the Dervish spears, and the suspense and anger of those dramatic days burned the name of the Sudan into the minds of the British people. For the next 13 years the Sudan suffered the hard and fanatical rule of the Mahdi and his successor, Khalifa Abdullahi.

But by the middle nineties Egypt was in moderate order, while the scramble for Africa was threatening to break into the great disordered no-man's-land round which Britain, in the name of Egypt, had been drawing purely diplomatic frontiers. Hence Lord Kitchener's expedition of British, Egyptian and Sudanese troops, which worked methodically up the Nile to win the victory of Omdurman in September 1898. It was here that the young subaltern Churchill joined in a rash charge into a gully full of Dervishes and, unlike many of his fellow Lancers, came out alive on the other side.

On the morrow of the battle Britain was faced with a very awkward situation, and the formula she found for meeting it is the one which governs the Sudan problem today. Fact and legal theory were at odds: Britain had decided upon the reconquest of the Sudan and had led the tripartite army, but she had done this as the guardian of Egypt and in Egypt's name. Yet she could not hand back this impoverished country to an Egypt which was under her own control. She was now in an expansive mood and she had, of course, the power to annex the Sudan. But this would have lead to jealous protests from the other Powers, especially from France, whose famous Marchand expedition was at this very moment obliged by Lord Kitchener to abandon the Upper Nile; and, moreover, British anti-imperialists were by no means silent at home. In characteristic fashion, therefore, the British authorities decided that, having for the moment the substance of power, there was no need to question Egypt's legal rights.

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The Agreement of 1899 set up the Sudan as a state separate from Egypt, freed from the foreign capitulations which had been the curse of that country. Egypt's former sovereignty and the rights acquired by Britain through conquest and not derived from her undefined control of Egypt were to be combined in a joint rule, or Condominium. The two flags, which can be seen today flying on all public buildings in the Sudan, suggested equal status, but the right to recommend the Governor-General was given to the British Government, and this, coupled with the Governor-General's almost unfettered power, is the keystone of the Agreement. It is one which could work only if one or another of the two nations so widely different in character were unquestionably the dominant partner. As it was in 1899, this Agreement was less between Egypt and Britain than between Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener. It will be observed that the Sudanese did not, and at that time could not, form a third party. Divided, their own militant rulers defeated and killed, they were passive, in desperate need of peace, order and the good government they had never known.

The British came into this stricken and impoverished country with Egyptian troops and Egyptian officials and, for many years, an Egyptian subsidy to pay for the administration of a poor country further impoverished by its misfortunes. They also brought with them Sayed Ali Mirghani, a holy man of a sect opposed to Mahdism. He had fled to Egypt and was now expected to rally orthodox opinion to counter the zealous but unorthodox revivalism which had swept over so many of the great Beggara cattle-owning tribes of the west. Mahdism, though politically defeated, was still regarded as dangerous and was held in horror by the sedentary and urban classes along the rivers who had gained most from Egyptian rule. For this reason the infant son born posthumously to the Mahdi, who had died at the height of his triumph, was kept under careful watch.

II

From 1900 until the First World War the Sudan Government went quietly about its task of building a firm, effective central and provisional government. Staffed from the best products of the public schools and the two ancient universities, it was authoritarian and beneficent. Its officers were chosen as much for their all-around record as for brains, and it was a common gibe that

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the Sudan was a land of Blacks run by Blues. The confidence of the people, relieved from disorder and uncertainty, was quickly won in so far as this can ever be done in a Moslem country by western rulers. Departments proliferated and social services were slowly extended; communications developed and with them trade and production. The Government pushed its fingers southward among the shy, ill-treated pagan tribes and took them gradually, but not always quite peacefully, into its administrative grasp. There was no serious difficulty with Egypt, which was still largely under British control and very much the junior partner: she supplied, as reluctant exiles, the trained and educated junior staff not yet available in the Sudan, and her vital irrigation department, under British direction, exercised an increasingly effective and scientific control of the Nile waters.

The dark Arabs of the north are a virile and dignified people: they accepted the British as agents of a conquering Power who did not abuse their position, and they met them upon a basis of admitted difference in which, thanks to the pride of Islam, there was no servility. Looking back today in the present atmosphere of urgency, it must seem that the British service, braced neither by criticism nor by difficult problems such as those presented in some colonies by immigrant communities, conducted their interesting task in too complacent and leisurely a manner. But this wisdom comes after many events.

The First World War broke across this slow, quiet progress. Its effect was indirect, but it disturbed the delicate equilibrium of the Condominium which rested upon British predominance. The British, intent upon their war with Germany and her local ally, Turkey, used Egypt as a base and a source of labor and supply with too little attention to the susceptibilities of a people stirred into sudden self-consciousness and political ambition by the war and by the new creed of self-determination. Britain even went so far as to declare a Protectorate over Egypt in 1914, and to denounce the lingering, legal suzerainty of Turkey over that country. The end of the war saw the emergence of a nationalist people's party in the Wafd which endeavored to rouse opinion at home and abroad against Britain; and as Britain felt Egypt slipping out of her control she tightened her grasp upon the Sudan, to protect her own interests, but also because she felt that her task there, well begun, was not even half done. It seemed equally impossible to leave the country to itself, or to hand it over to an

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Egypt under what Britain regarded as factious, irresponsible and Anglophobe leadership.

In 1922 Britain withdrew the Protectorate and recognized Egypt as a sovereign state, reserving communications and defense, and the Sudan, from her grant of authority. The Egyptian politicians attacked these reservations unceasingly; the next two years saw a rapid worsening of Anglo-Egyptian relations, and Egyptian attempts to foment trouble in the Sudan. The murder of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General, in the streets of Cairo in 1924, following a violent anti-British press campaign and mutinies in the Sudan among some of the Egyptian and Sudanese troops, roused the British to severe action. Egyptian troops, not without further incidents, were expelled and Egyptian participation in the administration virtually came to an end. But while Egypt's share in the Condominium was thus in practice almost abolished, Britain did nothing to cancel Egypt's legal rights under the Agreement.

From 1924 to 1936 the British administered the Sudan single-handed. Political instability and excitement in Egypt made it impossible for Britain to come to terms with her, but this period was on the whole one of peace and progress for the Sudan. The new Sudanese political leaders now complain that the progress was too slow, especially in training for self-government and in the closely related matter of education; they accuse the Government of punishing the Sudanese for the sins of the Egyptians by an excess of caution. And it is true that the British moved away from the system of direct rule, under which the Sudanese intelligentsia who were issuing in increasing numbers and at rising standards from Gordon College might have hoped to replace their rulers at an early date in a kind of centralized technocracy, and, drawing upon the example of indirect rule initiated by Lord Lugard, began to develop rural local government upon the long-neglected basis of tribalism.

The reversal may have been too sudden and too sharp. There was, and is, a great contrast in the way of life among the scattered, semi-nomadic peoples in the northern plains and the sophisticated, professional, mercantile and wage-earning groups in the four or five main towns, and especially in the large population of the three towns, Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North, which have grown up at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles. Here men read newspapers, attend cinemas and

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football matches, listen to the Egyptian wireless and discuss politics ardently in coffee shops. When the writer visited the Sudan in the years before the war and attended meetings with the young intelligentsia, there were fierce denunciations of the "African colonial policy" by which, the Sudanese said, their progress was being barred and tribal disunion fomented. By that date, however, the Government was already moving toward a broader and more balanced encouragement of a true local government on patterns which varied for large and small towns and for rural areas, and was speeding up the process of Sudanization of the civil service.

Economically, except for the universal slump in the middle of the inter-war period, the country made fair progress in spite of the great difficulties of economic development. Outstanding in boldness and imagination was the so-called Gezira scheme by which the waters of the Blue Nile were dammed at Sennar to irrigate nearly a million acres of land by natural flow. This land is farmed by a partnership among the 20,000 native tenants, the Government and a commercial company — the Sudan Plantations Syndicate — who divide the profits upon a 40-40-20 percentage. The country's revenues have benefited greatly from the export of the cotton thus grown, and the whole country has gained from the production of a large, assured grain crop in a land often afflicted by drought and famine. It is worth noting here that this large scheme is due for nationalization in the near future.

In 1936 a temporary political stability in Egypt under the Wafd and the leadership of Nahas Pasha, in combination with the darkening world situation, at last brought the Condominium Powers together. A Treaty of Alliance was signed which modified the British military concessions in Egypt without abolishing them, and in other ways met Egypt's heightened sense of national self-respect. The Agreement of 1899 in regard to the Sudan was confirmed, but it was agreed that Egyptian as well as British officials could again be appointed when Sudanese were not available. Egyptian troops were to return to the Sudan. (The writer watched the first of these march into Khartoum shortly afterward through silent crowds.) In recognition of the changed political atmosphere, there was a clause in which the parties agreed "that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese."

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III

This treaty led to the first strong, overt expression of Sudanese nationalism, which for years had been developing among the few townsmen who possessed some western education. The public recognition that, in the absence of any constitutional means of expression, the treaty settled the destiny of the Sudanese without any reference to their views, caused an outburst of protest. Several newspapers sprang into existence, some of them ephemeral and nearly all of them bitter in tone. The "Graduates General Congress," formed of educated, politically-minded elements, came into being, and, claiming to speak to the Government on behalf of the whole of the Sudan, demanded a legislative assembly, a Sudanese nationality and the right to self-determination. But by this time Britain was at death-grips with the Germans on the borders of Egypt and was in no mood to be patient with this narrowly-based, inexperienced and self-elected body of leaders. Rebuffed, the moderates began to lose control, and membership of the Congress was widened to include Sudanese with any claims to literacy. More ominously, the Congress leaders, informed that they did not represent the people, turned to the two religious figures who divided between them the allegiance of the great majority of the Moslems, and thus infused politics with the sectarianism of the masses and divided their own ranks. One of these holy men was Sayed Sir Ali Mirghani. Pious, aging, delicate and retiring in disposition, he had neither desire nor capacity to lead a political party, but as a rival to the other outstanding religious leader, he became, inevitably, the symbol round which opposition was grouped. On the other side stood Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, the Mahdi's son, who had by this time become a great public figure, winning his way by his moderate and astute political leadership and the great wealth he had amassed from growing irrigated cotton.

So long as the war lasted, the political situation was overshadowed by the country's danger: the Sudanese showed great loyalty to the Government and complete social discipline, while the fighting men lived up to their magnificent reputation. In 1944, in order to meet the pressure of the political groups and obtain an expression of opinion and support from the moderates, the Government set up a nominated representative Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. By the standards of the British colonies this

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was a belated and limited gesture, but the difficulties between the Condominium Powers had until then seemed to preclude any important constitutional innovation. Staffed in the main with moderate and experienced professional men and the more intelligent Nazirs (or chiefs) of the major tribes, this Council, which met in the Governor-General's palace, was a dignified, useful but not very lively body. It was, of course, derided by the younger politicians and editors.

These and many other Sudanese waited with impatience for the peace which they hoped would bring political emancipation as a reward for their honorable record in the war. They were, however, obliged to wait with growing excitement and a sense of frustration as, in 1946, their co-rulers entered into prolonged negotiations for the revision of the 1936 treaty, at the request of Egypt. Excitement reached a dangerous height when, after a treaty had been drawn up and initialled by Sidky Pasha and Mr. Bevin, the former was credited in the Egyptian press with an interpretation of its Sudan clause to the effect that "Britain has accepted the unity of Egypt with the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown." This statement caused an outburst of anger, especially, of course, from the Umma Party. When the treaty consultations had begun the members of this party had tried to coöperate with the parties which had grouped themselves round Sayed Ali Mirghani; these parties used the slogan "the unity of the Nile Valley," and hoped to gain from Egypt the self-determination which they seemed unable to wrest from the British. The two groups sent a joint delegation to Cairo to represent Sudanese views, but it soon broke up, for the Umma Party rejected Egyptian sovereignty with growing vehemence and, while claiming complete independence, was willing to accept the help of the British in achieving it. The other group, which appeared to comprise most of the urban, educated and trading classes, grew increasingly alarmed at the idea that Britain might relax control in favor of a Mahdist régime; they retained alarming memories of rough tribal tyranny which such a régime had exercised over the riverain groups. It was this fear, rather than any desire to exchange British for Egyptian control, which drove them deeper and deeper into the Egyptian camp. Tribesmen who knew little of politics or constitutional problems responded at once to religious sectarianism, and Mirghanists, claiming to be more orthodox, inevitably took the opposite side from the Mahdists, with

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their taint of heresy and their unfortunate historical associations.

In order to avoid disorder and factional fights, Mr. Attlee made a reassuring declaration about continuing the status quo in the Sudan; but this still further infuriated the Egyptians, and in July 1947, Egypt took her conflict with Britain to the Security Council. There the question drained away in a waste of arguments and inconclusive resolutions. The central point at issue was whether Egypt would accept Britain's demand, made in conformity with the tradition of the British Empire, that the Sudanese must be left free, when the time came, to decide for themselves whether to remain under Egyptian sovereignty or to be independent. Egypt refused to grant this demand.

The result was not, however, altogether sterile. The Sudan Government, which through its Governor-General, General Huddleston, had stoutly upheld to the British Foreign Office the Sudan's right to self-determination, decided to take a further step toward the attainment of that objective. It therefore set up an unofficial conference, mainly of experienced Sudanese officials, to discuss the form of a new constitution. This Constitution was put into legal shape and passed unanimously by the Northern Advisory Council, predominantly Umma in composition, in March 1948. The writer attended the debates. Neither the Sudanese nor the senior British officials who led the proceedings were highly experienced in constitution making, but together they hammered out a system on the British parliamentary model in an atmosphere of great good will, the Sudanese requesting and receiving a number of concessions.

In order to keep within the four walls of the 1899 Agreement, the conference retained in the Constitution the large powers of the Governor-General; but these are intended to be kept in reserve. The Constitution departs from the usual British colonial model by setting up a large representative assembly of nearly a hundred members. Ten of these are directly elected in the six major towns, where alone the people were considered ready for the ballot box. Another ten are nominated to represent special interests such as labor, journalism, etc. Fifty-two are elected in rural constituencies in the north by a process of indirect election — a controversial point, since the tribes are still inevitably dominated by their Nazirs and Modas (sub-chiefs), who are still largely dependent upon government support and draw official salaries, and, moreover, the chiefs themselves may stand for the

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elections which, not surprisingly, they win. With great difficulty, the Government decided to include 13 representatives of the Negro south, as these pagan and newly Christianized people are very much more backward than the Moslem northerners who once raided them for slaves. At present, representatives of these primitive tribes are selected at provincial councils, since any form of election would be meaningless to them.

Finally, there are some 20 members of the Executive Council and the Under-Secretaries. Like the British Cabinet ministers they sit in the chamber and, like them, they are chosen by the Governor-General in consultation with the leader of the Assembly who, in the Sudan, is elected by that body. In addition to the leader, at present a retired Sudanese army officer who commands confidence by his fine record and integrity, and who is also the secretary of the Umma Party and Minister for Agriculture, there are three Sudanese Ministers, one for Education, one for Public Health and one without portfolio. These four men sit in the new Executive Council with two of the Sudanese Under-Secretaries, those for Irrigation and for Economics and Trade. The British members of the Council are the three senior officials, the Secretaries (Civil, Financial and Legal), and the military commander, all four sitting ex officio. The British head of the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, nominated on personal grounds, and the Director of Economics and Trade have been appointed Ministers Without Portfolio. There are thus six British and six Sudanese members, a proportion laid down in the Constitution. The Council meets, like the British Cabinet, in private but it is no secret that its proceedings have been wholly constructive and amicable and that there has been no tendency to division on racial lines.

According to the usual practice in the early stages of British transfer of power, this Constitution gives large functions to the new organs in the full expectation that they will be used constructively. But, in countries where political immaturity, disunion or external interference may cause the new institutions to break down, large and indeed overriding executive and legislative powers are kept in reserve for the Governor so that if a crisis arises he may legally take up again the powers that have been delegated and so preserve law and order. In the Sudan this was made necessary by the continued validity of the 1899 Agreement in which, as we have seen, power is concentrated in the Governor-

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General's office. In response, however, to both Sudanese and Egyptian criticisms his position has been made less autocratic than in the first drafts of the Constitution. Sudanese criticism has, however, been directed less against these reserve powers, the need for which seems to be widely accepted, than against the methods of election, which are said to bear unfairly against one of the parties.

IV

This brings us back to the main problem of the country. The Constitution has been rejected by the "Unity" parties who boycotted the elections and demonstrated in the main cities against the opening of the Assembly. In this they had the support of Egypt, whose Government refused all requests to coöperate in the creation or the working of the new Constitution. The "Unity" parties are mainly represented in the towns and, in Middle Eastern fashion, in the schools, but they have few able and experienced leaders. The Umma or Independence group, by contrast, although it is based so largely upon the unsophisticated tribes of the western plains, contains some of the ablest Sudanese, men who have literally grown grey in the public service, and who by long and close association with their British colleagues have come to understand the problems and the methods of modern government. Thus the Minister for Education was Assistant Director in that department and has shown himself a most able parliamentarian; the Minister for Health is a senior doctor who comes of a family famous for its public services; the Sudanese Minister Without Portfolio is also Vice-Principal of Gordon College. One of the Under-Secretaries is the son of the Khalifa Abdullahi upon whom fell the mantle of the Mahdi and who was killed by the British troops. These and others now holding senior appointments are men of great integrity and personal charm, well known to the writer and on terms of close friendship with their British colleagues; their wisdom and conservatism are in striking contrast to the intemperance of their opponents and the excitable youths who at intervals parade the streets.

It is still an open question whether the new Constitution will solve the Sudan's problems and become in time a full expression of majority opinion and a center round which the nascent but still deeply divided nation may form itself. The nation has started as well as it could in the difficult circumstances: its simple but

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dignified buildings, run up in a few months and modelled on the plan of the House of Commons, have been the scene during this spring of debates conducted in English and Arabic in which the Assembly, with its trousered townsmen and its majority of tribal chiefs in the white turbans and flowing white robes, have steadily voted in support of their Ministers and have conscientiously learned, with a Sudanese judge as Speaker, the mysteries of British parliamentary procedure. Most encouraging of all, the black Christian southerners have sent some representatives who have surprised the northern Moslems, not only by their ability but also by their restraint. The writer heard one of them give an excellent speech in English in the course of which he quoted Mr. Churchill in favor of a government which was owned by the people rather than one in which the people were owned by the government. It is believed that the opposing groups are beginning to regret their nonparticipation and that they have been reassured to find that the Assembly, though predominantly Umma, has not fallen under the control of the extreme Mahdists. The Government is anxious to obtain their coöperation, but their demands for more direct elections, for the disqualification of Nazirs for membership and the cancellation of the requirement for two years' residence before election — all obviously demands of an urban group — would not be easy to apply at once in the social and educational stage of the Sudan.

Clearly, much depends upon the attitude of Egypt. There can be no doubt that her distraction and failure in Palestine have allowed the Sudan to take a very important step toward self-realization and independence. Possible forms of Egyptian participation under the new Constitution were being seriously discussed in Khartoum only a year ago; today it is already difficult to imagine how Egyptians could be introduced into the new Assembly or Council. Contacts between Egypt and the Sudan are very slight; few Egyptians visit the country, and since cotton is the major export of both countries, trade between them is small. The Nile waters are, of course, an indissoluble bond which demand complex and continuous coöperation of a kind Britain has scrupulously fostered. Yet with the large new plans of extending Nile control to Ethiopia and Uganda, in the interests of both countries, Egypt can no longer claim that she must rule the lands from which she draws her water.

If, however, ultimate strife between Egypt and the Sudan, and

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between the main parties in the Sudan, is to be avoided, Britain must use all her influence to achieve reconciliation in those two interdependent spheres. The Sudan as it is today has been created in 50 years under British guidance. With dangers within and without, with deep internal divisions, political and physical, with a precarious economy narrowly based on cotton, and now with a venture into parliamentary self-government, there is still much need of protective and educational work by Britain in the Sudan. But if she is to crown the success of her past work she must not only protect the rights of the Sudanese to attain full self-government and make that self-government a constructive and unifying reality, but also endeavor to understand the legitimate interests and natural fears of Egypt. By thus pursuing a policy of harmonization, it may be hoped that Britain can in time transform the now unworkable Condominium into a triple alliance freely accepted by three nations.

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FOUNDATIONS FOR WORLD ORDER. By ERNEST LLEWELLYN WOODWARD AND OTHERS. Denver: University of Denver Press, 1949, 174 p. $3.00.

These essays represent a collective effort by seven distinguished Americans and Europeans to find, each in the area of his special interest, the common bases on which a stable world order may be erected. The participants in this thoughtful symposium include E. L. Woodward, J. Robert Oppenheimer, E. H. Carr, William E. Rappard, Robert M. Hutchins, Francis Bowes Sayre and Edward Mead Earle.

WORLD IN TRANSITION. By G. D. H. COLE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 646 p. $6.00.

This volume presents a comprehensive conspectus of the major institutional problems facing the postwar world and of the special problems in each of its principal regions. Mr. Cole, an exponent of the Labor point of view in his many writings, is now Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford.

WASHINGTON OU MOSCOU. By PIERRE FRÉDÉRIX. Paris: Hachette, 1948, 311 p. Fr. 300.

The author explores the bases of the American and Soviet "imperialisms" which between them dominate the world but which must not, he holds, be allowed to plunge it into another holocaust.

WESTERN UNION. By ANDREW AND FRANCES BOYD. Washington: Public Affairs Press (London: Hutchinson), 1949, 183 p. $3.00.

This useful handbook, prepared for the United Nations Association, contains about 100 pages of optimistic narrative on the past, present and future of European coöperation, and about 75 more giving the texts of significant documents.

LE PLAN MARSHALL. By HENRI CLAUDE. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1948, 229 p. Fr. 240.

The Plan treated in the orthodox Communist manner as a scheme to forward American imperialistic designs on Europe.

WAR AND PEACE AIMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. EDITED BY LOUISE W. HOLBORN. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1948, 1,278 p. $6.00.

The continuation of a useful documentary collection of which the first volume appeared in 1943.

L'O.N.U. ET LA PAIX. By A. SALOMON. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1948, 204 p. Fr. 500.

A technical study of the Security Council's function of peacefully settling disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter.

FROM SMOKE TO SMOTHER (1938–1948). By DOUGLAS REED. London: Cape, 1948, 317 p. 10/6.

A vigorous, if episodic, survey of world affairs in which the author makes known his view that another war is inevitable.

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THE POWER OF FREEDOM. By Max Ascoli. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1949, 173 p. $2.75.

A challenging and sanguine restatement of the principles and prospects of the democratic way of life amid our present uncertainties and fears.

THE POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE WEST. By Frederick Watkins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, 368 p. $5.00.

An historical review of the development of political liberalism, intended for the informed layman.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF BOLSHEVISM. By Hans Kelsen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948, 60 p. $1.00.

A deep-cutting analysis of some of the fundamental contradictions in Communist theory and practice, particularly in regard to democracy and the dictatorial function of the state.

THERE SHALL BE NO VICTORY. By Axel Heyst. London: Gollancz, 1947, 336 p. 16/.

These are excerpts from the diary of a "European," who writes under a pseudonym, for the years 1939–44. They record long-term "meditations" rather than day-to-day events, and evince fear of a victorious Russia.

HOME FROM THE COLD WARS. By Leslie Roberts. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, 224 p. $2.50.

After making a tour around Europe, including the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1948, this Canadian journalist came to conclusions concerning American-Soviet relations at variance with current opinion in this country.

FROM THE HEART OF EUROPE. By F. O. Matthiessen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 194 p. $3.00.

A Harvard professor writes of his experiences at Salzburg and Prague during part of 1947. His Leftist outlook no doubt accounts for some of his odd interpretations of political phenomena.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. Edited by Fritz Morstein Marx. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949, 713 p. $6.35.

A new departure in texts on comparative government in its attention to social and psychological factors. The countries treated in detail by the eight authors include Britain and the Commonwealth, France, Italy, Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, China, Japan, Mexico, Brazil and Russia and her satellites.

THE MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS. By John C. Ranney and Gwendolen M. Carter. New York: Harcourt, 1949, 865 p. $7.50.

A well-organized, up-to-date treatise on the governments of Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union.

RESEARCH IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. Edited by Ernest S. Griffith. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948, 238 p. $3.00.

Reports prepared for the American Political Science Association and including chapters on comparative government, international relations and military government.

THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA. By H. A. Smith. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1948, 193 p. 12/6.

A practical handbook for naval and merchant marine officers.

CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1948. VOLUME I. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. London: Stevens (for the Faculty of Laws, University College, London), 1948, 248 p. 17/6.

Several of the chapters concern international problems.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION,

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1863–1914. By Doris Appel Graber. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, 343 p. $4.00.

A scholarly study of modern practice and the recent literature.

RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Evelyn Speyer Colbert. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1948, 228 p. $3.00.

An historico-juridical monograph.

CONTRACTS AND PEACE TREATIES. By Pieter N. Drost. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1948, 229 p. Guilders 6.90.

A comparison of the general clause on contracts in the 1947 Paris treaties and Treaty of Versailles of 1919, with suggestions for future practice.

TRIAL OF GOZAWA SADAICHI AND NINE OTHERS. Edited By Colin Sleeman. London: Hodge, 1948, 245 p. 18/.

The record of the trial (in 1946 at Singapore) of ten Japanese officers charged with committing atrocities against Indian soldiers.

WAR BETWEEN CONTINENTS. By F. O. Miksche and E. Combaux. London: Faber, 1948, 211 p. 15/.

A Czech and a French officer, after weighing the results of the last war and the relative power of the principal victors, hypothesize on the "planetary strategy" of another world conflict. They are neither pro-Soviet nor pro-west.

FEAR, WAR, AND THE BOMB. By P. M. S. Blackett. New York: Whittlesey House, 1949, 244 p. $3.50.

Dr. Blackett, Nobel Prize Winner in Physics, believes the atom bomb overrated as a weapon, hence that the policies of the west toward Russia rest on false fears and assumptions.

INTELLIGENCE IS FOR COMMANDERS. By Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Glass and Lieutenant Colonel Phillip B. Davidson. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1948, 189 p. $3.85.

A handbook for intelligence officers.

FOR WANT OF A NAIL. By Hawthorne Daniel. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948, 296 p. $3.75.

An historical review of the effect of logistics on modern warfare.

LES LÉVRIERS DE LA MER: TORPILLEURS ET DESTROYERS. By Henri Le Masson. Paris: Horizons de France, 1948, 63 p.

A popular, illustrated treatise on these types of naval vessel.

General: Economic and Social

A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE. By Clair Wilcox. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 333 p. $4.50.

Dr. Wilcox, an economist and public servant of note, was the effective head of the American delegation to the conference that drew up the Havana Charter. He gives, within the bounds imposed by the nature of the subject, a lucid account of the historical background of the I.T.O., the long process of its formulation and the nature of the final agreement. The appendix contains the text of the Havana Charter.

THE ECONOMIC MUNICH. By Philip Cortney. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, 262 p. $3.75.

A businessman states his opposition to inflation, exchange control and the Havana Charter of the I.T.O. on the ground that they impinge on private enterprise.

L'ÉCONOMIE MONDIALE. By Hubert d'Hérouville. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949, 136 p. Fr. 90.

A compact précis of the structure and functioning of world economy.

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BRETTON WOODS E I PIANI MONETARI INTERNAZIONALI. By Ugo Sacchetti. Rome: Edizioni Italiane, 1947, 327 p. L. 400.

The background of Bretton Woods and its immediate results, with documents. This study, and that below of Stammati and others, was prepared for the Società Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale.

INVENTAIRE ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'EUROPE. Paris: Presses Universitaires (for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), 1947, 555 p. Fr. 800.

A mass of statistics with graphs and maps. The material is arranged by subject rather than by country.

PRIVATE TRADE IN FOREIGN AID. By John C. Borton and Others. Charlottesville (Va.): Michie, 1948, 320 p. $7.50.

A practical manual for businessmen on E.C.A. procedures.

THE HISTORY OF BASIC METALS PRICE CONTROL IN WORLD WAR II. By Robert F. Campbell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, 263 p. $3.25.

A careful appraisal of the operation of the O.P.A. in this field.

LE MARCHÉ MONDIAL DU COTON. Paris: Presses Universitaires (for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), 1948, 270 p. Fr. 600.

A statistical review of production and market conditions in the principal cotton-growing and consuming countries. Numerous tables and graphs.

FUTURE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE POLICY. By John Donald Black and Maxine Enlow Kiefer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948, 348 p. $3.50.

Specifications for a program that will take care of the world's nutrition problems during the next decade.

PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS: AGRICULTURE IN THE WORLD WAR AGE. By Arthur P. Chew. New York: Harper, 1948, 227 p. $3.00.

A none too successful attempt to show that wars are caused by the urge to acquire agricultural resources.

THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF A SOCIALIST ECONOMY. By Burnham P. Beckwith. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949, 444 p. $5.00.

A pioneer work on how a Socialist economy, once established, should be operated in order to attain the ends for which it was created.

WEST OF THE DECLINE. By Frederick Jellinek. London: Alliance Press, 1948, 360 p. 12/6.

The author likes to play with words and ideas in this diagnosis of our economic and political ills and prognosis for a cure.

PROBLEMI INTERNAZIONALI DELLA EMIGRAZIONE. By Gaetano Stammati and Others. Rome: Edizioni Italiane, 1947, 398 p. L. 750.

Theoretical, historical (since 1820), administrative and social aspects of emigration.

LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE ET LES DÉPLACEMENTS DE POPULATIONS. By Robert Ginesy. Paris: Pedone, 1948, 184 p. Fr. 400.

A study of the bodies created to protect these migrants.

DICTATORS AND DISCIPLES FROM CAESAR TO STALIN. By Gustav Bychowski. New York: International Universities Press, 1948, 264 p. $4.25.

A psychoanalytical explanation of how five selected dictators — Caesar, Cromwell, Robespierre, Hitler, Stalin — gained and, he believes, lost control of their peoples.

NEW COMPASS OF THE WORLD. Edited by Hans W. Weigert and Others. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 375 p. $5.50.

In this sequel to "Compass of the World" (1944), the editors have collected 23 essays, six previously published elsewhere, on some of the key geographic and strategic problems of our time, primarily in Eurasia.

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ORIENTAMENTI SOCIALI DELLE COSTITUZIONI CONTEMPORANEE. By Ferruccio Pergolesi. Florence: Libreria Fiorentina, 1948, 235 p.

A comparative study of such matters as education, trade unions and the economic activities of the state.

LEARNING AND WORLD PEACE. Edited by Lyman Bryson and Others. New York: Harper, 1948, 694 p. $6.50.

Papers prepared for the Eighth Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life.

MAN AND HIS WORKS. By Melville J. Herskovits. New York: Knopf, 1948, 678 p. $6.75.

A scientific, readable treatise on cultural anthropology, by a leading authority, professor at Northwestern. The many illustrations and excellent bibliography enhance its value for student and layman alike.

MOST OF THE WORLD. Edited by Ralph Linton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, 917 p. $5.50.

Chapters on the peoples and cultures of a variety of areas inhabited by non-Europeans, by 14 contributors.

The Second World War

THEIR FINEST HOUR. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton (in association with the Cooperation Publishing Co.), 1949, 751 p. $6.00.

In this second volume of "The Second World War," Mr. Churchill carries his dramatic narrative from May to December 1940. Most of the story thus revolves around the Fall of France and the Battle of Britain, events which challenge his flair for inspired and graphic prose. As in his first volume, many documents are reproduced which illustrate the remarkable intellectual versatility of the author.

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS RELATING TO THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. New York: International Publishers, 1948, 2 v. $5.25.

This work was published by the Soviet Government in reply to the State Department's publication in 1948 of the collection of German documents entitled "Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941." The first volume contains documents (in English translation) from the German Foreign Office relating chiefly to the Munich affair of 1938, while Volume Two consists of private papers found on the estate of Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador in London during that same period. The object, of course, is to show how the Czechs were sold down the river.

DOCUMENTARY BACKGROUND OF WORLD WAR II: 1931 TO 1941. Compiled and Edited by James W. Gantenbein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, 1,122 p. $10.00.

Some 400 significant addresses and papers, arranged by countries and, under them, by topic, and without editorial matter.

CHRONIQUE DES ÉVÉNEMENTS INTERNATIONAUX. By Marcel Hoden. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1945–48, 5 v. Fr. 1,050.

A running account, topically arranged within a fairly rigid chronological structure, dealing with the period from June 1940 to the end of 1944.

LES QUARANTE JOURS (10 MAI — 19 JUIN 1940). By General de Cugnac. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1948, 80 p. Fr. 90.

A very concise analysis of the strategic ideas of the French and German general staffs, and of the forces at their disposal during the Six Weeks Campaign, with special attention to the decisive operations around Abbeville and Pontarlier.

L'AVIATION D'ASSAUT DANS LA BATAILLE DE 1940. By General Fleury Seive. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1948, 203 p. Fr. 300.

The record of France's attack planes and what it teaches.

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LES COMBATS DE SAUMUR, JUIN 1940. By Élie Chamard. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1948, 224 p. Fr. 260.

A heroic episode from the last stages of the conquest of France.

LE DRAME DE DUNKERQUE (MAI — JUIN 1940). By General J. Armengaud. Paris: Plon, 1948, 377 p. Fr. 480.

The story of Dunkirk told in considerable detail against the background of the Blitzkrieg in the west. Several maps.

LA DÉLÉGATION FRANÇAISE AUPRÈS DE LA COMMISSION ALLEMANDE D'ARMISTICE. VOLUME I, 29 JUIN 1940 — 29 SEPTEMBRE 1940. Paris: Costes, 1947, 496 p. Fr. 500.

The start of an important compilation of documents, published by the French Government, with appendices and an index.

THE DESERT AIR FORCE. By Roderic Owen. London: Hutchinson, 1948, 274 p. 21/.

A restrained history of how the R.A.F. coöperated closely with the Army to win victory in Libya.

POURQUOI L'ARMÉE ROUGE A VAINCU. By General A. Guillaume. Paris: Julliard, 1948, 258 p. Fr. 360.

General Guillaume, one of the chiefs of the postwar French Army, served two years during the war as military attaché in Moscow. In this objective volume he outlines the material and spiritual factors that account for Russia's resistance and final victory.

THE BIG CIRCLE. By Ho-Yungchi. New York: Exposition Press, 1948, 152 p. $3.00.

The story of the part played by Chinese forces in the Burma campaigns, by a brigadier general with the New First Army.

LA GUERRE AÉRONAVALE DU PACIFIQUE (1941–1945). By Rear Admiral R. de Belot. Paris: Payot, 1948, 204 p. Fr. 480.

A synthesis of available American and Japanese information, with sketch maps.

The United States

THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Dexter Perkins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 187 p. $2.00.

A concise, well-informed and balanced little handbook.

THE WORLD'S BEST HOPE. By Francis Biddle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, 175 p. $3.50.

In this "discussion of the rôle of the United States in the modern world" the former Attorney-General makes a number of acute observations on the economic and political trends of our day. He puts his finger squarely on a number of the weak places in the democratic armor, but on the whole is sanguine about the future of freedom.

AS OTHERS SEE US. By André Visson. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 252 p. $3.00.

A review of opinions on America held in certain European circles, and a refutation of some of them, by a European journalist transplanted to the United States.

OUR FARM PROGRAM AND FOREIGN TRADE. By C. Addison Hickman. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1949, 120 p. $2.00.

A study of the conflict between a nationalistic farm program and a commercial policy devoted to the expansion of multilateral trade.

OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. By Charles A. H. Thomson. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1948, 397 p. $4.00.

A thoroughly well-informed and annotated summary of the wartime operations of the

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O.W.I., the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs and other similar agencies, as well as of the State Department since the end of the war.

AMERICA'S PACIFIC DEPENDENCIES. By Rupert Emerson and Others. New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949, 134 p. $1.50.

A coöperative study of our colonial policies as applied in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Samoa and the territories held under U. N. trusteeship. Mimeographed.

THE WHOLE OF THEIR LIVES. By Benjamin Gitlow. New York: Scribner, 1948, 387 p. $3.50.

An exposé of American Communism, particularly during the twenties, by one of the Party's onetime leaders and Vice-Presidential candidate, expelled in 1929. In part this is a rehash of Gitlow's "I Confess," published in 1939.

WASHINGTON WITCH HUNT. By Bert Andrews. New York: Random House, 1948, 218 p. $2.50.

Factual reporting, by the head of the Washington bureau of the *New York Herald Tribune*, on the threat to civil liberties involved in the behavior of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and in the State Department's "firings" for security reasons in 1947. For his articles on the latter Mr. Andrews received a Pulitzer Prize.

THE ROOSEVELT COURT. By C. Herman Pritchett. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 314 p. $5.00.

Mr. Pritchett, after reviewing the record of the seven Roosevelt-appointed Justices, decides that the Supreme Court really does read the election returns.

THE ROOSEVELT MYTH. By John T. Flynn. New York: Devin-Adair, 1948, 438 p. $3.50.

Unadulterated venom from a professional F.D.R.-hater.

THE TRUMAN PROGRAM. Edited By M. B. Schnapper. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949, 261 p. $2.95.

Consists largely of political statements and addresses made by the President in 1948.

JOHN J. PERSHING, GENERAL OF THE ARMIES. By Frederick Palmer. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1948, 380 p. $4.50.

Colonel Palmer first knew Pershing in 1904 and later served on his staff in the AEF during World War I, to which two-thirds of the book is devoted. The author strives for impartiality and his account deals with strategy rather than politics and personalities.

Western Europe

LA FRANCE DEVIENDRA-T-ELLE UNE COLONIE AMÉRICAINE? By Georges Soria. Paris: Éditions du Pavillon, 1948, 214 p. Fr. 220.

This Leftist writer would much prefer an America run by Henry Wallace than by the likes of General Marshall, whose Plan, in his opinion, bids fair to rob impoverished Europe of her freedom. Preface by Frédéric Joliot-Curie.

THE MIRACLE OF FRANCE. By André Maurois. New York: Harper, 1948, 477 p. $5.00.

A readable but conventional interpretation of French history.

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN FRANCE. By John Eldred Howard. London: Cresset, 1948, 172 p. 10/6.

An analysis of the historical and constitutional processes by which the conduct of foreign policy under the Third Republic was made responsive to parliamentary control, especially between 1919 and 1939.

LES FINANCES DE 1939 À 1945. I. LA FRANCE. By Henry Laufenburger. Paris: Médicis, 1948, 185 p. Fr. 180.

A pioneer study, based on such statistics as are available and concluded with a brief exposition of the financial consequences for France of the war.

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UNE RÉVOLUTION DANS LA POLITIQUE COLONIALE DE LA FRANCE. By Bernard Lavergne. Paris: Librairie Mercure, 1948, 223 p. Fr. 330.

In this critique of the new French colonial policy the author explains why he favors the federal principle and opposes "assimilation," especially for the Moslems of North Africa.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ. By Jacques Chastenet. Paris: Julliard, 1948, 313 p. Fr. 330.

A half century of French political life, with Poincaré's career as the unifying factor.

THE PRIVATE DIARIES (MARCH 1940 TO JANUARY 1941) OF PAUL BAUDOUIN. London: Eyre, 1948, 308 p. 16/.

A banker rather than politician, Baudouin was drawn into Reynaud's War Cabinet in April 1940 and served Pétain as Foreign Minister from June 1940 to January 1941, when he left public life because of the growing collaboration of Vichy with Hitler. His day-by-day record is historically important, the more so as Baudouin appears to have been sincere, if timid and politically unsophisticated.

VIVE PÉTAIN VIVE DE GAULLE. By Lucien Galimand. Paris: Éditions de la Couronne, 1948, 260 p. Fr. 300.

A Radical deputy before the war and a Gaullist during it, the author in recounting his adventures in the Resistance and abroad pleads for an end to internal divisions among the French.

POURQUOI JE N'AI PAS DÉFENDU PIERRE LAVAL. By Albert Naud. Paris: Fayard, 1948, 284 p. Fr. 180.

One of Laval's defense attorneys throws doubt on the legality of his trial and death sentence.

WHAT ABOUT SCANDINAVIA? By Carl C. Rasmussen. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1948, 194 p. $2.25.

An American pastor takes a look at religious and social conditions in Norway, Denmark and Sweden.

THE ATLANTIC ISLANDS. By Kenneth Williamson. London: Collins, 1948, 360 p. 16/.

An informative book about the rugged Faeroes and their hardy folk. Illustrations.

THIS IS DENMARK. Edited by Knud Gedde. Copenhagen: Gjellerup, 1948, 272 p. (New York: Scandinavian Book Service, $6.75.)

Broadly descriptive, with a rich variety of illustrations.

A HISTORY OF NORWAY. By Karen Larsen. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the American-Scandinavian Foundation, New York), 1948, 591 p. $6.00.

The last two chapters concern the twentieth century.

SWEDEN: CHAMPION OF PEACE. By David Hinshaw. New York: Putnam, 1949, 309 p. $4.00.

In explaining how and why Sweden has kept out of wars for 135 years the author puts too much weight on the pacific intentions of the Swedes and not enough on factors over which they have little or no control.

INSTEAD OF ARMS. By Folke Bernadotte. New York: Bonnier, 1948, 227 p. $3.00.

These "autobiographical notes," finished shortly before Count Bernadotte's tragic death in Palestine, recount his various missions, political and humanitarian, during the last decade.

LE ORIGINI DEL PATTO D'ACCIAIO. By Mario Toscano. Florence: Sansoni, 1948, 207 p. L. 800.

A documented essay in prewar diplomatic history, based in part on unpublished documents in the Italian archives.

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UM DEN FRIEDEN MIT DEUTSCHLAND. By Wilhelm Cornides and Hermann Volle. Oberursel, Taunus (U.S. Zone): Europa-Archiv, 1948, 122 p.

A report on the London Foreign Ministers' Conference of November-December 1947, with a collection of documents dealing with the German peace problem from 1941–1948.

L'ADMINISTRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'ALLEMAGNE DU 8 MAI 1945 AU 24 AVRIL 1947. By Michel Virally. Paris: Pedone, 1948, 180 p. Fr. 300.

An analysis of the juridical nature of the military government and of the different administrative methods employed by the occupying Powers, by a high official in the French Zone.

VON LUTHER BIS HITLER. EIN WICHTIGER ABRISS DEUTSCHER GESCHICHTE. By Wolfram von Hanstein. Dresden (U.S.S.R. Zone): Voco-Verlag, 1947, 124 p.

A Communist essay rather unskillfully laying the blame on Luther for Germany's attempts to rule the world.

WIR WOLLEN DEUTSCH SEIN. By Bernhard Bach. Stuttgart (U.S. Zone): Rottacker, 1948, 104 p.

In this vest-pocket book the author pleads for a spiritual revival among the Germans as a necessary foundation for the creation of a new Germany.

DAS WEISS-BLAU-BUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN BUNDESVERFASSUNG UND ZU DEN ANGRIFFEN AUF CHRISTENTUM UND STAATLICHKEIT DER LÄNDER. By Friedrich August von der Heydte. Regensburg (U.S. Zone): Habbel, 1948, 139 p.

An intelligent critique of the constitutional project then before the Bonn Assembly.

THE GERMANS ON TRIAL. By Heinz Lunau. New York: Storm Publishers, 1948, 180 p. $2.50.

With much heat the author, an anti-Nazi pacifist, admonishes us not to be too hard in our judgment on Germany because Nazism could happen anywhere.

LES COMPLOTS CONTRE HITLER (1938–1945). By Maxime Mourin. Paris: Payot, 1948, 216 p. Fr. 360.

An account derived primarily from published sources in German and English.

THE SWISS WITHOUT HALOS. By J. Christopher Herold. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, 271 p. $3.75.

An unconventional interpretation of their history and institutions.

AGRARPOLITIK UND AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT. By Hans Bachmann and Wilhelm Gasser. St. Gallen: Fehr, 1948, 152 p. Sw. Fr. 16.

A statistical study of recent Swiss experience.

IL TRAVAGLIO DELLA DEMOCRAZIA ITALIANA, 1943–1947. By Pietro Barbieri. Rome: Leonardo, 1948, 238 p. L. 500.

A collection of political articles by a priest closely identified with anti-Fascist activities after the German occupation of Rome.

DUE ANNI DI VITA POLITICA ITALIANA (1946–47). By Benedetto Croce. Bari: Laterza, 1948, 204 p. L. 600.

The concluding volume of a series in which the philosopher-statesman has recorded his participation in Italy's post-Fascist political life.

IN DIFESA DELLA LIBERTÀ. By Luigi Albertini. Milan: Rizzoli, 1947, 188 p. L. 400.

A collection of the speeches delivered in the Senate by one of Italy's leading liberals between 1921 and 1928 and of articles in the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, of which he was editor until dismissed by the Fascists in 1925. There is a preface by President Luigi Einaudi.

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LA FIN DE LA MONARCHIE ITALIENNE. By Domenico Bartoli. Paris: Éditions "Le Portail," 1948, 409 p. Fr. 480.

The romanticized lives of Victor Emmanuel III and of his daughter-in-law, ex-Queen Marie José. The Italian edition — "Fine della Monarchia" — was published by Mondadori, Milan, in 1948 (400 p. Lire 1,000).

LA QUESTIONE MERIDIONALE. By Corrado Barbagallo. Milan: Garzanti, 1948, 295 p. L. 750.

A review of the age-old problem of southern Italy's economic and social backwardness, by a prominent historian.

HISTORIA DEL ANARQUISMO ESPAÑOL (1836–1948). By Eduardo Comín Colomer. Madrid: Editorial R.A.D.A.R., 1948, 429 p. Ptas. 40.

A circumstantial account of Europe's most vigorous anarchist movement, in which the author tries to show its connection with Free Masonry.

SPANISH SUMMARY. By Francis Noel-Baker. London: Hutchinson, 1948, 96 p. 7/6.

A "summary" of Spanish history, permeated with anti-Franco sentiments.

OCASO Y FIN DE UN REINADO (ALFONSO XIII): LOS REYES EN EL DESTIERRO. By M. de Almagro San Martín. Madrid: Aguado, 1947, 344 p. Ptas. 25.

A rather romanticized narrative of the fall of the monarchy and of the fate of the royal family abroad since then.

A ALIANÇA INGLESA. Compiled and Annotated by José de Almada. Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 1946–47, 2 v. Escudos 200.

Documents selected to show the historical development of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance from the fourteenth to the twentieth centuries.

Eastern Europe

THE SOVIET WAY OF LIFE. By Maurice Lovell. London: Methuen, 1948, 213 p. 4/6.

A not particularly well-informed or critical exposition of Russian institutions.

STALIN AND CO. By Walter Duranty. New York: Sloane, 1949, 261 p. $3.00.

Thumbnail sketches of the 13 men in the Politburo and an account of how that body collectively sets policy for the Soviet Union.

PEOPLE COME FIRST. By Jessica Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1948, 254 p. $2.75.

A thoroughly laudatory report on a trip through Russia right after the war by the editor of *Soviet Russia Today*, who professed to find the Government primarily concerned with the everyday needs of the average citizens.

LET'S DO BUSINESS WITH RUSSIA. By Stella K. Margold. New York: Harper, 1948, 244 p. $3.50.

Mrs. Margold holds that, with the help of such things as American loans, our trade with Russia could be greatly expanded. She is on solider ground in her practical information concerning the conduct of present American-Soviet trade.

SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1917. By Maurice Dobb. New York: International Publishers, 1949, 475 p. $4.00.

A useful but hardly an objective description and appraisal, by a lecturer in economics at Cambridge University well-disposed toward the Soviet point of view.

RUSSIA GOES TO SCHOOL. By Beatrice King. London: Heinemann (for the New Education Book Club), 1948, 185 p. 10/6.

A sympathetic survey of the Soviet educational system at all levels, and of its metamorphosis during three decades.

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SANAN SÄILÄ TAISTELUN TIELLÄ. By Atte Pohjanmaa. Helsinki: Kansanvalta, 1948, 220 p. M. 400.

In these reminiscences, the editor of Finland's leading Social Democratic newspaper, the *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, stresses political developments, with special attention to the rebirth of the Social Democratic Party after the debacle of 1918.

TYÖVÄENKYSYMYS JA TYÖVÄENLIIKE SUOMESSA. By R. H. Oittinen. Helsinki: Tammi, 1948, 227 p. M. 410.

An historical sketch of the Finnish labor movement.

SUOMEN LAPPALAISET I–II. By T. I. Itkonen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1948, 1,122 p. M. 1,950.

This monumental work, a study of the Finland Lapps, is a notable achievement in Finnish scholarship.

SIX CENTURIES OF RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS. By W. P. and Zelda K. Coates. London: Lawrence, 1948, 235 p. 21/.

Over half of this review of an age-old antagonism deals with the era since 1914. Maps and appendices.

POLAND STRUGGLES FORWARD. By William Cary. New York: Greenberg, 1949, 192 p. $3.00.

Favorable impressions of postwar conditions in Poland, gained by an American observer in 1947. Illustrations.

IN SEARCH OF A LOST PEOPLE: THE OLD AND THE NEW POLAND. By Joseph Tenenbaum. New York: Beechhurst Press, 1948, 312 p. $4.50.

Despite the near extermination of the Jews in Poland by the Nazis, the author, president of the World Federation of Polish Jews, after a visit to that country in 1946 discerns a better future for his people.

THE PROBLEM OF EASTERN GALICIA. By Stanislaw Skrzypek. London: Polish Association for the South-Eastern Provinces, 1948, 94 p. 6/.

A Polish irredentist tract replete with statistical tables, graphs, maps and documentary appendices.

THE FEAST OF THE LOCUSTS. By Christopher Sidgwick. London: Hutchinson, 1948, 224 p. 21/.

Random recollections of travels in prewar Central Europe.

LEBENSEINHEIT–DONAURAUM. By Richard Kutschera. Linz: Dichtl, 1948, 260 p.

The author pleads for a Danubian Union centering in Vienna but pays little attention to the realities of current political alignments.

DOLLFUSS: 1892–1934. By Louis Rambaud. Lyon: Vitte, 1948, 258 p. Fr. 360.

Though this purports to be an objective study of the Austrian Chancellor, assassinated by the Nazis in 1934, its general tone is distinctly laudatory of the man, his religious fervor and his policies.

PERSONALITY AND CULTURE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS. By Dinko Tomasic. New York: Stewart, 1948, 249 p. $3.75.

An interesting study of the interplay of social organization and culture with politics in the Balkans and lower Danubian basin.

LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE DEVANT NOTRE CONSCIENCE ET DEVANT L'HISTOIRE. By Francisque Gay and Others. Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 1948, 95 p. Fr. 40.

Essays by nine Frenchmen, including Georges Bidault.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: PAST AND PRESENT. By Gerald Druce. Prague: Orbis, 1948, 178 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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A survey of various geographic and economic aspects of the country, not always consistent, or critical of its sources of information.

LA PLANIFICATION EN TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE (LE PLAN BIENNAL). By Guy Braibant. Paris: Colin, 1948, 160 p.

An on-the-spot analysis of Czech planning between the Nazi occupation and the Communist *coup d'état*.

ZSIDÓ SORS MAGYARORSZÁGON. By Jenö Lévai. Budapest: Magyar Téka, 1948, 486 p.

A documented history of anti-Semitism in Hungary between the two World Wars, with special attention to the reign of terror during the German occupation, 1944–45.

MAGYAR-ROMÁN KÖZÖS MULT. By László Makkai. Budapest: Teleki Pál Tudományos Intézet, 1948, 278 p.

An effort to demonstrate that the Magyars and Rumanians share a common past, and can thus live together in harmony now.

ROMANIAN OASIS. By Henry Baerlein. London: Muller, 1948, 222 p. 15/.

An anthology of varied material on Rumania and her people.

YUGOSLAVIA. Edited by Robert J. Kerner. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949, 558 p. $6.50.

This is the ninth volume to appear in Kerner's "United Nations Series" and like the others is the work of a panel of writers and treats a wide spectrum of subject matter, on the whole with authority and objectivity. It is, of course, too much to hope that the interpretation of recent political events will please all parties, in particular the Serbian nationalists.

TITO'S REPUBLIC. By Monty Radulovic. London: Coldharbour Press, 1948, 241 p. 12/6.

A Reuters correspondent returned to the land of his birth in 1945, but after a year left disillusioned in the Tito régime, then still behind the Iron Curtain. This is the personal account of what he saw, heard and felt.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

MAXIMS AND REFLECTIONS. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1949, 176 p. $2.75.

Apposite remarks arranged under general subject headings.

RÉGIME ÉLECTORAL ET RÉGIME PARLEMENTAIRE EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE. By Jacques Cadart. Paris: Colin, 1948, 224 p.

A statistical analysis of how the electoral machinery and the political parties operate.

OUR PARLIAMENT. By Strathearn Gordon. London: Hansard Society, 1948, 181 p. 8/6.

An up-to-date edition of a standard handbook on the organization and operation of Britain's two legislative houses.

MR. ATTLEE: AN INTERIM BIOGRAPHY. By Roy Jenkins. London: Heinemann, 1948, 266 p. 12/6.

Though only time can give true perspective to Attlee's career, the present work is informative and balanced, and is in part based on the Prime Minister's diary.

LIFE OF LORD LLOYD. By Colin Forbes Adam. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 317 p. $6.00.

The authorized biography of a secondary figure in British politics — Tory M.P., soldier, Middle East expert, Governor of Bombay, High Commissioner in Egypt, and Colonial Secretary at his death in 1941.

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THE PROBLEM OF BRITAIN'S OVERSEAS TRADE. By H. S. Booker. New York: Staples, 1948, 172 p. $2.50.

A not too technical exposition of its historical evolution during the last century and of the great changes wrought by the recent war and the loss of most of Britain's overseas investments.

THE INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF GREAT BRITAIN. London: Europa Publications, 1948, 208 p. 15/.

A series of lectures delivered in the winter of 1947–48 by a number of economists and businessmen.

LES ADMINISTRATIONS CHARGÉES DE L'ÉCONOMIE DIRIGÉE EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET LEUR ÉVOLUTION DEPUIS LA GUERRE. Paris: Presses Universitaires (for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), 1948, 283 p. Fr. 500.

An analysis of the administrative structure of governmental agencies concerned with economic planning, illustrated with a number of charts.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE NATIONS. By Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948, 228 p. $2.50.

Eight essays on various problems involved in the changing relationships within the Commonwealth, in particular those stimulated by rising nationalisms.

LE COMMONWEALTH BRITANNIQUE ET LE MONDE ANGLO-SAXON. By Raymond Ronze. Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 1947, 309 p. Fr. 150.

A review of the historical development and contemporary state of the Dominions (as of 1946), and of their relations with the United States.

BRITISH PREFERENCE IN CANADIAN COMMERCIAL POLICY. By Douglas Rudyard Annett. Toronto: Ryerson (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1948, 188 p. $3.50.

An historical and analytical treatment.

CANADA'S ECONOMY IN A CHANGING WORLD. Edited by J. Douglas Gibson. Toronto: Macmillan (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1948, 380 p. $4.50.

Ten chapters by as many authors. Statistical appendix and bibliography.

MÉMENTO ÉCONOMIQUE: LE CANADA. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1948, 171 p. Fr. 420.

A comprehensive, practical survey of the Dominion's economic resources and organization, published for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques.

BRITAIN AND THE ARAB STATES: A SURVEY OF ANGLO-ARAB RELATIONS, 1920–1948. By M. V. Seton-Williams. London: Luzac, 1948, 330 p. 21/.

A strictly factual summary of events in each of the countries, including the Persian Gulf states, with chapters on Arab nationalism and the Arab League, documentary appendices and a select bibliography.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN OPPOSITION, 1939–1945. By Michael Roberts and A. E. G. Trollip. London: Longmans, 1948, 240 p. 15/.

A documented account of party politics in the Union during the war, of particular interest because the then Opposition has become the Government.

OPPORTUNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Conrad Norton. London: Rockliff, 1948, 172 p. 15/.

A rather rosy picture of social and economic conditions, intended to attract the immigrant.

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AUSTRALIA'S COLOURED MINORITY. By A. O. Neville. Sydney: Currawong, 1948, 263 p. 12/6.

A sociological study of the anomalous status of the Commonwealth's "half-castes."

INDIA AS A WORLD POWER. By Madan Gopal. Delhi: Rajkamal, 1948, 160 p. Rs. 2/12.

Essays on her relations with the Great Powers and her neighbors, with a look into the future.

THE NEW INDIA. By Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee. London: Allen and Unwin, 1948, 201 p. 8/6.

Brief survey of the structure and problems of the new Dominion by a former member of the Indian Civil Service and Trade Commissioner in London.

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN TRADE. Edited by A. N. Agarwala. London: Probsthain, 1947, 319 p. 24/.

Reports by a dozen Indian Trade Commissioners throughout the world.

MAHATMA GANDHI. By E. Stanley Jones. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1948, 160 p. $2.00.

A friendly interpretation of the Mahatma's teachings and ideas.

The Middle East

IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE. By Maurice Hindus. Garden City: Doubleday, 1949, 270 p. $3.00.

A voyage through Persia, Iraq, Palestine and Egypt that convinced the author, long a student of economic and political conditions in Eastern Europe, of the need for an agricultural revolution in the Middle East, of which the beginnings were already evident in Israel.

STATE AND ECONOMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Alfred Bonné. London: Routledge, 1948, 427 p. 30/.

This study of "a society in transition" is a valuable addition to the growing literature on the contemporary Middle East. In it Dr. Bonné, Director of the Economic Research Institute for the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, traces the recent development of economic, social and political forms in the Arab countries and Turkey.

TÜRK BOGAZLARI. By Cemil Bilsel. Istanbul: Matbaasi, 1948, 133 p. Ltq. 1.

This volume contains a review of the Straits problem, the texts of the Montreux Treaty (1936), and the notes concerning it exchanged by Russia and Turkey in 1946.

THIRTY YEARS OF LEBANON AND SYRIA (1917–1947). By Eugenie Elie Abouchdid. Beirut: Arab Publishing Co., 1948, 614 p. £ Leb. 10.

A scissors-and-paste review of the rise of the Levant States from mandate to national independence.

LA QUESTION ARABE. By General Pierre Keller. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1948, 127 p. Fr. 75.

A popular précis.

ARABIAN OIL. By Raymond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949, 201 p. $3.50.

The authors skillfully untangle the story of American oil interests in the Arab countries.

TRIAL AND ERROR. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHAIM WEIZMANN. New York: Harper, 1949, 498 p. $5.00.

To Dr. Weizmann, President of Israel, more than to any other man goes the credit for the realization of the Zionist ideal. Notable in this intellectually candid record is the fact that he embraced and propagated Jewish nationalism because he regarded it as a

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positive good, not merely a negative escape from gentile persecution. This intensely human book, which in a sense is the story of modern Zionism, constitutes one of the indispensable sources for the history of our times.

FIFTY YEARS IN PALESTINE. By Frances E. Newton. London: Coldharbour Press, 1948, 328 p. 8/6.

The autobiography of a passionate friend of the Arabs, and a statement by her of the Arab case in Palestine.

THIS IS ISRAEL. By I. F. Stone. New York: Boni and Gaer, 1948, 128 p. $2.75.

A journalist in Palestine during the "time of troubles" reports on the birth of Israel. Profusely illustrated by Robert Capa and others.

SHALOM MEANS PEACE. By Robert St. John. Garden City: Doubleday, 1949, 335 p. $2.95.

A most readable and sympathetic report on the human side of the Jews' struggle last year to win a war and create a state in Palestine.

MÉMENTO ÉCONOMIQUE: LA PALESTINE. Paris: Presses Universitaires (for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), 1948, 192 p. Fr. 460.

A factual review of the economic development of Palestine under the mandate, supported by an impressive array of statistics and several maps.

HISTOIRE DE L'ÉGYPTE. By Charles-H. Pouthas and Others. Paris: Hachette, 1948, 177 p. Fr. 175.

A short manual covering the period from 1517 to 1937 and prepared under the direction of Professor Pouthas of the Sorbonne.

IRAN: PAST AND PRESENT. By Donald N. Wilber. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, 234 p. $3.00.

A reliable, up-to-date handbook on the country, its people and their institutions.

The Far East

WAY OF A FIGHTER. By Major General Claire Lee Chennault. New York: Putnam, 1949, 375 p. $4.50.

In the tradition of his onetime and despised superior, General Stilwell, the author condemns without stint (and sometimes without reason) most of his colleagues and superiors in China, where he began leading Chiang's air force against the Japs in the late thirties, and later organized the "Flying Tigers." Among the few upon whom he bestows his approval are the Generalissimo, Madame Chiang and, above all, himself in whom he has unlimited confidence.

CHINA CHANGED MY MIND. By David Morris. London: Cassell, 1948, 202 p. 8/6.

As a member of an ambulance unit the author saw China at war and in the end forsook his pacifism.

CHINA: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE. By Gerald F. Winfield. New York: Sloane (in coöperation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1948, 437 p. $5.00.

A research biologist with long experience among Chinese farmers portrays their primitive way of life and its implications for the future of China and the world. Overpopulation, not feudal land tenure, is the great problem, he holds, and unless met squarely by birth control, land reforms will only intensify China's agony.

CHINA, THE FAR EAST AND THE FUTURE. By George W. Keeton. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1949, 511 p. 21/.

This revised and expanded version of a work first published in 1943 contains a number of new chapters in which Dr. Keeton discusses postwar developments, notably the

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rise of aggressive nationalist movements and the new relationships of the Great Powers in the Orient.

FRONTIER LAND SYSTEMS IN SOUTHERNMOST CHINA. By Chen Han-Seng. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, 1949, 156 p. $2.00.

"A comparative study of agrarian problems and social organization among the Pai Yi people of Yunnan and the Kamba people of Sikang." Mimeographed.

JAPAN DIARY. By Mark Gayn. New York: Sloane, 1948, 517 p. $4.00.

The dark side of American occupation practices in Japan and Korea, related in detail by the Tokyo correspondent of the *Chicago Sun* during the first postwar year.

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN. By T. A. Bisson. New York: Macmillan (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1949, 143 p. $2.75.

Mr. Bisson, a recognized expert on the Orient who served in the government section of SCAP, reports none too optimistically on the success of our professed program to reform the political mores of the Japanese.

THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN. By Edwin M. Martin. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1948, 155 p. $3.00.

A compendium of agreements, declarations, directives and official statements of policy, by a onetime Chief of Occupied Area Economic Affairs in the State Department.

ANATOMY OF PARADISE. By J. C. Furnas. New York: Sloane (in coöperation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1948, 542 p. $5.00.

A discussion of the economic, social and cultural problems of the peoples who dwell on the islands of the Pacific, for whom the author believes the United States has now acquired political responsibility whether or not they are under our direct jurisdiction.

THE FORTUNATE ISLANDS. By Walter Karig. New York: Rinehart, 1948, 226 p. $3.75.

A novelist and naval historian paints an idyllic picture of life in American-controlled Micronesia and pleads for us not to spoil the charming civilization of these islands. Profusely illustrated.

FIJIAN VILLAGE. By Buell Quain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 459 p. $5.00.

An anthropologist's case study.

AGRARIAN UNREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Erich H. Jacoby. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, 287 p. $4.00.

An objective survey of causes and manifestations in Java, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Philippines and Siam, with a final chapter on "national movements."

MALAYA AND ITS HISTORY. By Sir Richard Winstedt. London: Hutchinson, 1948, 158 p. 7/6.

This authoritative account, useful for understanding the historical background of the current troubles in Malaya, is part of the "University Library."

OUT OF EXILE. By Soetan Sjahrir. New York: Day, 1949, 265 p. $3.00.

This volume by the Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic consists of (1) letters he wrote his wife during his imprisonment for nationalist agitation between 1934 and 1938; (2) an abridged version of "Our Struggle," which takes the narrative up through the war and into the early stage of the Republic. It reveals an enlightened and humane man, remarkably free from petty bitterness.

THE PACIFIC ERA. Edited by William Wyatt Davenport. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1948, 274 p. $3.75.

Papers occasioned by the fortieth anniversary of the University of Hawaii.

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Africa

THE AFRICAN MANDATES IN WORLD POLITICS. By Rayford W. Logan. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, 220 p. $4.00.

The history of Germany's efforts to regain control of her former colonies in Africa between the two world wars, based in considerable part on the minutes of the British Parliament, the French Chamber of Deputies and the Reichstag. Mimeographed.

AFRICANS IN KHAKI. By D. H. Barber. London: Edinburgh House, 1948, 120 p. 3/6.

How Britain's African soldiers reacted to army life.

L'AFRIQUE DU NORD. By Jean Despois. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949, 624 p. Fr. 900.

A solid treatise on the physical and human geography of French North Africa and on the results of European colonization there. In the first four parts the area is dealt with as a whole; in Part V each of the three countries is treated separately. Extensive bibliography.

TUNISIE. By Pierre Hubac. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1948, 159 p. Fr. 165.

An illustrated, popular bird's-eye view of the Regency.

LA MODERNISATION RURALE AU MAROC. By Yves Barennes. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1948, 152 p. Fr. 300.

How it is being done and what are its social and political results.

TREKKING AMONG MOROCCAN TRIBES. By James Haldane. London: Pickering, 1948, 192 p. (New York: Revell, $6.00.)

The author had excellent opportunities for observing life in many parts of Morocco, French and Spanish, during his many years of missionary work there.

EN ALGÉRIE. By Lucie Paul Margueritte. Paris: The Author, 1948, 243 p. Fr. 360.

A travelogue recapturing some of the atmosphere of prewar Algeria.

HISTOIRE DE LA RÉGENCE DE TUNIS. By Henri Cambon. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1948, 319 p. Fr. 600.

A solid synthesis, of which half is devoted to the French Protectorate since 1881.

BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN AFRICA DURING THE YEARS 1941–1947. By Lord Rennell of Rodd. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1948, 637 p. (New York: British Information Services, $4.65).

An official report covering not only the ex-Italian possessions (including the Dodecanese) but Madagascar and the "reserved areas" in Ethiopia. Documentary appendices and chronology.

QUALE SARÀ IL DESTINO DEGLI ITALIANI IN AFRICA? By Mario Vannuccini. Rome: Faro, 1945, 215 p. L. 280.

A somewhat amateurish review of Italy's contribution to the development and settlement of her erstwhile colonies.

AFRICA EN LA ACCIÓN ESPAÑOLA. By Tomás García Figueras. Madrid: Dirección General de Marruecos y Colonias and Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1947, 229 p. Ptas. 30.

Twoscore vignettes on Spain's part in Africa's history.

PERSPECTIVAS ECONÓMICAS DEL AFRICA ECUATORIAL ESPAÑOLA. By José Luis Barceló. Madrid: Ministerio de Industria y Comercio, 1947, 117 p. Ptas. 10.

Brief essays by the editor of *El Mundo Financiero*.

ESPAÑA EN MARRUECOS (LA OBRA SOCIAL). By Vial de Morla. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1947, 173 p. Ptas. 30.

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Facts, figures and photographs illustrating the economic and social benefits conferred by Spain on her Moroccan subjects.

SETTLERS OF KENYA. By Elspeth Huxley. New York: Longmans, 1948, 126 p. 90 cents.

A popular introduction to their economic and political problems, by one who has long lived among them.

L'AFRIQUE DU SUD, CETTE INCONNUE. By Andrée Viollis. Paris: Hachette, 1948, 254 p. Fr. 250.

Impressions of the country and the people, popularly presented.

Latin America

WE OF THE AMERICAS. By Carlos Davila. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1949, 264 p. $3.50.

A Chilean journalist and political figure deplores our failure to make Pan Americanism more than a subject for toasts at diplomatic banquets.

L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE. By Georges Rouma. Brussels: Renaissance du Livre, 1948, 739 p.

This first of two volumes provides compendious data of all sorts concerning all but the Caribbean republics of South America.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1945. NO. 11. Edited by Miron Burgin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, 404 p. $7.00.

Continuing an invaluable bibliographical series.

POR LA RUTA DE LA CONFEDERACIÓN AMERICANA. By Rafael Larco Herrera. Lima: Editora Médica Peruana, 1948, 315 p.

A miscellany of essays by an enthusiastic Peruvian protagonist of closer hemisphere solidarity and mutual defense.

WHO'S WHO IN LATIN AMERICA: PART VI: BRAZIL. Edited by Ronald Hilton. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948, 269 p. $3.50.

A revised and expanded edition of the standard source.

THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY. By Henry William Spiegel. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1949, 246 p. $4.50.

An objective analysis of its strengths and weaknesses.

SOUTHERN EMPIRE: BRAZIL. By Bertita Harding. New York: Coward-McCann, 1948, 215 p. $3.50.

A pleasant excursion through the country and among its people, aimed largely at the tourist trade.

ARGENTINE. By Georges Lafond. Paris: Éditions Latino-Américaines, 1948, 288 p. Fr. 300.

Compact data on the history, geography, economy and government of the country. Another volume in the same series is "Vénézuela" (same author, publisher, 1948, 189 p. Fr. 240).

THE LONG LAND: CHILE. By Carleton Beals. New York: Coward-McCann, 1949, 244 p. $4.00.

Practical information for the traveller.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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World Food situation, 1949. Washington, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, 1949. 60 p.

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——. Report from the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to H. R. 1211, Feb. 4, 1949. Washington, 1949. 2 pts. (H. Rept. 19.)

——. Report from the Committee on Finance, Senate, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 1211. March 11, 1949. Washington, 1949. 2 p. (S. Rept. 107.)

Export control act of 1948. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1661. Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 1949. Washington, 1949. 181 p.

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SYSTEMATIC survey of treaties for the pacific settlement of international disputes, 1928–1948. Lake Success, United Nations, 1948. 1201 p. (1949. V. 3.) $10.00.

THE CHARTER and judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal; history and analysis. Lake Success, United Nations, 1949. 99 p. (1949. V. 7.) 75¢.

PREPARATORY study concerning a draft declaration on the rights and duties of states. Lake Success, United Nations, 1948. 228 p. (1949. V. 4.) $1.50.

ISRAEL

PROGRESS report of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine. Assistance to refugees. Lake Success, United Nations, 1949. 11 p. (Official Records, General Assembly, Third Session. Supp. No. 11a.) 15¢.

THE PALESTINE situation. Adverse report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. Res. 50. Jan. 31, 1949. Washington, 1949. 5 p. (H. Rept. 10.)

ARAB and Jewish refugees of Palestine. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany S. J. Res. 36. March 1, 1949. Washington, 1949. 4 p. (H. Rept. 174.)

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IL PROBLEMA industriale del mezzogiorno, by Giuseppe Cenzato and Salvatore Guidotti. Milan, Ministero dell'Industria e Commercio, 1946. 153 p. L. 500.

JUGOSLAVIA

COMMUNIST Party of Yugoslavia. Fifth Congress. [Reports] Belgrade, Office of Information o FPRY, 1948.

1. On the construction of Socialist economy in the FPRY, by Boris Kidric. 93 p. *2.* Report of the Central Committee . . . on the organizational work of the CPY, by Aleksander Rankovic. 90 p. *3.* Report on agitation-propaganda work of the Central Committee, by Milovan Djilas. 62 p. *4.* The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the struggle for new Yugoslavia, for people's authority and for socialism, by Edward Kardelj. 96 p.

ARCHBISHOP Stepinatz of Yugoslavia and Cardinal Mindszenty of Hungary. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. Con. Res. 1. Feb. 9, 1949. Washington, 1949. 2 p. (H. Rept. 61.)

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VI. (2). Labour clauses in public contracts. 35 p.

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